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PREFACE 
The purpose of this paper is primarily expository. It was 
made possible by the availability of sources of material not previously 
available to researchers, primarily in the files of the Provincial 
Archives of Newfoundland and those of Government House in St. John's. 
Documentation a\railable in the National Archives in vlashington on this 
subject has, as far as is knovm, not previously been exploited for 
research as was done in Parts II and III of this paper. The historical 
monograph before the reader is therefore not designed to establish or 
argue a new theory of hi story or to reinforce the works of others but 
to place on record the series of events leading to the Agreement of 
March 27, 1941. If the views of other authors are incidentally 
challenged by the record itsel~ a usefUl additional point may have 
been made but this is by no means the prime intent. One such author 
is S.J.R. Noel who in Politics in Newfoundlandl states that the United 
States negotiated an agreement 'vith Britain in September 1940 "ignori ng 
the apprehension of the Newfoundland Commissioners " of the Commission of 
Government. It will be seen that the Newfoundland Commissi oners, together 
-vrith those who had been sent from Britain, had no real apprehensions 
about the September 1940 accord; the concerns that developed came much 
l ater when the detai led agreement was being negotiat ed. The Noel 
sentence gi ves credence to an additi onal myth popular in Ne,·rfoundland, 
namely, that there was a vast di fference of approach on this issue 
b et ween those Commissioners who were native Newfoundlanders and those 
1s. J. R. Noe 1, Politi cs i n Nevrfoundland (Toronto : Universi ty of 
Toronto Press, 1971), p . 243. 
i 
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who 1vere sent from Great Britain. This is a pop•1lar misconception; the 
author heard it from a number of individuals orally during his research. 
Yet there is nothing in the record to reflect this point of view; on 
the contrary, all of the views, objections and misgivings that were 
expressed by the Commissioner for Justice and Defense, a native New-
foundlander, were forwarded over the name of the Governor with no 
substantial change. 
The period from June to September 1940, during which agreement 
in principle was reached on the so-called "destroyer-for-bases" deal 
between the United States and Great Britain has been discussed by a 
number of r~storians and in this portion of the paper a large number of 
secondary sources have therefore been used. ·· Little new light could be 
introduced except for the reception of the proposal in St. John's for 
which ne>·r primary sources became available. This section uf the paper 
(Part I) is, therefore, primarily intended to furnish a setting for the 
period vrhich followed. Part II describes the developing of positions in 
St. John's, ~rashington and London, and to some extent in Ottawa, as it 
became clear that the granting of base rights required very detailed 
arrangements in many fields. Part III describes the London negotiations 
themselves from their beginning to their ~uccessful conclusion. The 
documentary references in this last part will be found to be largely 
American in origin and a word of explanation may be needed. The American 
delegation in London worked ivith very short rein$, all their decisions 
were ad referendum Washington. There is, therefore , a full record. The 
NevTfoundland delegation, on the other hand, had the full powers vThich 
t-v10 of the six members of the Commission of Government vTere bound to 
iii 
have. Their reports to St. John's, as a result, were very fevl, many of 
them of such a technical nature that they were found to be extraneous 
to the purpose of this paper. 
The author is indebted to His Honor, E. John A. Harnum, 
Lieutenant Governor of Newfoundland, for access to Government House 
files, to Mr. B. Gill for the opportunity to use the Provincial Archives 
during strange and unusual hours, to the librarians of the various 
libraries in St. John's for their assistance throughout the period of 
research, and to Miss Catherine Murphy for endless patience in the 
preparation of the manuscripts. Financial assistance was made available 
by the Foreign Service Institute, Depertment of State, Washington, D.C. 
The valuable guidance received from Professor J. Tague at Memorial 
University deserves special mention; he was particularly patient and 
willing to discuss ideas 'ili th me at odd hours of day and night when my 
schedule permitted it. 
PART I AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE 
The diplomatic negotiations which led to the establishment of 
American bases in Newfoundland culminated in two agreements: an 
agreement in principle which 'tvas set forth in an exchange of notes on 
September 2, 1940, and a detailed agreement relating to the bases 
signed in London on March 27, 1941. 
To understand the negotiations which led to the first of these, 
the Agreement of September 2, 1940, it is necessary to understand the 
political setting in which this agreement was negotiated, the political 
attitudes which surrounded it, and the statesmanship which was brought 
to bear to make the agreement possible. The agreement was, it mus~ be 
noted, one negotiated bet1veen a belligerent in a 'tvar --Great Britain --
and a non-belligerent or ostensibly neutral country-- the United 
States. The action of the United States could hardly be considered 
anything like the traditional action of a neutral but rather developed, 
as shall be shown, into the activities of a state committed to one side 
of a conflict in every way short of the actual participation in "tolar. 
It was a far-reaching action. President Roosevelt compared his action 
vrith that of the purchase of Louisiana and while this may have been a 
somevlhat exaggerated view of the import of his action, the statesmanship 
required had a great deal of similarity.1 
It is, therefore, important that the setting in which this 
action could take place be fully in mind: the status of the war at the 
1
"Message of President Roosevelt to the Congress, September 3, 
1940" i n: Department of State, Peace and 'Ylar: United States Forei n Polic~, 
1931-1941 (~-lashington: United States Government Printing Office, 19 3 , 
p . 565. 
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time, the political situation particularly in the United States and, 
of course, in Newfoundland. All these had a bearing on the nature of 
the agreement and must therefore be examined before the agreement 
itself can be analysed. 
The significant negotiations leading to the so-called "destroyer-
bases'' deal took place during three months of mid-1940: June, July and 
August. This was a momentous period in the life of Europe. On May 10, 
Nazi Germany, without warning, had invaded the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxemburg. That same day Hinston S. Churchill replaced Neville 
Chamberlain as British Prime Mintster.2 By May 17, the German armies 
had driven deeply into France. On June 10, Italy entered the war and 
by June 13 Paris had fallen. The armistice surrendering France to the 
German onslaught vias signed on June 22 and the fall of France was 
completed.3 During July, the Germans intensified their air attacks on 
British cities, communications and shipping, and in early August opened 
their air offensive in earnest. This was the period of Britain's heroic 
resistance and it was in this atmosphere, this most serious period of 
the assault on Britain, that the negotiations about to be examined 
took place. 
Vlith the outbreak of i'lorld Har II, the dangers of the spread of 
the 1•7ar had been recognized in the United States. It ,.,as with this 
danger in mind that the United States attended the Conference of Foreign 
2vlilliam L. Langer ( ed.), An Encyclopedia of vJorld History (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), ~ · 1146. 
") 
..)Ibid., p. 1148. 
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Ministers o~ the American Republics in Panama in the ~all o~ 1939 and 
proposed the declaration o~ Panama which delineated a Western Hemisphere 
security concept.4 · Because the United States and the other American 
Republics were acute~ conscious o~ the absence o~ Canada and Newfound-
land ~rom the con~erence and '-1ere aware o~ the special relationship of 
these countries to the United Kingdom, the security area which was 
established speci~ical~ excluded Canada and New~oundland. In the 
0 
Atlantic, the northern boundary was set at 44 46' 36" N "except the 
territorial waters o~ any part o~ Canada"5 and, in a map drawn by the 
Department o~ State geographer and annotated by the President, New~oundland 
was speci~ically excluded.6 It must there~ore be concluded that the 
United States Government did not seek to incorporate New~oundland into 
the general Western Hemisphere security belt, particularly since the 
Act of Habana, again warning against European encroachment on the 
Western Hemisphere (and concluded during, and published a~er, the 
destroyer-bases deal) also ~ailed to include Canada and New~ound1and 
in the security area.7 
The United States had not yet emerged ~rom its period of 
isolation, neutrality laws \·Jere still on the books and sentiments ~or 
a neutral America still pervaded the country. Although the President 
himself may have been one o~ the more realistic leaders , knowing the 
United States would not be able to keep out of the war ~or any lengthy 
4Department o~ State, Forei n Relations o~ the United States 
(Diplomatic Papers) Vol. V (1939 : The American Republics Washington: 
United States Government Printing O~fice, 1957), p. 36. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid., p.35 • 
7nepartment of State, Foreign Relations of the Unittd States 
(Diplomatic Papers) Vol. v ( 1940) : The American He'Plibl~csVJash1ngton: 
United States Government Printing Office 3 1961), p. 252. 
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period o~ time, he instructed James Farley as late as July 9, 1940, 
in the draf'ting of the Democratic party platform to state: "He do not 
want to become involved in any foreign war. We are opposed to this 
country's participation in any wars, unless for protection of the 
Western Hemisphere. We are in favor of extending aid to democracies 
in their struggle against totalitarian powers, within the law. "8 The 
forces of isolation were strongly represented in the Senate particularly 
by men such as Senator Burton K. Wheeler9 and in the country at large 
by influential publicists such as Colonel Robert R. McCormick and the 
Chicago Tribune. "America First" movements under the leadership of 
such men as Gerald L.K. Smith were able to enlist the support of 
national heroes such as Charles K. Lindberg. The country was only just 
beginning to recover from the depression and its general sentiment was 
the desire to keep out of the war. In an election year (1940), this 
type of political attitude at the grassroots was not to be lightly 
disregarded. 
But other forces were also at work. On May 17, a bi-partisan 
Committee to Defend America by Aidi ng the Allies v1as founded. 10 Some 
of the most respected members of America's "establishment " were 
sufficiently concerned to participate in the group: 'Hilliam Allen Hhi te, 
-
the editor of the Emporia (Kansas) Gazette, a renowned journalist and 
8 
'Hi lliam L. Langer and S. Ever ett Gleason, The Challenge to 
Isolation 1937-1940 ( "Harper Torchbooks"; New York : Harper and Row, 
1952 , Vol. II, p. 671. 
9 Jame.s MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956), p. 439 . 
10 Phi lip Goodhart, Fifty Shi ps that Saved the Worl d (Garden City, 
Ne1-1 York : Doubleday and Co. , I nc. , 196 5) , p. 110. 
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well-known Republican became Chairman; Lewis Douglas, a former Director 
of the Bureau of the Budget; Francis P. Miller, a member of the Council 
of Foreign Relations; and Clark Eichelberger, a Middle Western lecturer, 
became members of its Executive Committee and involved men like Adlai 
ll Stevenson who became chairman of the Committee's Chicago Branch. This 
group, as well as its more militant off-spring, The Century Group, were 
to become a very active lobby as the events of the summer unfolded. 
There were other political forces in the United States which also 
needed to be considered. The Presidential system of government in the 
United States could not provide for a "national union" government as 
was possible in Britain and Canada. Yet the impending world emergency 
made it desirable for President Roosevelt to bring Republicans into the 
Cabinet which until then had been an exclusively Democratic body. On 
June 19, the President appointed Colonel Frank Knox to the position of 
Secretary of the Navy and Henry L. Stimson, who had previously served 
in the Hoover Cabinet, as Secretary of War.12 These appointments were 
also to have major long-range effects on the conduct of the coming 
negotiations between the United States and Great Britain to trade bases 
for destroyers. 
The legal basis for the establishment of American bases in 
Newfoundland stemmed from this "destroyer-for-bases deal" between the 
United States and Great Britain. It is therefore necessary to examine 
how this "deal" developed, what forces went into its negotiations, and 
particularly the involvement of Newfoundland. 
11 Mark Lincoln Chadwin, "Warhawks: The Interventionists of 1940-
1941" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1966), p. 78. 
12 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 510. 
There had been agitation for some time among various American 
groups for the transfer to United States jurisdiction of some of the 
British bases in the Western Hemisphere. The most vocal agitation 
for this came from isolationist circles; the Chicago Tribune in 
particular had been proposing that some of the British islands in the 
Western Hemisphere be transferred to the United States in payment of 
13 
World War I war debts. ~lilitary considerations had also led some 
strategists to the conclusion that such bases might be desirable. The 
United States wanted more naval bases to implement the defense of the 
Panama Canal and the Atlantic Coast. 14 In August 1939, the United 
States Navy had received permission from Britain to operate patrols 
from the islands to Trinidad, St. Lucia and Bermuda and the Navy was 
desirous of additional bases. 
-6-
It is not clear to what extent, if any, these desires influenced 
later developments; apparently there is no record that a trade between 
destroyers and bases was ever proposed by professional naval personne1.15 
Politically, moreover, little thought had been given to American 
bases in the off-shore islands and no serious negotiations toward this 
end had been undertaken when the quest for destroyers came to dominate 
l3 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 746. 
14 Samuel Eliot Morrison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World 
War II, Vol. I: The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939 to May 1943 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946), P·33. 
15 Daniel s. Greenberg, "U.S. Destroyers for British Bases - Fifty 
Old Ships Go to War," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 
Vol. LXXXVIII (Nov. 1962), 73. 
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the ~~ted States-Britain relationship. The first reference to the 
transfer of destroyers to Btitain came, curiously enough, in a con-
versation at Warm Springs, Georgia, between President Roosevelt and 
Canadian Prime Minister W. L. MacKenzie King. King had taken his 
usual spring vacation in the southern United States and was invited 
to visit Roosevelt before his return to Canada on April 23, 1940. The 
Nazi invasion of the Low Lands had not yet taken place--Europe was 
still in the grip of the period known as the "phony war. " Yet 
Roosevelt told King that there \-Tas some defense equipment belonging 
to the United States Navy which might be usefUl to Canada in its east 
coast defense measures and spoke of the "possibility of finding it 
necessary to send destroyers to assist the British." 16 
One of the earliest decisions made by vlinston Churchill after 
he beca.llle Prime Minister \<?as to request the United States to make just 
such destroyers available for the defense of Britain. On May 15, 1940, 
the American Ambassador, Joseph Kennedy, had his first intcr,rie,·: -.:.·:i th 
the new Prime Minister. "I asked him," he reported, "what the United 
States could do to help that would not leave the United States holding 
the bag for a war in which the Allies expect to be beaten ••• He said 
it was his intention to ask for the loan of thirty or forty of our old 
17 destroyers and whatever airplanes we could spare right now." And 
indeed Churchill followed the interview that same day with the first 
16 
J.W. Pickersgill, The MacKenzie Ki~ Recor~, Volume I, 1939-1944 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960 , p. 108 
.. 
17 . . 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of' the United states 
(Diplomatic Papers) Vol. III (194o): The British Commonwealth The Soviet 
Union, The Near East and Africa (Washington: United States Gov~rnment 
Printing Office, 1958), p. 29. 
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of many telegrams that were to be exchanged between him and the President. 
In it he listed his immediate needs and leading the list was "the loan 
of forty or fifty of your older destroyers to bridge the gap between 
what we have now and the large new construction we put in hand at the 
18 beginning of the war. This time next year we shall have plenty." 
On May 16, Roosevelt replied that "a step of this kind could not be 
taken except with the specific authorization of the Congress and I am 
not certain that it would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the 
19 Congress at this moment." Roosevelt also doubted that American defense 
requirements would permit him to dispose of the destroyers even 
20 
temporarily. The turn-down was apparently firm. A week later, 
Arthur Purvis, head of the British Purchasing Mission in Washington, 
noted : "Destroyers No. 21 Quite firm. " 
In this situation, and 1·1ith the war fortunes of Britain steadily 
deteriorating, various people sought to find a way to reverse the 
President's deci sion. On May 24, Lord Lothian, then Britain's Ambassador 
to the United States, sent a cable from 1-Tashington r ecommending that the 
British Government make a formal offer to lease airfields i n Trinidad, 
Newfoundland and Bermuda to the American Government. Having not yet 
made the connection of a possible trade of such right s for the badly-
needed destroyers, the British Cabinet shelved the idea . 22 There was 
18 
vJinston S. Churchill, Their Fi nest Hour (Boston: Houghton 
Mi fflin Company, 1949), p. 24. 
19 
Department of State, Foreign Relations, III (1940), 49. 
20 
Ibid. 
21 
Goodhart, Fifty Ships, p . 70. 
22 
Ibi d., p . 1 00 . 
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no motion in the American Government either, and on May 29, Secretary 
of the Treasury Morgenthau, one of the "hawks" in the Roosevelt Cabinet, 
confirmed to Purvis that destroyers ,.,ere "out." 23 However, only five 
days later, Morgenthau told Purvis that he thought the President was 
personally convinced about the need for action but had as yet taken no 
decision.24 The disappointment was keenly felt in Britain. On June 5, 
Churchill, in a telegram to MacKenzie King, sounded this note when he 
said, "He have not expected them /Jhe American~ to send military aid, 
but they have not even sent any worthy contribution in destroyers or 
planes •••• Any pressure which you can apply in this direction would be 
25 invaluable." The same day the British Government instructed Purvis, 
its ~urchasing agent, to keep up a steady pressure on the President as 
a confidential report had been received at 1-lhitehall that the President 
26 
might be willing to reconsider his attitude. Outside of Government, 
a number of men felt the need to enter the arena and try to move the 
negotiati ons off dead-center. On June 10, a group was founded, many of 
"t-Jhose members ~Jere previously associated '' ith the Committee to Defend 
America by Aiding the Allies, to take direct action and to focus attention 
on the need for a transfer of United States destroyers to ~he British 
Navy. This association, knmm as the Century Group, included such men 
as Dean Acheson, Halter Lippmann, Joe Alsop, Dr. James Conant, Elmer 
23 
Ibid.' p. 70. 
24 
Ibid. 
25 Churchill, Finest Hour, ~ · 146. 
26 
Goodhart, Fifty Ships, p. 71 . No information as to t~e source 
of this report is given. 
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Davis and Allen Dulles. 27 On Sunday June 11, the Century Group placed 
an advertisement, drafted by Robert Sherwood, in major newspapers across 
the country. Under the heading "Stop Hitler Now" it called itself a 
"Sunnnons to Speak Out" and constituted the first clear call for 
American participation in the war effort by a group of reputable 
citizens. That day, Churchill again cabled Roosevelt: , .••• But even 
more pressing is the need for destroyers •••• Nothing is so important 
as for us to have thirty or forty old destroyers you have already 
reconditioned •••• They will bridge the gap of six months before our 
wartime construction comes into play. We will return them or their 
equivalents to you if at any time you need them. The next six months 
28 
are vital. " 
Th€ war situation worsened. On June 13, Paris was evacuated. 
On June 14, the Government of Canada decided that the commitment it had 
made to Britain earlier that year to provide some forces to protect 
Bell Island, Newfoundland, from German attack needed to be taken 
seriously. It therefore decided to base one f l ight of fighter aircraft 
at Gander along with an Infantry Battalion for ground protection. Thes e 
troops had to come from Canada's hard-pressed Second Division-- i t ' s on~ 
source of tra ined troops. 29 
27 
Ibi d., p. 112-114. See al so Chadwin, The Interventi oni sts. 
28 
DepPrtment of State~Foreign Relations, III (1940), 52. 
29
colonel C. P. Stacey, Offi cial History of the Canadi an Army i n 
the Second World War, Vol. I., Six Years of War: The A~ i n Canada, 
Britain and the Pacifi c (ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955~p. 179. Bell 
Island ' s iron ore mines v1ere consider ed a particularly vulnerable 
i ndustrial installat i on. 
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On June 16, Prime Minister King cabled Churchill that "the 
United States should be a:f':f'orded opportunities to get bases at Iceland, 
Greenland, New:f'oundland and the West Indies and supply (sic) the 
inadequacy of' the de:f'ense of' our own coasts ••• ~30 This preoccupation 
with the dangers of' an attack on New:f'oundland was no passing matter. 
A :rew days later, the American Minister to Ottawa, J. Pierpoint 
Mo:f'fat, recorded: " ••• The Canadians are definitely worried about 
an air raid •••• The most important and vulnerable point is of course 
the great air:f'ield in New:f'oundland ~andeiJ. The Canadians have troops 
there but they have no artillery and no anti-aircra:rt guns •••• The 
Newfoundland Government is asking the Canadians with increasing urgency 
for assistance, notably in protecting her :rour main harbors. The 
Canadians will want to discuss the whole Newfoundland situation in 
31 Washington." 
During these same trying days, Churchill despatched yet another 
appeal to Roosevelt, calling the supply of thirty-five destroyers "a 
definite practical and possibly decisive step which can be taken at 
once and I urge most earnestly that you weigh my words. "32 But 
isolationist sentiment remained the order of the day in the United 
States, particularly in the Senate. There the Naval Construction Bill 
was being debated. The sentiment was~rongly in :f'avor of preventing the 
30 
Pickersgill, The MacKenzie King Record, p. 125. Considering 
later jealousies over American dominance of the defense of Newfoundland, 
this statement takes on added significance. See p. 49 below. 
31 
Nancy Harvison Hooker (ed.), The Moffat Papers (Cambridge : 
Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 315 . There is no confirmati on avail-
able of this request by the NevTfoundland Government. 
32 
Department of State~Foreign Relations, III (1940), 54. 
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transfer of any ships to any other country. The Committee Chairman 
handling the bill, Senator David I. Walsh (D.-Mass.) had inserted 
language to that effect and it was only through some adroit parlia-
mentary maneuvers by Senator Lister Hill (D.-Ala.) that the original, 
completely restrictive wording was altered to provide an opening which 
later became most important. As finally passed, Section 14(a) of 
Public Law 671, June 28, 1940, provided that "no military or naval 
weapon, ship, boat or aircraft to which the United States has title 
shall hereafter be transferred unless the Chief of Naval Operations 
shall first certity that such material is not essential to the defense 
33 
of the United States." 
As the German armies, poised across the Channel from Britain, 
prepared for their effort to defeat that island empire, pressure in the 
United States for delivery of the destroyers continued. In a meeting 
between William Allen vlhi te and the President on June 29, V.Thi te again 
spoke of Britain's needs and urged the President to reconsider. Accord-
ing to some reports, it was he who first linked the idea of bases and 
34 destroyers. While Lord Lothian's biographer, J.R.M. Butler, appears 
unsure of his sources of this conversation, he stated that "it is idle 
to ask who origin~ted the idea , dozens claimed credit later."35 In any 
33 Congressional Record, June 21, 1940, pp. 13369-13371. (Italics 
supplied by author.) For a discussion of the passage of the Act see 
also Herbert W. Briggs, "Neglect ed Aspects of the Destroyer Deal, " 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. XXXIV (1939-1940), ;69-587. 
See also Goodhart, Fifty Ships, p. 91. For the later authorization by the 
Chief of Naval Operations, see p . 32 below. 
34 
J.R.M. Kerr 1882-1940 (London: 
MacMillan and 
35 
Ibi d. 
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case, British pressure continued. On July 1, there was a dinner at the 
British Embassy. Columnist Joe Alsop was one o~ those invited. As 
later reported by Harold Ickes, the British said that "without more 
boats (sic) England could not hold the Channel against Hitler and that 
36 
Britain needed some o~ the old United States destroyers desperately." 
This word got to Harold Ickes, then Secretary o~ the Interior and one 
of the President 's close con~idants. He reported that he "spent a lot 
of time arguing with the President that, by hook or by crook, we ought 
37 
to accede to England's request. " In light o~ this pressure, a 
telegram from Ambassador Kennedy dated July 5 throws an interesting 
sidelight on the story. He re~vrted that Lord Ha l ifax, then Britain ' s 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had shm-m him a message from Churchill 
to Lord Lothian requesting Lothian again to take up the question of the 
destroyers. "I think that Churchill was making too much of a demand on 
the President. • • and that he \vould settle it in his own time and that 
to try to give him the 'hurry up' or to point out the dangers to America 
38 
would not influence him very much." Credence must be given to the 
thought that the link between bases and destroyers originated, or at 
least found a ready home, with the pro-Allied pressure groups in the 
United States because there are reliable reports that at the meeting 
39 Century Group on July 11 this idea v1as again discussed. In any case, 
the idea took hold. 4 40 V!hether it \vas Lord Lothian's telegram of May 2 , 
36 
Harold L. Ickes, The Secret 
The Lowering Clouds: 1939-19 1 Nev1 
37 Ibid. 
of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. III, 
Simon and Schuster, 1955 ), Po ?33. 
38 Department of State, Foreign Relations, III (1940), 55. 
39Goodhart , Fifty Ships, p. 147; Chadv1in, The Interventionists, p . lOl. 
40 p. 8 , above. 
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MacKenzie King's appeal or some private communication from a top-level 
American, the idea of bases jelled on July 13. That day there v1as a 
Circular Telegram to the Governors of various British Dominions from 
the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that the British 
Government had learned from informal discussions in vlashington that 
the United States Government desired to obtain air facilities to meet 
its immediate national defense needs. Among these was the right to 
41 
conduct occasional training flights to a Newfoundland airport. Sir 
Gerald Campbell, then British High Commissioner at Ottawa, informed 
Prime Minister King of the request and asked his views. King lost no 
time in expressing the view that it would be highly desirable to have 
42 
the facilities made available to the United States. This general 
enthusiastic response was also the case in Newfoundland which immediately 
responded that it had no objection.43 
Pressure in Hashington kept building. One of those vrhose help 
the British Embassy had solici ted was Benjamin Cohen, a trusted personal 
friend of the President. On July 19 Cohen wrote the President arguing 
that authority to transfer t he destroyers existed vlithout additional 
authori zation from Congress "if the r elease would .•• strengthen rather 
41+ 
than weaken the defe nse position of the Uni t ed States. ,. On July 22 , 
41This informati on is based on information obtained under a specia l , 
pri vileged arrangement from the files of Government House , St. John's, 
Newfoundland. No di rect quotes \·ler e permitted but the substance i s 
essentially as here r eported. Refer ences to these f i l es wi l l henceforth 
be annotat ed a s GH Files. 
42Pickersgill, The MacKenzi e King Record, p . 128 . 
1. ~3 GH Files. 
44 Goodhart, Fifty Ships , p . 152 . Secret ary Knox 's r e suonse i s not 
r ecorded. 
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Roosevelt sent the memo to his Secretary of the Navy with a note 
doubting that Cohen's point of vie1v 1·1ould stand up. He also feared 
45 
that Congress would be in no mood to allow any form of sale. 
Part of the reason for the delay in American reaction to the 
British pleas had been the holding of the Democratic National Convention. 
On July 19, Roosevelt accepted his Party's nomination for an unpre-
cedented third term. As soon as the convention was over, Lord Lothian 
again started to build pressure. In a broadcast over an American 
radio network on July 22 he stated that Britain most urgently needed 
destroyers and armed motor boats; "one hundred of these now might 
46 
make the difference between success and failure." 
On July 30, the Century Group, disappointed but not discouraged 
by the President's failure to respond to their private and public pleas, 
launched a national press advertisement campaign urging Americans 
specifically to write or telegraph their President, their Senators, 
their Congressmen urging the United States to "sell over-age destroyers 
and give other material aid to Britain - and give it immediately 
before it is forever too late . "47 As if to reinforce this dire v;arning, 
Churchill again cabled Roosevelt on July 31 -that it had become most 
urgent ''for you to let us have t he destroyers., . He cited the l ar ge 
losses Britain was sustaining a nd ended with the eJ_oquent appeal: 
45
rbid. 
L~6 
Butler , Lord Lothian, p . 291 
47 . Nevr Yor k Tl1lles, July 30 , 1940, p . 13 . 
"I am conf'ident now that you know exactly how we stand, 
that you will leave nothing undone to ensure that 50 
or 60 of' your oldest destroyers are sent to me at 
once. 
Mr. President, with great respect I must tell you 
that in the long history of' the world this is the 
thing to do now." 48 
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Lord Lothian, whose ef'forts during July had been very intense, 
now again approached Secretary of the Navy Knox, assuming that the 
Churchill appaal "\Wuld be discussed at the Cabinet meeting scheduled 
for August 2. Lothian was at his most effective in private conversation 
and had continually set out forcefully the danger to America of not 
supporting Britain. And v1hen asked hmv America could best help he 
., ,. 49 
would say, · Give us your old destroyers. The day before the 
Cabinet meeting, a delegation from the Century Group '\·Tent to the 
Hhite House, saw the President and urged the release of the ships. 
They reported a noncommittal and unenthusiastic response. 50 
In the history of the "destroyer-bases '' deal there are two key 
dates on which vital decisi ons v1ere made: August 2 and August 13 . 
Pressures for American action had been building all during July. 
Churchill's latest, emphatic appeal was in hand. Pri vate pressures, 
channelled to members of the Roosevelt Cabinet, were mounting. Thus, 
for instance, another effort vms made on August 1 to r each the 
President and Secretary Knox through Harold Ickes '\·Tho was known to 
be sympathetic to the pro-British vie>-1. On the day of the Cabinet 
meeting , Ickes 1o1rote yet another memorandum to the President. In it 
1~8 
Department of State , Forei gn Rel ations, III (1940), 58. 
4a 
/Butler, Lard Lot hi an, ~ · 292 . 
50 ChadHin, The I nterventionists , P . 117 . 
-17-
he attributed to Knox the idea that naval and air bases off the 
51 
Atlantic Coast might be made available to the United States fleet. 
Roosevelt himself reported the Cabinet meeting that afternoon 
for the record: 
II Long discussion in regard to devising ways 
and means to sell directly or indirectly, fifty 
or sixty 'Horld Har old destroyers to Great 
Britain. It was the general opinion, without 
a dissenting voice, that the survival of the 
British Isles under German attack might very 
possibly depend on their getting these destroyers. 
It 'ltlaS agreed that legislation to accomplish 
this is necessary. 
It v1as agreed that legislation, if asked for 
by me without any preliminaries, 'ltiOuld meet with 52 defeat or interminable delay in reaching a vote. " 
It ,;.,as therefore decided that Roosevelt, through vlilliam Allen 
Hhite, 1vould seek the support of the R~publican nominee, Hendell 
'ltTillkie, and through him the support of the Republican leadership in 
53 the Congress, particularly the Senate. There is no reference to the 
idea of bases in the Roosevelt Memorandum, but Ickes reports that this 
1·1as discussed and that it ><ras agreed that joj_nt use of t he bases wa s 
54 
acceptable. The idea a~parently ~·;a s r a ised by Knox and supported 
by Stimson and Ickes. 55 In any case, legislation seemed to be required 
51 Ickes, Secret Dia~;, pp. 283- 284 . 
52 Department of State , Foreign Relations, III (194o), 58. 
53Elliott Roosevelt ( ed.), F.D.R. - His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, 
Vol. II (Nevi York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce , 1950), p.l050. 
54 Ickes, Secret Diary, p . 292 
55 Chadvrin, The Interventi onists, p . 118 ; see also Butler, Lord 
Lothian, p . 294. 
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and Judge Haclavorth, the State Department's Legal Adviser, submitted 
a draft that evening. 
Since Roosevelt had recognized the need for preparing 1 Congress 
for legislation, it may be assumed that the public pressures now being 
built had his tacit blessing. The Century Group s~~g into even more 
effective action and on the evening of August 4 arranged for a broadcast 
by General of the Armies John J. Pershing, the World \·Jar I hero. This 
speech, drafted primarily by Halter Lippman, 56 specifically stressed 
the destroyer issue. "\•Te have an immense reserve of destroyers left 
over from the other war ••• , If there is anything we can do to help 
save the British Fleet ••• 1~e shall be failing in our duty to America 
if I·Je do not do it. "57 The speech obviously made a major impact if 
only to judge by the adverse reaction. The Chicago Tribune warned that 
the sale of destroyers to a nation at \var would be an act of we.r. 58 
But the most interesting reaction came from the German Foreign Office. 
In a telegram to its Embassy in Hashington it noted the speech, i ndicating 
that, should the United States seriously intend to make warships avail-
able to England, the question \·JOuld arise whether this should not b e 
cause of 1·1arning to the United States on violation of its neutrality. 59 
But the German Embassy rejected the s eriousness of the speech. Pershing 
was char acterized as one of the i nternationalist circle , Roosevelt as 
being unable to obtain the required Congressional authori zation, and 
56chad1-Jin, The Interventioni sts, p . l24. 
57Goodhart, Fifty Shius , p . l60. 
5~urns, The Lion and the Fox, p . 439 . 
59Akten zur Deutschen Auswaerti en Politik 
Kriegsjahre Series D, l 937-l9 5, Part X, Volume 
Die 
-19-
the United States as having an insufficient number of destroyers for 
its mom defense. In any case, a German protest vias considered to 
be counter-productive since "the feverish hate-clique 'tvould make the 
most of the warning and thereby perhaps obtain Congressional 
th . t• 1160 au or1za 1on. 
For the next few days, the idea of base rights and the sale of 
destroyers moved along parallel lines but not necessarily linked. Thus, 
for instance, Sir Gerald Campbell informed Prime Minister King on 
August 3 that the air facilities which the United States desired in 
Newfoundland and the 1·Jest Indies were being offered by Britain. That 
same day, Cnnada's Minister in Washington reported that the link 
bet,veen destroyers and bases Has being made in Washington. 61 On what 
basis Sir Gerald made his statement is not clear since no such in-
formation reached Newfoundland until a week later and it could hardly 
be expected that the British Government, which was keenly aware of its 
relations 't•Jith the Dominion, should have so overlooked Newfoundland. 
During most of July, Secretary of State Hull had been av1ay at 
the Habana Conference. He had nm1 returned and Lord Lothian called 
on him on August 4 to bring him up-to-date. He expressed his Govern-
ment 's "urgent desire,. to purchase a number of older destroyers. He 
also told him that he had r ecommende:l that Britain cede or lease some 
62 
of its bases i n the Western Hemisphere to the United States. The 
next day, Lord Lothian submitted a memorandum to the Pres ident listing 
60 
Ibid.' p. 375. 
61 Pickersgill, The MacKenzie King Record, p. 129. 
62 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell HUll 
a nd Stoughton, 1948), Vol. I, p. 831 . 
(London: Holder 
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the facilities Britain was prepared to offer. Among t hese was t he 
offer to authorize United States Army aircraft to make occasional 
training flights to Newfoundland and to make use of the airport there 
an offer to vlhich Britain had received Newfoundland's consent on 
July 14. There was no immediate reaction to the Lothian Memorandum, 
only a promise to study it further. 63 
Meanwhile, however, the public pressure was beginning to show 
results. "A"llericans are at last beginning to realize t hat if Bri tain 
were to go this autumn, they >vould immediately lose t he Pacific to 
Japan, South fl~erica to Hitler •••• Hence the growth of the demand 
to send us fifty destroyers now, " Lord Lothian wrote to Lady Astor 
64 
on August 7. To keep up the pressure, the Century Group now 
called on Admiral Standley, one of t he Horld Vla r I naval commanders, 
and had him deliver an appeal, this one drafted by columni s t Joe 
65 Alsop . But the most decisive act i on of t he Group came on Sunday, 
August 11, ·Hhen four prominent laHyers, Charles C. Burli ngham, 
Thomas D. Tha cher, George Rublee and Dean Acheso~ published a long 
and cl osely reasoned letter i n the New York Ti mes ana l y zing t he 
66 
existi ng legal situat i on, parti cularly t he Act of June 28 , 1940 , 
and attempt ed to demonstrat e that t he s ale of destroyers to Britai n 
could be fitted into t he exi sti ng legal frame-vmrk . In other 1·1ords , 
they a r gued that no ne\·: l egi slation I·Ja S neces sary and t hat the 
63nepartment of Stat e, For eign Re lat ions, III (1940), 63. 
6~utler, Lord Lot hia n, p. 296 . 
6 5chadl·lin, The I nterventioni sts, p . 125. 
66P . 12 , above . 
-21-
President could and should act on his own responsibility without 
k . th f 1 . t. 67 as ~ng e Congress or nevi eg1sla 1on. 
It was the President himself who, on August 13, in a meeting 
with Morgenthau, Stimson, Knox and Welles, drafted the essential 
principles of the agreement which \\'as finally reached. 68 Roosevelt, 
in his telegram to Churchill stated that it might be possible to 
furnish at least fifty destroyers but that this could only be done 
if the American people and the Congress frankly recognized that in 
return therefor the national defense and security of the United 
States would be enhanced. To accomplish this, he requested (1) an 
assurance that the British Fleet would not be surrendered or sunk 
but sent to other parts of the Empire for its continued defense; 
(2) an agreement authorizing the use of Newfoundland, Bermuda, the 
Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad and British Guiana as naval 
and air bases by the United States in the event of attack; Rnd 
(3) in the meantime the right to establish such bases and use them 
for training and exercise purposes, the land to be ~cquired by 
purchase or ninety-nine year lease. All specific details were to 
69 be •wrked out later. The reply from London was prompt and affirm-
ative, preferring the long-term lease to outright sale. Actually, the 
President also favored the lease arrangement. He vl8 S ,.,ell av1are of 
the "penurious conditions" of the native population of most of the 
67 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 757. 
68 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in 
Peace and Har (NeN York: Harper and Bros., 1947), p. 356. 
69 Department of State, Foreign Relations, III (1940), 65. 
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islands and consequently did not want to assume the burden o~ admin-
70 
istering these populations. Churchill did, however, thrm-1 in one 
caveat because o~ his awareness of the sensitivities o~ various parts 
o~ the Empire. "It will be necessary," he wired, "~or us to consult 
the Governments o~ Ne~1foundland and Canada about the Newfoundland base, 
in 1-1hich Canada has an interest. Ttle are at once proceeding to seek 
. 71 the~r consent." Churchill was thus not only acknowledging the 
Dominion status of Newfoundland but also the special defense respon-
sibilities which Canada was about to assume with respect to New~ound-
land. At the very time o~ exchange o~ these telegrams, the Canadian 
72 Air Minister was in New~oundland making mutual de~ense arrangements. 
In a telegram on August 15 from the Secretary o~ State ~or 
Dominion A~~airs to the Governor of Newfoundland the destroyer-bases 
deal v!as described. It was pointed out that Roosevelt needed to make 
certain concessions to Congress. It was also stated that the use of 
New~oundland (and certain v7est Indian islands) was essential as a 
naval and air ba~e in the event o~ an attack on America and that in 
the meantime the Americans would eJqJect to be allowed to use Newfound-
land ~or naval and air training ~rograms. The President was reported 
to ~~sh to secure these rights by purchase or by 99-year lease and no 
doubt the latter ·would be easier from New~oundland' s ~oint of view. 
70 Hull, Memoirs, p. 834. 
71 Churchill, Finest Hours, p. 407. 
72
c.P. Stacey, Arms, M~n and Government, The vlar Policies of 
Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer ~or Canada, 1970), p. 357. 
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The Governor was asked to explore the reaction of' Newfoundland public 
opinion to the proposal and was told that, subject to his concurrence, 
73 Britain proposed to agree to the proposal. On August 16, the next 
day, Governor i·lalwyn replied that there was no public opinion problem 
in Newfoundland and that Newfoundland was agreeable to either lease or 
74 
sale. Actually the Newfoundland Government lvas not quite as certain 
of' its public opinion as it pretended. Commissioner Emerson, handling 
the portfolios of' Justice and Defense for Newfoundland's Commission of' 
Government, suggested to the editors of St. John's two daily newspapers 
that they launch a trial balloon by writing careful editorials indicating 
the possibility of' an approech by the Americans for bases in Newfound-
land. This they did and there is no record of' any adverse public 
75 
reaction. 
On August 16, perhaps overly optimistic considering the hurdles 
still to be mastered, Lord Lothian wrote Lady Astor: "I think the trick 
has been done. At least the President told me on the telephone this 
morning that he thought it ~vas. ,. 76 Breckenridge Long, then Assistant 
Secretary of' State in 1-Jashington, was much more skeptical. He recorded 
the ulan and stated "it would 1wrk if' England wins or the destroyers 
were sunk - but l.JOuld not be so good if' Grormany got the destroyers. " 
73 GH Files. 
74 
Ibid. 
77 
75 
St. John's Daily News, August 17, 1940, p . 4. See also "Wayfarer ·· 
St. John's Daily Nev:s, October 28 , 1969, 1) . L~. The original endorsement 
is quite strong, urging the Government of Newfoundland to advise the 
British Government that ··Newfoundland would be happy to let the Americans 
have b ases here. " See also St. John's Evening Telegram August 17,1940, p.4. 
76 Butler, Lord Lothian, p . 297. 
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But there is no doubt that the major problem, that of American 
public acceptance, had been met. Had Roosevelt been in the habit of 
showing off public opinion polls as some of his successors did, he could 
have pointed to one taken on August 17 showing approval of -- the yet 
78 
unpublished -- destroyer-bases deal by 62% of those polled. 
On August 17, Roosevelt, during an inspection tour of troops in 
upstate Ne\•T York, invited Canada's Prime Minister King to confer with 
him at Ogdensburg, New York. This meeting resulted i n the establishment 
of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States (PJBD), 
whose most immediate task •;,.Jas to plan for the defense of the vulnerable 
parts of Canada and the United States, particularly the northeast area. 
At a later date, the Board vJas to play a considerable role in the planning 
of defense bases in Newfoundland. At the Ogdensburg meeti ng, however, 
Canada's pre-occupation with her Newfoundland defense commitments was 
also demonstrated in other forms. Prime Minister King , for exampl e , 
presented Roosevelt with a list of muni tions needed for Ne1·Jfoundland' s 
defense, including 15 PBY flying boats for the Canadian naval air force 
•vorking out of Ne·wfoundland. 79 King and Roosevelt also discussed the 
78 
Dexter Perkins, "TtJa s Roosevelt \\Trang?' ' Virgi nia Quarter l y 
Revie1•T, Vol. XXX (Summer, 1954) , 362. 
79 
Arthur Cheever Cressy, Jr., C8:fladian - American Co-operation 
in Horld Har II, (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy, Boston, 1951), p .33 . Dean Acheson, then an active member 
of the Century Group , records in Morning and Noon (Boston : Houghton 
r~fflin Co., 1965, p. 224 ) that he approached the Canadian Charg~ in 
Ttrashington, Loring Christie, urging him to have MacKenzie King put 
further pressure on Roosevelt to sell the destroyers. Christie re-
fused. Acheson then saw Lord Lothian and asked him to vrrite to King . 
1-!hile sympathetic to the idea , Lord Lothian did not think he could do 
this through normal channels. Acheson then suggested a handwritten 
note 1·1hich Acheson would mail through normal post al channels and Lord 
Lothian ''was delighted with the conspiracy." 
projected United States bases in New~oundland and King emphasized 
So 
Canada's immediate geographic and de~ense interests. King told 
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Roosevelt that the British and Canadian Governments would both have 
81 
to deal with the problem o~ establishing bases in New~oundland. 
The ~ounding o~ the PJBD ~inally stirred the otherwise blas~ 
German Embassy. The German Charge in Washington, Dr. Hans Thomsen, 
now wired Berlin that the value o~ bases which might be acquired could 
remove Congressional objection to the delivery o~ the destroyers, perhaps 
by delivering them ostensibly to Canada. Thomsen ~elt Roosevelt, as 
Commander-in-Chie~, could overrule the Chie~ o~ Naval Operations but 
that such action would end the position o~ the United States as a 
82 
neutral. 
While there were still many hurdles, the August 13 ~ormula 
developed its own momentum and on August 19 the President approved the 
dra~ of an agreement under which Britain would make available to the 
United States, for the immediate establishment thereof, naval and air 
81 base ~acilities in the islands named ~or a period o~ ninety-nine years. -
It was now necessary for Mr. Churchill to advise the House of Commons 
o~ the negotiations but his speech on August 20 nearly placed an in-
superable roadblock in the vJay o~ consummation o~ the deal. The trade 
o~ old destroyers ~or bases seemed obviously one-sided in ~avor o~ the 
80 
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United States; particularly if one discounted the really important but 
unspoken British objective of committing the United States to participate 
in the war, to lose its "neutral" status. It seemed preferable to 
Mr. Churchill, therefore, to grant the bases as an outright gesture, 
rather than as an uneven trade. But this attitude lost sight of the 
fact that it was precisely the idea of pointing to a trade to enhance 
United States security which had been inherent in Roosevelt's August 13 
proposal. The resolution to this problem \vas to come later. On 
August 20, Churchill informed the House that "we have decided spontan-
eously, and \•Ii thout being asked or offered any inducement, to inform 
the Government of the United States that we would be glad to place ••• 
defense facilities at their disposal by leasing suitable sites in our 
Transatlantic possessions for their greater security against the un-
.. 84 
measured dangers of the future. Churchill ascribed to Roosevel t, 
without reference to the destroyers, a desire "to discuss "Yli th us and 
with the Dominion of Canada and with Nevi±''oundland, the development of 
American naval and air facilities i n Ne\·Jfoundland and i n the \-Jest 
Indies •••• He feel sure that our interests and interests of the colonies 
t 1 d b " 85 hemse ves, an of Canada and Ne\·lfoundland, will be served there y. 
Roosevelt backed Churchill's ploy by b eing equally cagey that day at a 
Press Conference . Asked about ta~~s for bases he said these "YJere going 
84 
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The di~ had now been sufficiently cast for the military planners 
to go into action. On that same August 20, the United States Army-Navy 
Joint Planning Committee was directed by Secretaries of War and Navy to 
begin its investigation of desired base sites. 87 With the possibility 
thus in the offing that the United States would establish bases in 
Newfoundland, Canada, which had consistently viewed Newfoundland as 
part of its "sphere of influence, " was motivated to try to establish 
its pre-eminence in the field. On August 20, an official Canadian 
mission arrived in St. John ' s headed by e.G. Power, Canada's National 
Minister of Defense for Air, to achieve broad agreement on the co-
88 
ordination of defense measures wi th the Government of Newfoundland. 
As negotiations continued within the American Government it was 
again Stimson, Knox, Morgenthau and Welles who insisted on the executi on 
of the original August 13 formula. Stimson reported that not all advisors 
were equally bold : at a meeting on August 21 there was some timidi ty 
among Cabinet members, some who wanted to use the subterfuge of gi ving the 
destroyers to Canada for use in convoy duty r ather than to turn them over 
86 Samuel I. Rosenman {ed.), The Public Papers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. IX: War and Aid to Democracies: 1940 
(New York: Russell and Russell, 1968), p. 333 . 
87 Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engleman and Byron Fa i rchild, United 
States A in World War II: The Western Hemisphere: Guardi the 
United States and Its Outposts Washington: Office of the Chief of 
Military History, Department of the Army, 1964), p .79. 
88 Stanley W. Dziuban, United States A in World War II: Military 
Relations between the United States and Canada, 1939-19 5 Washington: 
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959 ), 
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directly to Britain. But Stimson's strong objection to this type of 
cosmetics carried the day. 89 
There was yet another concern in Washington, the attitude of 
Congress. The President continued to be concerned about adverse 
Congressional reaction; it was, after all, an election year. On 
August 23 he therefore des-patched a letter to Senator Halsh in which 
he tried to convince Walsh of the propriety of' his action. He cited a 
mythical Dutchess County (N.Y.) farmer who said to him: 
"Say, ain't you the Commander-in Chief? If you 
are, and own 50 muzzle-loadin ' rifles of the 
Civil Har period, you vlould be a chimp if you 
declined to exchange them for seven modern 
machine guns, wouldn't you?" 
More seriously, Roosevelt reminded Wc:lsh t .hat United States weakness 
had lain in the fact that from Newfoundland to Trinidad, the sole off'-
shore protecti on was in Puerto Rico, St. Thomas and St. Croix •••• 
''If for fifty ships, \·lhich are on thei r last legs anyway, we can get 
th~. r ight to put in naval and air bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the 
Bahamas, Jamaica , St. Lucia, Tri nidad and British Guiana, then our 
operating deficit is largely cured ••• I do hope you will not oppose 
the deal." 90 
The Act of June 28 91 had made it impossible to give the destroyers 
a'o'lay, yet Churchill on August 20 had made i t difficult to arrange a 
89 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service , p . 358 . 
90Elliott Roosevelt, FDR Letters, p . 1056. 
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trade of destroyers for bases by stating that they would be a spontan-
eous gift. Lord Lothian pointed out that Churchill had to Ol)pose a 
trade "because the British Government might incur the charge of de-
faulting on its share of the bargain LI.e. not receiving an adequate 
quid-pro-qu~? ••• Mr. Churchill feels that British public opinion would 
not support a bargain of this kind if it was presented as a contract. " 92 
It was at this point that Judge Hackworth found the saving 
solution. He suggested that there might be a compromise cfter all 
between Churchill ' s desire for reci~)rocal gifts and the United States 
legal position. Since the British had not stated precisely what bases 
they intended t o lease, the bases could be divided into two parts. The 
first would comprise the bases in Newfoundland and Bermunda. These 
Britain could lease as an outright gift. The second \o!Ould consist of 
the bases around the Carribean, str ategically more important to the 
United States because of thei r :oroximity to the Panama Canal. These 
93 
could be l eased i n consider at i on of the Cession of fifty destroyers. 
The drafting of this C:)mpromise soluti on n01-1 started in earnest. 
91~ Long reported lengthy conferences, vJith Hull, Knox, Stimson and Lothian 
all in on the draft i ng sessions. " I t has all been ke pt very con-
fidential and even certain phases of i t have not b een typewr i tten but 
have been drafted and carried i n l onghand. " "He agreed," he reported, 
''that t he transf er of fifty destroyers to England would be a violation 
of i nternational l aw and t hat Germany might take umbrage c. t i t. Tde a r e 
92 Hull, Memoirs, p . 836. 
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not so much worried on that account because we approached the subject 
from the point of' view of national defense." Long continued: 
"We have tried to distinguish between strict 
neutrality and that necessary latitude which 
must exist in any independent government to 
permit it to defend itself •••• On the same 
·philosophy, if we consider our neutrality as a. 
thing apart, we will be prevented from employ-
ing measures necessary to our self-defense ••• 
being prevented from buying certain bases now 
belonging to England and P§sing for them in a 
manner agreeable to us." 
B.r August 28, the compromise was agreed to. In a note to Hull 
96 that day, Roosevelt agreed to the idea. By this time, the Army-Navy 
Joint Planning Committee had made its preliminary report and had 
listed the bases in Newfoundland as of priority importance for 
strategic reasons. It saw a real danger of Newfoundland falling into 
hostile hands and posing a danger to Canada and New England. It 
recommended that two reinf'orced inf'antry battalions be stationed in 
Newfoundland, one each in St. John's and Gander. 97 
Also on August 28 the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
informed the Governor of Newfoundland that the idea of 99-year leases 
had been agreed to. Not a word -vras mentioned of' the destroyer part 
of the deal. But the Government of' Newfoundland was becoming a bit 
restive. The Canadians had taken to speaking for Newfoundland in the 
95 Ibid. 
96 Elliott Roosevelt, FDR Letters, p. lo6l. 
97 Conn, Engleman and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and 
Its Outposts, p. 79 . 
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discussions with the United States98 and to ward o~~ such pro-
consular activities on the part o~ Canada, New~oundland asked to 
attach an observer to the British Embassy in Washington. It was 
never granted. 99 
The agreement was hammered out during the next ~ew days. It 
took the ~orm o~ an exchange o~ notes bet1-1een the British Ambassador 
in Washington and the United States Secretary o~ State. The notes 
vrere dated September 2, they were. transmitted to the Congress, and 
thereby made public, with a message ~om the President on September 3. 
The opening paragraph o~ Lord Lothian ' s note took account o~ the 
~riendly and sympathetic interest o~ the British Government in the 
national security o~ the United States and its desire to strengthen 
American ability to de~end the Western Hemisphere and t8 secure to 
the United States "~reely and without considerations," leases ~or the 
"immediate establishment and use o~ naval and air bases and ~acilities 
~or entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereo~, _on the 
100 
Avalon Peninsula and on the southern coast o~ New~oundland •••• " 
All the bases were to be leased ~or 99 years, ~ree ~rom all rent and 
charges other than compensation ~or ~rivate property owners. Questions 
:J~ the exact location o~ the bases and those o~ jurisdiction within 
101 the areas >vere to be determined by l at er agreement. 
see also Dzuiban, United States-Canada Militart Relations, pp . 
19 - 30 . 
99 GH Files. 
100 Department o~ State, Peace and War , pp . 565-566. For text 
see Appendix A. 
lOl Ibid. 
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On September 3, Roosevelt vJas aboard his train, returning to 
Washington. He held a news conference to fill the White House press 
corps in on the ne,-.rs. He was obviously elated, delighted with the 
formula that had been found and again compared his action with the 
Louisiana Purchase, which~ he pointed out, was also done without the 
102 
consent of the Senate. Roosevelt displayed his knowledge of 
Newfoundland's geography-- he described Newfoundland to the reporters 
and, for example, made clear to them that Botwood (which was known 
to be a Canadian base) was not on the Avalon or the southern coast 
103 
of the Island. 
To complete the legal process it was also necessary for the 
Chief of Naval Operations to certify that there was no diminution of 
security. This he did in a letter to Roosevelt dated September 3: 
102 
"It is my opinion that an exchange of 50 over-age 
destroyers for suitable naval and air bases on 
99-year leases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the 
Bahamas, Jamaica, Santa Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua 
and in British Guiana will strengthen, rather 
than impair the total defense of the United 
States. Therefore I certify that on the basis 
of such an exchange ••• the fifty over-age 
destroyers are not essential to the defense of 
the United States." 104 
Rosenman, Roosevelt Public Papers, pp. 375-385. 
l03 Ibid. 
104 Congressional Record, Sept. 3, 1940, p. 17279. This statement 
was apparently drafted either prior to or without consideration of 
the Hackworth formula - lending further credence to the fact that 
this division of the bases into two parts was only a political 
expedient. 
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rli th his message to Congress, President Roosevelt transmitted 
a lengthy opinion by the Attorney General 105 justifying the legal 
position that the agreement did not require Congressional consent nor 
violate existing legislation. It is a long, involved opinion and 
there may well be doubt about its legality in retrospect. But at 
the time, public opinion generally supported the President's action 
and so there was no appreciable debate. 
There was debate by the writers of learned articles. Edwin 
Borchard, for example, held in October 1940 that ''there is no poss-
ibility of reconciling the destroyer deal with neutrality, with 
United States statutes, or with international law. It can only be 
explained by the legal fact that the United States is now, and has 
lo6 been for some time,in a state of war." Herbert Briggs emphasized 
the same point - holding the supplying of the vessels to have been 
··a violation of our neutral status, a violation of national law and a 
violation of international law." 107 Quincy Wright, on the other hand, 
justified the action and felt that the United States should not have 
to worry about having violated its neutrality-- the United States, 
he contended, vras not a neutral but a supporting state-- one which 
105 Department of State Bulleti n, September 7, 1940 , p. 201 . For 
a description of the Attorney General's role, see also Eugene c. 
Gerhart, America's Advocate: Robert H. Jackson (Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs Merrill Co., Inc. 1958). 
lo6 
Ed~rin Borchard, "The Attorney General's Opinion on the Exchange 
of Destroyers for Naval Bases," The American Journal of International 
Lavr, Vol. XXXIV ( 1939-1940), 697 • 
107 Herbert Briggs, "Neglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal, " 587 . 
assisted a defending state without armed force. lOS 
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The Government of' New·f'oundland, now inf'ormed by telegram f'rom 
London of' the f'ar-reaching nature of' the Agreement, issued a public 
statement on September 3: 
" ••• In assenting to the making of' this agreement, 
the Government of' Ne,o~f'oundland has been impressed 
with the urgent needs of' the moment. The agreement 
is indivisible fi.e. bases f'or destroyer~! and the 
release of' war materials to Great Britain of' 
paramount importance. 
No question of' sovereignty arises. In certain 
harbors, yet to be chosen, suf'f'icient land vrill 
be leased f'or construction and operation of' bases 
by the United States naval and air forces in a 
manner somevrhat similar to that followed in the 
granting of' rights to industrial enterprises. 
Considerable negotiations still remain to take 
place, and the f'orce of' the views expressed by 
the Newf'oundland Government regarding the 
representation in these discussions of' Newf'ound-
land interest is f'ully appreciated by the 
Government of' the United Kingdom. He have been 
assured that the v!ishes of' this country will be 
taken into account in these discussions • 
••• The establishment of' American naval and air 
bases in Newfoundland 1vill be of' utmost import;ance 
to Nevrf'oundland whose geographical position is 
such that she would be exposed to the f'irst 
attack by an aggressor from the East having 
designs on the North American continent." I 09 
108 
"The Transfer of Destroyers to Great Britain," American 
Journal of' International LavT, Vol. XXXIV (1939-1?40), 685. 
In a letter to Charles Cheney HYde on October 22, 1940, Judge 
Hackworth supported the essence of' the Attorney General's view. 
He held that "the United States could not fail to take advantage 
of' an opportunity to improve its def'ense ••• by acquiring air and 
naval bases at strategic points. This f'act justif'ied the turning 
over of' the destroyers." (Marjorie M. vlhiteman, Digest of' 
International Law, Vol. XI, Hashington: United States Government 
Printing Of'f'ice , 1968, p. 253.) 
l09 St. John's D~ ily News, September 4, 1940, p . 3 . 
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The reaction of' the Ne,v.foundland public was f'avorable. It 
was led by the Daily News ~~hich opined that "no elected Government 
would have f'ailed the Mother Country in this perilous hour and in 
a matter of' such vital urgency. " But the editors looked ahead, 
anticipated that at the end of' the war there might be some other 
indirect return to lighten the lot of' the people. They also urged 
the Government to insist on its right of representation in the PJBD 
whenever questions c oncerning Ne,·Jf'oundland were discussed and urged 
the Government to be tough negotiators in the period immediately 
ahead. 110 Public reaction generally f'ollowed this lead, in arry case 
any qualms were suppressed by the hope that the construction of' the 
bases 1·1ould bring with it undreamt of' chances of' employment and 
•t 111 prosper1. y. 
In the United States, too, there was general acclaim. Justice 
Felix Frankf'urter wrote the President, congratulating him and noted 
that the achievement had an eve~ bigger signif'icance because of' the 
ef'f'ects it might have in Latin America, on the opinion in countries 
like Spain, Greece, Turkey, Egypt and even Russia. 112 
The German Embassy was very upset. Roosevelt's action was 
t ermed i llegal, dictatorial , dupi ng the public •113 The I talian 
Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, records "a great deal of' excit ement 
110 Ib"d 
__ 1._.' p.4 
111 St. John Chadwick, Newf'oundland - Island into Province (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 179. 
112 Max Freedman ( ed.), Roosevelt and Frankf'urther Their Corres-
pondence 1928-1945 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 19g7), p . 542. 
113 . 4 8 Akten, Part XI, Volume . 1 , p. 7 . 
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and indignation in Berlin." 114 
Dexter Perkins may have surmned up the meaning of the agreement 
most succinctly when he said that it shov:ed the intention of the 
Roosevelt Administration to defend the outposts as well as the main-
land of the North American continent. 115 In light of this, the 
actual value of the destroyers must be considered negligible and 
we may therefore disregard Anthony Eden's unhappiness over the bargain 
because the destroyers '\vere in such poor c :-mdi tion that they made 
unexpectedly large demands on British shipyards. 116 
Lord Lothian's e,rnluation of this episode may most poignantly 
sum up its value. He believed it meant American acceptance of the 
British fleet based on Britain as America's outer line of derense. 
To strengthen this outer line, the Americans contributed destroyers. 
The offer of' bases in the British trans-Atlantic islands '::a s Britain's 
recognition that these islands ·Here t he inner line of America's 
defense.117 
114Hugh Gibson (ed.), The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943 (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Co., 1946), p . 103 . 
ll5Dexter Perkins, "Bringing the Monroe Doctrine Up to Date " 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. XX (Jan. 1942 ) , 257. 
116Earl of Avon (Anthony Eden), The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning 
( London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1965), p. 133 . Several of t he destroyers 
saw immediate action and most of them were i n acti ve service by t he 
spring of' 1941. Actually, delivery of the destroyers b egan at once. 
British cre1·1s took over the first eight at Halif'ax on September 6 and 
the others follov:ed soon thereafter. See Dzi uban, United States -
Canada Military Relations, p. 165, and Goodhart, Fifty Ships. 
ll7Butler, Lord Lothian, p . 298 . 
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PART II - JOCKEYING FOR POSITION 
Once agreement in principle had been reached, two major 
problems remained to be solved before the bases could actually be 
established and become a part of the defense of North America. It 
was necessary to decide on the exact location of the bases in the 
various off-shore islands, and a detailed agreement needed to be 
negotiated setting forth the conditions under which the bases would 
be operated. 
The planning staffs of the various military services of the 
United States had, during the period of negotiation of the Agreement 
of September 2, been giving considerable thought to the exact location 
of the bases. They had recommended the lease of existing naval air 
facilities at Botwood and Gander Lake; naval facilities at St. John's; 
the Gander Airport; plus sites at St. John's and on the Southeast 
1 
coast for an Army and a Navy base respectively. Inasmuch as Canadian 
units were already stationed at Gander, any American base there was 
ruled out by the President prior to the exchange of notes of September 2 
and the words "on the Avalon Peninsula and the Southern coast of 
2 Newfoundland" were specially included in the text. 
Two days after the exchange of notes granting the United 
States the right to establish bases in the off-shore islands, the 
United States Government announced that it would send a mission of 
l Stanley VT. Dziuban, United States Army in World vlar II: 
Milita Relations between the United States and Canada 1939-1945 
V!ashington: i)ffice of the Chief of Military History, Department of 
the Army, 1959 ), p . 165 . 
2 See Appendix A. 
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experts, under the direction of Rear Admiral John W. Greenslade, to 
the various islands to survey the situation and recommend exact loca-
tions for the base sites. In addition to Admiral Greenslade, the 
mission consisted of the following: Captain Russell S. Crenshaw, USN, 
from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Captain D. W. Rose, 
USN, of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; Commander K. B. Bragg, 
USN, of the Bureau of Yards and Docks; Commander Calvin T. Durgin, USN, 
of the Bureau of Aeronautics; Lt. Colonel Omar T. Pfeiffer, USMC; 
Commander Harold Bicsemeier, USN, of the Office of the Judge Advocate; 
Brigadier General J. L. Dever, USA, Commanding Officer o:f the Hashington 
Provisional Brigade; Colonel A. J. Maloney, USA, then assigned to the 
. 3 
Army War College and Major T. Griffin of the Army Air Corps. Commander 
Biesemeier and Colonel Maloney were to play key roles in the later 
t . t• 4 nego 1.a J.ons. 
Thinking on the exact location of the bases was now also pro-
gressing both in London and St. John's. ~On September 6, t:~e Secretary 
of State for Dominion Affairs cabled Governor VJalviYn requesting the 
Commission's views on the location of the bases. For its part, the 
British Government believed that locations on Conception Bay, Bell 
Island and the City of St. John's should probably be excluded from 
consider~tions as base sites. London also wanted to be certain that 
there vias no relinquishment of British control of the cable stations at 
Bay Roberts, Harbour Grace, Hearts Content, Arnold's Cove, Colinet, 
3New York Times, September 4, 1940, p. 3. 
4 
see b elow, p. 83. 
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Placentia and Port aux Basques. 5 
In response, Commissioner Puddester, then Acting Chairman o~ 
the Commission of Government, indicated that the Commission saw no 
reason to exclude the possibility o~ the establishment o~ American 
bases in the Conception Bay area. While something might be said for 
the exclusion of American presence in highly populated areas in the 
vicinity of the capital, the Commissionembelieved that the bases 
should be attracted to the area because o~ the economic benefits they 
might bring to it. 6 
The first indication o~ specific American plans came to 
St. John's from Hamilton, Bermuda on September 9. Hamilton was the 
first stop of the survey mission headed by Admiral Greenslade. The 
British Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies, located in 
Hamilton, cabled the Foreign O~fice, with copy to St. John's, that 
the Greenslade mission contemplated a Naval Base at Placentia with an 
alternative \<linter site at Mortier Bay, Burin.7 
Shortly thereafter, the United States Consul General at St. John's, 
Harold B. Quartan, was asked to make arrangement for the cruiser 
u.s.s. St. Louis, carrying the Greenslade Mission, to dock at St. 
John ' s and for two Navy patrol planes to land at Botwood to be 
5 Telegram No. 715. See Archives o~ the Province of Newfoundland 
and Labrador, Fi l es of the Commission of Government, Box S-4-2-1 
Folder M. (Fi les of Commission of Government, of which extensi ve use 
was made in the research of this paper ~or i.ll be abbreviated FCG, 
followed by box and folder number, e.g. FCG S-4-2-l,M.) 
6 Tel egram No. 591, September 12 , 1940, FCG S- 4-2-l,M. 
? Tel egram, September 9 , 1940, FCG S- 4-2-l,M. 
available to the survey mission. 8 Both were welcomed. 
The Greenslade Mission arrived aboard the cruiser u.s.s. 
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St. Louis on September 16 and the admiral and his party immediately 
called at Government House and presented a proposal embodying the 
American requirements: The United States needed a naval base, or 
facilities in an existing harbour, possibly at St. John's. There 
>vas need for a naval air base, and locations at St. Mary's, Argentia, 
Mortier Bay and Long Harbour were considered although the location at 
Mortier Bay was nearly immediately excluded because of the lack of a 
good anchorage. As for the Army, it required facilities for a 
Reinforced Battalion of Infantry which would have three functions: 
defend the naval air base,defend the naval facility and assist in the 
defense of the city of St. John's. Admiral Greenslade left a Memorandum 
containing these points with the Governor.9 
Other points v1ere discussed '"ith various staff members. In 
his report to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Governor 
vJalwyn stressed the cordiality of the meeting, and noted that in 
addition to the facilities formally requested, the Americans were seek-
ing a supply base, possibly at ~-fni tbourne, and emergency landing places 
for aircraft between Port aux Basques and St. George's on Newfoundland's 
8Telegram, Secretary of State (Hashington) to American Embassy 
London, September 13, 1940 ; Telegram, USS St. Louis to American 
Consulate General, St. John's, September 15, 1940; Diplomatic Note, 
Commission of Government (Commissioner Woods) to American Consulate 
General, September 14, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,M. 
9Memorandum of Conversation, Members of the Greenslade Mission 
with the Commission of Government, Government House, St. John's, 
Sept ember 16, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,M. 
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southwest coast and somewhere betl\'een G::~nder and St. John's. 
Consul General Quarton, in his report to Washington, also 
reported on the cordiality of the I·Telcome extended to the Greenslade 
Mission but reported that Admiral Greenslade had been carefUl not to 
mention any specific sites for fear that land prices would increase. 
Quartan felt the need to explain that "the tendency is in Newfoundland 
to exploit foreign interests, be it an alien government or manu-
facturing or industrial interests. " 10 This view of Quartan undoubtedly 
contributed to later difficulties i n the agreement on land expro-
priation; i~hether based on actual fact or not, it tended to influence 
vJashington' S viei·!S. 
On September 20, Admiral Greenslade and his colleagues returned 
from their survey and proposed the followine; installations to the 
Commission of Government: 
A seaplane base on the Argentia Peninsula; 
a small naval base site in the Harbour of St. John's; 
an army base on a 160 acres site south of St. John's in 
the vicinity of the Southern Shore Road and the Old Petty Harbour 
Road; 
an additional base for the training of a division of American 
11 
troops of 2.8 square miles south of Little Placentia Harbour. 
10 Despatch No. 1012, September 17 , 1940 . Most of the Ameri can 
documents Vlhich will be cited are taken from File No. 811.3451~4 
(United States Naval Bases in British Possessions) of the National 
Archives and R·-·cords Service, Hashington, D.C. Each document is 
indexed by an identi~ying number, thus 811 .34544/112 . All documents 
in this s eries will be cited as NARS follov;ed by the document number, 
for example J.ITARS No. 112 , Hhich appli es t o the des;:mtch here cited. 
11 Memorandum, Admiral Greenslade t o Governor ·Halwyn, Sept ember 20 , 
191~0 . FCG S-4-2-l ,M. 
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Con~ul General Quarton reported after the meeting at which the report of 
the Greenslade Mission had been presented and explained thatthe small 
naval base in the Harbour of St. John's was to consist of 1500 feet of 
'vaterfront property on the harbour's southside. As for the proposal 
for an army base south of St. John's, Quarton reported that both the 
Commissionerfbr Natural Resources (Mr. Woods) and the Secretary for 
Natural Resources felt that the Old Bay Bulls Road was difficult to 
keep clear in \·Tinter and therefore thought it would be more practicable 
to obtain property on the North Side of Quidi Vidi Lake. Sanitation 
12 
would also be better there. The next day, Governor 1-Talwyn, on 
behalf of the Commission of Government wrote to Admiral Greenslade 
and accepted his proposals of September 20 in principle. 13 
The acceptance in principle vTas followed by another meeting 
between the Greenslade Mission and the Commission of Government. 
Admiral Greenslade at this meeting again mentioned the need for two 
emergency landing fields and accepted the recommendati on, now jointly 
forvl8rded by the Commission, that the location at Quidi Vidi would be 
preferable to the one on the Southern Shore Road. At this meeti ng 
also, a point arose Hhich had to b e reiterated at frequent intervals 
thereafter: the American intention -vlith regard to the use of local 
labor. Admiral Greenslade stat ed flatly that local labor 1vould be 
d t t xt t "bl 14 use o as grea an e en as poss1 e . 
12 De spatch No. 1017, Sept ember 20 , 1940. NARS No. 11~ 
13 Letter, Governor \·!alwyn to Rear Admir al Greenslade , September 21 , 
194o. FCG S-4-2- l ,M. 
14 Minutes of the Meet ing of t he United States Mission vTi t h t he 
Commissi on of Government, Sept ember 21 , 1940, 11 :00 a .m., at 
Gover nment House , St. J ohn ' s . FCG S-4- 2- l ,M. 
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Governor Walwyn reported the Greenslade proposal to London on 
September 22 and on September 27 was informed that from a strategic 
point of vie,.,, His Majesty's Government saw no objection to the 
proposed naval facilities at Argentia and in the harbour of St. John's, 
the St. John's "suburban" army base, a military training area in the 
vicinity of Placentia and a Canadian or American airfield near 
15 St. John's. 
Three of the four American bases locations 1..rere now fairly well 
established: a naval air base at Argentia (with nearby Army facilities 
for its protection, later known as Fort McAndrew), a naval facility 
in the harbour of St. John's ,and an .army base on the North Shore of 
Quidi Vidi Lru~e (later known as Fort Pepperrell). The fourth install-
ation, later known as Harmon Field was not proposed until November 20. 
At that time, the United States authorities informed the British 
Embassy at 1iJashington that they w·ere now anxious to obtain further 
facilit i es, n amely "a staging point f or land aircraft in the vicini ty 
of St. Georges." 16 The Commission of Government saw no objection17 
and this area became part of the 99-year lease prop~rty. 
The negotiations 1br t he agreement 'l.vhich ·would set forth the 
condi tions unde r which the b ases 'l.·iere t o oper ate -- the r ights, dutie s 
l 5 Telegram No. 781, Se cretary of State for Dominion Affairs to 
Governor 1iJalwyn, September 27, 1940. FCG S-4-2- l , M. 
16 Tel egra."'l No. 2744 , Briti sh Embassy, 1iJashington, t o the Foreign 
Office , London, November 20 , 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,C. 
l7 Telegram No. 755, Governor '\i.Ja lvryn to Secretary of State for 
Domini on Affa irs, Novembe r 22 , 19 40 . FCG S-4-2- l ,C. 
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and authorities of the United States Forces and their relationship 
to the surrounding community -- were considerably more difficult 
than choosing the sites. Essentially, these negotiations fall into 
two periods: the period f'rom September 2, 1940 to January 28, 191+1 
when actual negotiations began in London, and the period covering 
those negotiations to their conclusion on March 27, 1941. The 
first period \•Tas used for the development of positions on various 
issues, particularly within the Government of Newfoundland, and was 
marked by minor skirmishes over seemingly insoluble problems; the 
second involved the detailed negotiationsaf the clauses of an agreement 
awarding rights for 99-years and negotiated in the broader setting of 
United States relations with Great Britain during the period when the 
Lend-Lease Bill was before Congress, the United States had not yet 
entered the \-Tar and the Churchill Government was hoping, by every means 
possible, to obtain maxim~m American support. 
Immediately following the signature of the agreement in 
principle (the exchange of notes of September 2), the Secretary of 
State for Dominion Affairs at London sent a telegram to the Government 
of Ne"Yrfoundland stating that preliminary consideration -vras being given 
to the maximum concessions '"hich could be made in each of the areas 
-...1here the United States had acqui red base rights and invited the 
various dependent governments to comment. It was assumed that the 
United States would make a preliminary survey (the Greenslade Mission) 
and that, in the case of Ne\·Tfoundland, the results of the American 
survey would be communicat ed bot h to Canada and Newfoundland , because 
of Canada's special role i n Newfoundland's defense . Expert discussions 
-45-
'"ere to follmv and it v1as hoped that during negotiations vThich would 
take place in London both the Government of Newfoundland and the 
Government of Canada \•Tould send special representatives. 18 London 
also suggested to the Newfoundland Government that Commissioner 
L. Ed\-:ard Emerson represent Nel·lfoundland at any London tall~s •19 The 
Governor agreed to the appointment of Mr. Emerson but added the name 
of the Commissioner for Finance, John H. Penson, because of the 
f'inancial,customs and fiscal considerations which would be involved 
. t' t• t• 20 1n ne nego 1a 1ons. 
Consul General Quartan \vas pleased with the Nev1f::1undland 
Government 's initial reaction to the September 2 agreement and 
reported tv10 days later that "the fact that the Commission of Govern-
ment has so promptly given its approval to the negotiations which were 
concluded between Great Britain and the United States on September 2 
is evidence of the good feeling which exists between the Government of 
this Isla..11d and the American Go·rernment." 21 He believed that the 
Government of Newfoundland I·Tould continue to be cooperative v;hen the 
actual bases had been located and the pros and cons considered . He 
accurately predicted that some months would elapse before the negotia-
tions could be completed and the actual purchase of private property 
18 Telegram No. 703, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, 
to Go'rernor 1ifalwyn, September 1~ , 1 91-fO. FCG S-lf-2-l,M. 
l 9 Telegram, Secretary of State for Dominion Affai rs to Governor 
\·Tcl\vyn (Private and Personal), September 6, 1940 . FCG S-lr- 2- l ,M. 
20 Telegram, Governor lilahryn to Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, September 7, 1940. FCG S-LJ--2-l ,M. 
21 Despatch No. 1001 , September 4, 1940 . NARS No. 65~ 
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22 for the prospective bases could take place. 
London's initial telegram, with its references to the 
Canadian involvement, once again raised the spectre of a British-
Canadian agreement without due consultation of the Government of 
Newfoundland. The Commission was quick to respond and on September 6 
advised London that it desired to have an opportunity to communicate 
its views on all issues in the negotiations to London before comments 
were solicited from the Government of Canada. It also requested that 
it be represented on the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board 
on Defense (PJBD) in the discussion of all issues bearing on the 
23 defense of Newfoundland. On the same day, the Commission informed 
24 Ottawa of its desire to be represented on the PJBD. The issue of 
Canada's involvement was one of the most irksome during these early 
days of developing negotiations. In a telegram to London a few days 
later, the Commission returned to it once more, pointing out that the 
interests of Newfoundland and Canada were not necessarily identi cal. 
"We hope," they addressed themselves to the Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, "that you wi ll do everything possible to disabuse 
the Canadians of any idea that they are i n a position to settle the 
destinie:; of Newfoundland in negotiations with the United States. " 25 
22 
Ibid. 
23 Telegram, Governor Halwyn to Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, London, September 6, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,M. 
24 Telegram, Governor vlalwyn to Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, Ottawa, September 6, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,M. 
25 Telegram No. 591, Governor Walwyn to the Secretary of State 
for Dominion Affairs, London, September 12 , 1940. FCG S- 4- 2-l,M. 
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In spite of this, reports continued to reach Newfoundland of further 
discussions of the defense of Newfoundland by the PJBD without the 
participation of Newfoundland. Indeed, this was the case. In its 
meeting of August 27, 1940, the Board had adopted as its Second 
Recommendation a statement on the defense of Newfoundland which 
stated, inter alia, that 
"The Board considers that the defense of Newfound-
land should be materially strengthened by: 
(a) Increasing the strength of the Canadian 
garrison immediately; 
(b) Establishing, as soon as practicable, and 
not later than the Sprirgof 1941, a force 
of aircraft of suitable types adequate 
for patrolling the seaward approaches to 
Newfoundland and Canada and for the local 
defense of the Botwood area; 
(c) Selecting and preparing, as soon as practicable, 
bases permitting the operation of United States 
aircraft, when and if circumstances require, 
in numbers as follm-rs: 
(1) a minimum of four squadrons of patrol 
planes (48 planes), 
(2) a minimum of one composite group of 
land planes (73 planes); 
(d) Completing, as early as practicable, and not 
later than the Spring of 1941, the installation 
of appropriate defense for the port of St. 
John's, Newfoundland, for Botwood, and for 
other points as required; 
(e) Taking such additional measures as further 
examination of the defense problem and 26 local reconnaissance show to be necessary." 
26 Dziuban, United States -Canada Military Relations, p. 348. 
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It is probably significant that the Canadian Section of the 
PJBD, which would probably have been sensitive to intra-Empire 
relationships to a greater extent than the United States Section, 
was able to endorse such a far-reaching recommendation. Some explan-
ation may be found in the memorandum written by Dr. 0. D. Skelton, 
Canadian Minister of Defense in the Cabinet of W.L. McKenzie King, 
which he '"rote to the Prime Minister on August 22, 1940. "In view of 
the definite possibility," he wrote, "of a movement on the part of 
Newfoundland to enter Confederation, the question arises whether we 
should seek tQ have any arrangement made by the United States as 
regards {the establishment of American bases i£7 Newfoundland brought 
into ha:nnony • • • with the Canadian arrangements. " 27 In the Canadian 
Ministry of Defense there would appear to have been a very strong 
feeling that Newfoundland would soon become part of Canada and the 
absence of any inhibitions to speak for Newfoundland on the part of the 
Canadian Section of the PJBD may to some extent be explained by this 
atmosphere. But the ire of the Newfoundland authorities was conside~ 
ably increased when the PJBD at its meeting of September 11 again took 
note of the problem of the defense of Newfoundland and passed its 
Eighth Recommendati on, reading as follows: 
27 C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Government: The War Policies of 
Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer for Canada , 1970), 
p. 358. 
"That the United States initiate as expeditiously 
as practicable such portions of the increased 
defense of Newfoundland, covered by the Second 
Recommendation of the Board ••• as may be found 
to :fall within the limits o:f bas2§ now being 
acquired by the United States." 
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The result was a vigorous protest from St. John's to London and Ottawa. 
"When we agreed with the Government o:f the United Kingdon," the telegram 
to ottawa read, "that they should o:f:fer on our behal:f to the Government 
o:f the · United States o:f America the lease of areas in Newfoundland 
:for naval and air bases, we did not contemplate the disposition o:f our 
facilities and the settlement o:f the rights to be granted either to 
your Government or the American Government without consultation with 
this Government." 29 Exactly what happened in Ottawa on arrival o:f 
this telegram is not clear but on October 1 the Secretary o:f State :for 
External .A::f:fairs wired Governor Halwyn stating that the views of the 
PJBD were only recommendations to the Governmen~and did not represent 
Government policy. The Newfoundland Government was also invited to be 
30 represented whenever Newfoundland problems ·were discussed in the PJBD. 
London was informed that the Commission found the role of the PJBD "which 
appears to have defined the defense roles as bet-v1een Canada and the 
United States ·without reference to the Government of Nev1foundland" 
31 
unacceptable. London at once 1·1ent on record to reassure the authori-
t ies i n St. John's that their point had been made; Canada v1as to be 
28 Dziuban, United States-Canada Military Relations, p . 350. 
29 Telegram, Governor Ylah.ryn to the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, Ottawa, September 17, 19l+O. FCG S-l~-2-l,M. 
30 Telegram, October 1, 1940 . FCG S-4-2-l,M. 
31 Te legram No. 602 , Governor HalvlYn to the Secr etary of State 
for Dominion Affairs, September 17, 1940. FCG S-4-2 -l,M. 
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brought into the discussions only from the point of view of military 
strategy which necessarily needed to be coordinated; His Majesty's 
Government assured the Commission that it would not agree to anything 
with the American Government without first consulting the Government 
of Newfoundland. 32 
On October 2, the PJBD itself decided to make the necessary 
amends. It invited the Government of Newfoundland to send represent-
atives to the next meeting of the Board at Halifax on October 4 33 
which was promptly accepted and Messrs. Emerson and Penson were design-
t t th C . . 34 A C d " A. l ated o represen e onmuss:~.on. ana J.an J.r Force p ane was 
made available to fly the delegates to the meeting. 35 
The preliminary skirmish between St. John's and ottawa had 
obviously filtered through to the PJBD for Messrs. Penson and Emerson, 
in reporting on the meeting, stated that 
"it became clear that the interest of the PJBD 
was mainly concentrated on defense measures 
designed to meet the present emergency •••• 
They were thus a good deal concerned with the 
speed with which the proposed United States 
defensive measures were likely to take effect. 
They regarded the present threat as being such 
as to warrant the utmost possible expedition 
in carrying out of United States proposals •••• 
The political problems LQf occupying bases in 
another countr~:7 had scarcely been envisaged. " 36 
32 Telegram, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Governor 
Walwyn, September 22, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,M. 
33 Telegram, Chairman of the PJBD to Governor Walwyn, October 2, 
1940. FCG S-4-2-l,M. 
34 Telegram, Governor Walwyn to Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, October 3, 1940. FCG. S-4-2-l,M. 
35 Telegram, United Kingdom High Commissioner at ottawa to 
Governor Walwyn, October 3 , 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,M. 
36 Report No. J.59 - '40, from the Commissioner for Justice and 
Defense to the Commission of Government, October 6, 1940 . FCG S-4-2- l ,X. 
As £or the establishment o£ the bases themselves, it became 
clear at the PJBD meeting in Halifax that the American proposals did 
not vary substantially £rom the Greenslade report. The American 
authorities were, however, anxious to receive title to the property 
to be leased since they did not wish to undertake construction work 
outside the United States unless proper title was vested. At this 
point, the Newfoundland authorities, impressed by the need for speedy 
action, suggested a simple 99-year lease as soon as the boundaries of 
the proposed bases were delineated and a deferral o£ the solution of the 
major problems of the status of the bases to a later date. Had this 
view been upheld, many of the problems o£ the next £ew months could 
37 
undoubtedly have found easier solutions. 
While this jockeying for position between Canada and New£oundland 
was in progress, officials and influential private individuals in 
St. John's began to develop thoughts as to some of the reciprocal rights 
and protective measures which might be built into any agreement between 
Great Britain and the United States which was to spell out the American 
base rights in more detail. As early as September 6, less than a week 
after the initial exchange o£ notes, the St. John's Daily News demanded 
the repeal of United States Public Law 600 which limited the importation 
of fish which had been £illetted or processed outside the United States. 
In the same editorial the DaiJ.y Nel-JS also demanded that a separate 
37 Telegram No. 651, Governor Walwyn to the Secretary of State, 
for Dominion Affairs, October 8, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,M. 
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immigration quota be established for Newfoundland. 38 
In his despatch to Hashington reporting these demands by the 
Daily News, Consul General Quartan held both to be unrelated to the 
bases issue.39 In this view, Quartan was supported by Leonard C. 
Outerbridge (later Sir Leonard), a director of a large St. John's 
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commercial house, Harvey and Company, who :felt that any effort to obtain 
a repeal of the processed fish import legislation would be undignified 
in view of the wartime situation which had brought about the American 
base rights, and would in any case fail. He recommended that the 
40 
attempt not be made. 
On September 12, 1940, the Commission of Government itself 
started to make known to London its first, tentative concerns about 
the nature of the permanent arrangements. As was the case in the re-
lationship with Canada, the Commission's first concern was with its o~m 
status. "He hope," they wired, "that no negotiations 1vith the United 
States 1·1hich affect Newfoundland will be contemplated by His Majesty's 
Government unless the proposals under negotiation have been communicated 
to us and >ve have had an opportunity of offeri ng our comments." 41 
Certain general rights were then considered. "As no question of sovereign 
rights "'tlill arise, the broad basis upon which such an agreement with the 
38 St. John's Daily News, September 6, 1940, p. 4. 
39 Despatch No. 10o6, September 6, 1940. NARS No. 78. 
40 Letter to the Editor, St. John's Daily NevJS, September 10, 1940 , p . 5. 
41 Telegram No. 591, September 12, 1940, Puddester (Vice Chairman 
of the Commission) to the Secretary~ State f or Dominion Affairs, 
FCG S-4-2-l,M. 
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United States should be approached is much the same as that applicable 
to private applicants seeking rights in an underdeveloped country such 
as this and it will be helpfUl if this attitude is maintained by our 
Governments in negotiation even if it is not so expressed to the other 
42 party." This attitude did little to shovT that the Commission under-
stood the grave nature of the conflict seen at that moment in London 
or the desperate need which London felt to commit the United States to 
support Britain more actively in its war effort. Compared with the 
all-out war effort then being made in Britain, the Commission's more 
detailed concerns seemed puny. The Commission, for example, conceded 
the right of the United States to navigate in the air and sea free from 
administrative restrictions; the right to import construction materials 
duty-free; and the remission of port fees "seemed proper." other customs 
and fiscal concessions were to be judged on their merits and special 
"serious" consideration would have to be given to liquor control and the 
application of immigration regulati ons. Military courts 1wuld be given 
jurisdication over military offenses, but the Commission assumed that 
otherwise the base areas would remain under the jurisdiction of the 
l.jJ 
ordinary courts of Newfoundland. 
In these early stages of the negotiations, before the United 
States had made knmm its viei-JS of the rights it expected to exercise, 
there was no real objection to quick movement toward the establishment 
!1-2 Ibid. 
L~3 Ibid. 
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of the bases. On October 11, Lord Lothian reported to t he Foreign Office 
that United States Secretary of the Navy Knox wanted to begin on the 
bases and not wait for the results of the detailed negotiations. He 
asked specifically if it were possible to proceed with the establishment 
of the base at Placentia LArgenti~. The British Ambassador added: 
"The United States is now passionatel y interested in re-armament and 
operations for defense. If nothing is done in these bases until all 
minor details are settled for all eight Islands and legal agreements 
reached in London, there will be months delay and danger of exasperating 
American public opinion." 44 Lord Lothian's telegram was also sent to 
Governor Walwyn for his information. The next day, St. John ' s responded 
by advising London that it agreed with Lothian ' s vie1·1s and was prepared 
to go ahead \·lith an interim arrangement not only at the naval base at 
Argentia but also at both locati ons i n St . John's and at t he Army base 
near Argentia. 1 ~ 5 London wanted to b e helpful but sa\·/ some di f ficulty 
in the concept of i nterim l eases. \·Jhil e t he For ei gn Office on October 13 
advised t he Bri tish Embassy i n ~·!as hington that it saw no object i on t o 
proceeding at Pl acentia , 46 t he Secret ary of State f or Dominion Affai r s 
advised St. J ohn' s t hat a simple i nt erim l ease coul d not b e appr oved 
),7 
without s ome idea of its form • ...,_ The n, as later , the Ne>·rfoundland Govern-
ment vias a>·rare of the \veat her factor Emd urged Lor d Lothi an to advise t he 
') ~f I . Telegram, October 11, 19'+0, Br i t ish Embassy, Hashington to 
Foreign Offi ce . FCG S-4- 2- l,M. 
1 ~5 Telegram No . 666 , Governor V!ahryn t o Secretary of St at e for 
Domini on Affairs, October 1 2 , 19L~o . FCG S-4- 2- l , M. 
!f6 Telegram, October 13 . FCG S-1+- 2-l,M. 
i;7 Telegr am, October 13. FCG S-h- 2- l , M. 
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Americans that they needed to get started prior to the end of November 
because the construction season would not last into December and 
would not resume before mid-May. 48 
The need for some type of interim arrangement became even more 
clear >vhen Lord Lothian received the first draft of the American proposal 
for a permanent lease. This draft, which had originated in the Navy 
Department and had been passed to the British Embassy in Washington is 
frequently referred to as the Knox draft. The draft was not only too 
far-reaching and too loosely drafted; it's terms were so sv1eeping as to 
build immediate resentment in both the British Government and the Govern-
ments of the dependent areas \•There the bases were to be located. The 
Knox draft 1110uld have accorded to the United States "rights, pm-1er, 
authority and control" beyond anything previously envisaged. For example, 
it proposed to give the United States "rights, power and authority to 
assume military control and conduct military operations 1·1ithin any part 
of Ne1·1foundland and surrounding >-raters and air space to the extent which 
may be necessary or convenient for the protection of the properties, 
instrumentalities and act i vities of the United States or otherwise to 
safeguard its national inter ests •••• " 49 Among other, obviously ob-
jecti onable proposals was the proposed paragraph (k) which would have 
!.~8 Tel egram, Governor HalvfYn to British Embassy, Has hington, 
October 13 , 1940. FCG S-4- 2-l,M. 
!~9 "Lea se to the United States of America by His Majesty's Govern-
ment in the United Kingdon of Ce rtain Area s of Land a nd \•Tater in 
NevTfoundland," as r eproduced a s a n e nclosure to Memor andum, L.E. 
Emerson, Commissione r for Justice and Defence t o Governor i:!alwyn, 
November 6, 1940 . FCG S-4- 2-l ,C., p . 2 . 
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given the United States "the right, power and authority to use all 
public lands, areas, sites, air£ields, ports, docks, piers, quays, 
berths, ships, repair £acilities, arsenals, magazines and hospitals to 
the extent ,.,hich may become necessary or convenient £or the protection 
o£ the property, instrumentalities and activities o£ the United States, 
or other>-rise to sa£egua.rd its national interests without compensation 
other than reimbursement o£ any additional cost directly resulting £rom 
50 
such use. rr Ttm problems which 1vere to provide major stumbling blocks 
later were dealt with in an equally sweeping manner. In the area o£ 
customs, the dra£t demanded £ree entry on all goods destined £or military 
or civilian personnel and their dependents subject only to the pro-
hibition o£ resale; in the area o£ jurisdiction, the United States de-
manded the right to try anyone arrested on the base, regardless o£ 
nationality, and on the other hand demanded that United States milit ary 
or civllian personnel be deli vered to the American authorities £or trial 
regardless o£ the nature o£ the o££ense or the locale i n which it was 
conunitted. 5l 
On t he receipt o£ the dra£t, Lord Lothian immediately called on 
President Roosevelt and Secretary o£ the Navy Knox. He objected to the 
draft, called i t "too l egali stic" a nd r eported to London that it had 
5° Ibid., p. 3. 
5lrbi d., 9 .4. 
52 been withdra•m by mutual consent. 
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In the same conversation, Secretary Knox pointed to the need 
for some interim agreement beyond the agreement of September 2 because 
it was the opinion of the United States Government that at least 
interim title had to be transferred before funds appropriated by 
Congress could be spent. 53 In view of the early end of the con-
struction season in Newfoundland, such an interim arrangement there 
now assumed first priority. The Naval Attache of the British Embassy 
in Washington and the Embassy's legal advisor met with United States 
Navy officials on October 19 and agreed that a simple letter from the 
Ambassador to the Secretary of the Navy naming the area to be leased 
would be sufficient; the exact boundaries could be set forth in the 
later, more formal agreement. 54 Both London and st. John's concurred 
with the proposed exchange of letters, making only minor suggestions. 55 
A dra:rt -was forwarded f'rom the Washington Embassy to London on 
52 Telegram No. 2307, British Embassy Washington to Foreign Office 
October 15, 191~0. FCG S-4-2-J.,M. It is interesting to note that Lord 
Lothian was so convinced that the Knox draft had b een 'IIi thdra•m, and 
realized that its circulation would cause consider able uproar among the 
Government's affected, that he refused to for\·:ard the draft to St. John's. 
It was only after numerous requests by the Commission of Government thBt 
the British Embassy finally forwarded the draft. It was recej_ved in 
St. John's on November 4 . 
53 Ibid. 
54 Telegram No. 23L~9 , British Embassy, i'lashington t o Foreign Office , 
October 19 , 19L~o. FCG S-4-2-l,M. 
55 Tel egram No. 685, Go,_cernor Halwyn t o Secretary of Stat e for 
Dominion Affairs, October 19 , 1940, FCG S-4-2-l,M and Telegram No. 2821, 
Foreign Office to B;:i tish Embassy Hashington, October 27, 1940 , FCG 
s-4-2-l,M. 
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November 2 and it took yet another prod from 'tiashington to get final 
approval. On November 9, asking for authority to send its letter, the 
British Embassy once more averred to the mood in Washington. "The 
United States GoYernment, " it lvired, "are obviously apprehensive re-
garding the Atlantic and I thire{ the more we can meet them in the rapid, 
practical application of the Bases Agreement, the less likely they will 
be to do any hasty weakening of their naval forces in the Pacific ." 56 
The letters 1·1ere exchanged on November 11, 1940, the substantive letter 
being sent by Mr. Neville Butler, the British Charge in \·!ashington, to 
the Secretary of the State. It read as follm·Js: 
"Dear !11r. Secretary: 
Pending the settlement of the terms of a formal 
lease of the areas to be used as bases under the 
agreement contained in the exchange of notes 
betHeen the Government of the United States and 
ills .tvlajesty' s Government on September 2, 1940, 
I have been authorized to inform you that His 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and 
the Commission of Government of NeHfoundland 
confirm that it has been agreed as follows as 
regards the areas to be leased in Newfoundland: 
1. T:1e: base shall comprise the area set 
out in the schedule hereto, the exact boundaries 
of Hhich shall be embodied in the said lease; 
2. It is hereby agreed that the said area 
shall be leased to the United States for the term 
of 99 years subject to the terms and conditions 
in the said lease; 
3. The United States Government is hereby 
authori zed to commence any works in the sai d area 
necessary to the establish~ent of the said base; 
4. The United States Government shall f orth-
vii th take steps to agree vli th the Government of 
Ne1·1foundland on a procedure to be adopted for t he 
56 Tel egram No. 2612 , British Embassy Hashi ngton to Foreign Offi ce , 
Novembe r 9 , 1940 , FCG S- L~-2- l,C. 
settlement and payment by the United States Govern-
ment of claims of owners of private property for 
compensation for loss or damage which may be caused 
by expropriation. 
Schedule 
A. An air base and army training ground on the 
Argentia peninsula and on two square miles 
south of Little Placentia Harbour. 
B. A naval base in St. John's harbour. 
C. A site for an Army defence force, 160 acres 
north of Quidi Vidi Lake." 57 
On November 28, in a supplementary letter, the follo>-Jing was 
added to the schedule: 
"D. A staging point for land aircraft in the 
immediate vicinity of St. Georges." 58 
Of all the issues which T:~ere to occupy the negotiators during 
the months leading up to the signing of the agreement, none i•Jas more 
hotly debated and more difficult of resolution than the question of 
jurisdiction of the United States over its own forces and over host 
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country nationals on the one hand, and that of the host Government over 
Americans on the other. It v1as raised in early ne'tlSpaper edi torials and 
touched upon in the Commission of Government's first substantive response 
to London 59 and v1as, as >-Till be seen, one of the f i nal issues to be 
negotiated before the Agreement itself was concluded. It was first 
57 Telegram No. 127S, British Embassy, Washington to Foreign Office, 
November 2 , 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,C. 
58 Letter, Lord Lothian to Secretary of State Cordel l Hull, 
November 28, 1940. FCG S-4- 2-l,C. 
59 Telegram No. 591, see ~ . 53 , above. 
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broached informally by the British Government in a telegram to St. John's 
on October 30. At that time, the Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs forwarded some preliminary thoughts for comments by the various 
authorities concerned. In the field of criminal jurisdiction, London 
believed that inside the leased base areas the United States should 
have jurisdiction over its o'~ forces. It believed that United States 
courts should also be accorded jurisdiction over British subjects if the 
criminal offense was related to the protection of the security of the 
bases. All other offenses committed by British subjects within the 
leased areas WOlud be subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts. 
Outside the leased areas, the rules would be those applied in ports 
aboard foreign vessels; that is, while local law ·would in theory apply, 
commanders would in fact exercise jurisdiction over their mom forces 
unless the criminal act involved local nationals in which case local 
law would be applied. Local courts would in any case have jurisdiction 
over all non-United States nationals involved in a case outside the 
leased base areas. A different a~proach appeared to London to be 
warranted in case of civil law suits. Here it was felt that American 
jurisdiction could be accepted i n cases originating in the leased base 
areas if both parties t-~ere United States citizens. If one party was 
American and the other non-American, London proposed to have the cases 
tried in the courts of the nationality of the defendant. (This '"as a 
particularly curious twist since it would have meant that any Newfound-
lander seeking r edress in tort against an American serviceman would 
have had to a~pear in an American court and vice versa.) For civil 
cases originat i ng outside the lea sed areas , London preferred trial in 
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local courts but was willing to consider having cases involving solely 
American parties tried in United States courts, and cases involving 
one American party in the courts o~ the nationality o~ the de~endant. 60 
As might have been suspected, the reaction in St. John's was 
s>-Iift and vehement. "We apprehend," '·Tired Governor Walwyn, "that there 
>-Jill be grave disappointment and even a sense o~ betrayal in New~ound-
land i~ the Americans are given such extensive jurisdiction in this 
country as that contemplated in your Telegram No. 886. '' 61 
The sense of' betrayal was already f'elt among the Cormnissioners 
in St. John's. They waxed to their most eloquent heights: 
"It is possible that the circumstances may be 
such that the devotion o~ the people o~ this 
country to the preservation of' Great Britain 
and the Empire would rise superior even to 
their natural repugnance to such invasions of' 
the sovereignty of' their country as those con-
templated but vie earnestly hope that their 
devotion will not be put to this gevere test 
if' it can possibly be avoided." 2 
No more eloquent words could have been found if' they had been used to 
oppose sending Neivf'oundland' s f'orces into battle at Beaumont-Hamel. 
For i ts part, the Commission of' Government suggested that t he 
Americans should be given no reason to think that they would be granted 
the ·:Ji de jurisdiction contem~lated but only such jurisdi ction as was 
60 Telegram No. 886 , Secretary o~ State for Dominion Af'~airs to 
Governor Hali·IYn, October 30, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,M. 
61 Telegram No. 717, Go·vernor Halwyn to Secretary of State for 
Dominion A~~airs, November 3, 1940 . FCG S-4-2- l ,C. 
62 Ibid. 
Leaf' 62 omitted 
in page numbering. 
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absolutely essential to the safe and e:f:fecti ve use o:f the bases. And 
then the wounds o:f Newfoundla nd's pride bled once more: 
"He also venhure to suggest that it should be 
brought to the attention of the American Govern-
ment that their b a ses wi ll be situated in a 
country in which Brj.tish lav1 has been admin-
istered i n accordance i·li th British standards 
:for a century and a half and that there 1vill be 
no need here to protect themselves against the 
crudeties of law and custom which in the past 
at least have justified demands for extra-
t erritorial j~isdiction in certain parts o:f 
the world." b3 
The Commissi on of Government r e quested that it be a ssoci ated 
i·lith any discussions on this issue so that ' 'there may b e no danger of 
avoi dable conuni tments to the Americans which v1ill provok e protests from 
the people o:f Nei<~ :foundland and the r eby give the enemie s of the Empir e 
a pret ext for assertions that t he r i ghts of a small unit o:f the Empire 
have b e en given av1ay by Great Britai n ·wit hout t he consent of t hos e 
primarily concerned." 64 
It i s not clear f r om t he availabl e r ecord ·Hhet hcr London wa s 
anger e d or amused by this outbtrrs t of l oca l pri de . But i t quickly urged 
St. Jol1..n ' s to stop b eing concer ned a nd to make knOim i ts specific ob-
jecti ons t o the Bri t i sh pr oposal. I t l·las again emphas ized that t her e 
v1a s no i nte ntion to exclude St. John ' s :from t he development of pr o-
pos als and t hat the t elegram 1·1hic h had b rought t he strong response had 
b een p rovis i onal and hypothet ical pr e c i s ely i n order to gain t he viev1s 
of those concer ned . 65 
63 Ibi d. 
61+ Ibid . 
65 Te l e gr am, Secret ary o:f Sta t e for Dominion Affairs to Governor 
Fah:yn, Novemb er 8 , 1940 . FCG S- 1~-2 -l , C . 
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The explosive rejection of what the Conunission considered to be 
far-ranging concessions to the United States in the field of jurisdiction 
was symptomatic of a re-thinking of Ne1-1foundland' s position toward the 
establishment nf the bases. Gradually second thoughts took the place 
of the initial very favorable reaction to the Base Rights Agreement of 
September 2. The Commissioner for Justice and Defense, the Honorable 
L.E. Emerson, a Newfoundlander, \vas in the forefront of this recon-
sideration. In a memorandum to the members of the Conunission of 
November 28 he bluntly stated that the Commission of Government would 
have to come to grips \•li th the real meaning of the September 2nd 
Agreement. "There appears to be no reason, " he held, "based either 
upon the logical results that follm.., from the Agreement Lof September 2, 
l94Q7, nor upon the principle of equity, why, merely because we have 
freely and generously acceded to the desire of the United States Govern-
ment to erect in Newfoundland a first line of defense for the United 
States, we should add a further gift in the nature of monetary contri-
buti ons. " 66 But monetary contribution was not really vlhat Emerson 
had in mind; no one had proposed this. V.lhat Emerson objected to were 
proposals that the United States should be permitt ed to establish its 
bases ~·Tithout paying to Newfoundland taxes, duties and fees. "The 
logical result of the Americans coming here to defend their own land," 
he continued, "s hould be that they \·Till obey t he laws of t his country 
in all respects, and will pay all the taxes and duties vlhich fall to 
b e paid by any other residents of this country. From the equitable 
66 
Memorandum, November 28 , 1940 , File J-4-1940 . FCG S- L~-2-l,X . 
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point of view," it seemed to him, "that not only should we not make monetary 
sacrifices, but we should be receiving monetary considerations. It is 
true that we have waived these, we are not charging rent, but it would 
be both illogical and inequitable if, having waived the payment of rent, 
we also gave to the United States the equivalent of actual cash 
contributions." 67 
The views of Commissioner Emerson had two direct consequences. 
One was an effort to send a delegation to Washington to attempt to 
exact f'ram the United States concessions in unrelated areas. Commissioner 
Emerson resurrected the proposal originally made by the Daily News 68 
that representatives be sent to Washington to make preliminary inquiry 
into the matter of requests for compensating advantages. Primarily, 
Emerson proposed, Newfoundland should seek opportunities to develop 
the export of f'resh and f'rozen fish and fish oils and seek the 
establishment of a separate immigration quota for Newfoundland. 69 
The Commission approved the idea and the suggestion was embodied 
70 in a telegram to London the next day. London took a broader view. 
67 Ibid., p.2. It may be wondered whether Mr. Emerson later shared 
the views of his successor as Commissioner of Justice and Defense, Hon. 
H.A. Winter, who wrote i n a draft despatch to the Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs on October 5, 1945 that "the large volume of steady 
employment at high wages upon the Bases during the war years has been 
responsible, more than anything else, for the present widespread 
prosperity and national surplus. " FCG, Old Box 147. 
68 see p. 35, above. 
69 Draft Message circulated to the Members of the Commission, Dec-
ember 19, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l ,C. Newfoundland was included as a sub-quota 
of Great Britain and not entitled to its own quota as had been the case 
between 1924-1934. 
70 Telegram No. 800, Governor Halwyn to Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, December 20, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,C. 
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It believed that these requests, while in themselves appropriate 
subjects for negotiation with the United States, should not become 
part of the leased bases negotiations, fearing the resulting counter-
demands by the United States. London therefore suggested that the 
St. John's authorities consult with the British Embassy in Washington 
but saw no point in sending a delegation to Washington until the 
Embassy felt the time to be propitious.71 While the Commission of 
Government immediately seized on this suggestion72 the Embassy delayed 
its reply until it was clear that negotiations for the Agreement were to 
get underway and then suggested that in view thereof, the despatch of a 
delegation to Washington was unnecessary.73 
Meanwhile, and also as a result of the development of revised 
attitudes, the Commission of Government had taken steps to prepare for 
negotiations, should they be authorized. Dr. Raymond Gushue was ap-
pointed to head a special committee to look into the possible concessions 
that might usefully be asked of the Americans. In a report dated 
December 13, 1940 "torhich apparently did not reach the Commission until 
after Christmas, Dr. Gushue examined the various proposals which had been 
made. He recommended against any effort to have the tariff lowered on 
fresh and frozen fish because Canada would benefit from any such action 
by virtue of the most-favored-nati on clause of the American-Canadian 
trade agreement and as a result would continue to be able to undersell 
7l Telegram No. 1042, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to 
Governor Walwyn, December 24 , 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,C. 
7 2 Telegram No. 28, Governor Vlalwyn to British Embassy, TtJa shington, 
December 29, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,C . 
73 Telegram, Secretary of Stat e for Dominion Affairs to Governor 
Halwyn, January 11+, 1941. FCG S-4-2- 2 ,M. 
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Newfoundland exporters. On the other hand, he felt an effort might be 
made to obtain a specific purchase quota from the United States for 
fish products. He believed that any effort to obtain a repeal of the 
processing tax on fish oils would require Congressional approval and 
therefore be likely to fail. The idea of a purchase quota, however, 
appealed to Dr. Gushue and he recommended that an effort be made to 
obtain such a quota for silver and black fox fur exports. He recom-
mended against a push for a separate immigration quota since there was 
opposition to any wartime transfer of assets by Newfoundlanders and the 
United States was unlikely to accept prospective immigrants without 
some personal funds. 74 In light of Dr. Gushue's analysis, a Newfound-
land mission to Washington would undoubtedly have had a difficult time 
obtaining any meaningful concessions and it would appear that London 
was wise in throttling the NeHfoundland approach. While agitation for 
compensation in Q~related areas subsided during the remaining period of 
negotiation, not all elements of the Newfoundland community had 
accepted the idea. In a formal submission to the Commission of Govern-
ment, Mr. H. T. Renouf, Secret ary of the Newfoundland Board of Trade, 
held that the acquisition by the United States of bases in Newfoundland 
presented an "unequalled" opportunity for the negotiation of a reciprocal 
agreement under which "advantages of great importance to the vJell-being 
of the people of this Island may be obtained. " 75 Mr. Renouf, in 
careful phraseology, suggested that these negotiations should be con-
ducted "with a view of securing such economic and/or financial benefi ts 
7h 
· Memorandum, Dr. R. Gushue to Commission of Government, December 13, 
1940. FCG. S-4-2-l,X. 
75 Letter, H.T. Renouf t o Gov. Halwyn, January 2 , 1941. FCG S-1+-2- 2, M. 
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as ,..,ill be reasonable under the circumstances" and suggested that the 
Commission establish a consultative committee of local representatives 
for the purpose. 76 There is no record that this was done. 
Of the questions being considered prior to actual commencement 
of negotiations, that of legal jurisdiction was, as has been shown, 
by far the most explosive. Two other issues proved similarly thorny. 
The first of these was the question of customs. There was little doubt 
that materials for the construction of the bases and actual military 
equipment would be admitted duty-free but what items were to be per-
mitted for the individual serviceman, for the contractor employee, for 
dependents? In the eyes of the Commission of Government, a very guarded 
approach was necessary. Hhen the first commanding officer of the first 
American survey party requested to be permitted to import two trucks, 
one car, survey equipment and some consumables, he was given only 
temporary permission to import these i tems duty-free subject to later 
re-negotiation and v1as told that no more tha n 500 cigarettes could b e 
brought in duty- f ree by anyone. 77 
In revievTing the period of reappraisal and reconsi deration 
characterized by the Emerson memorandum, i t appears quite probabl e that 
this activity and the r esult_ant attitudes in the f ield of customs wer e 
stimulated not only by the passage of time and the opportunity for 
r econsi deration vlhich it presented but also by the receipt i n St. John's 
of the Knox draft. 78 The Commi ssion, already s ensi t i ve t o a possi ble 
Ameri can assertion of powersbeyond those c0nsidered to be absolutel y 
76 Ibid. 
77 Memor andum of Conversation, Commissioner Penson, Major Bruton 
(U. S. Army) , Mr . Sundell, United St ates Vi ce Consul, October 16, 1940 . 
FCG S-4-2- l ,M. 
78 see p . 55, above . 
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essential to the military purposes at hand, rejected the whole philosophy 
which it saw embodied in that dra:f't. "We do not consider that any useful 
purpose would be served by comment in detail on the clauses of' the dra:f't 
lease," the Commission wired to London. "Most of' them are so wide as to 
justif'y their rejection in principle." 79 The Commission went further: 
"It is our belief' that it would be a grave error 
on the part of' the United States Government to 
press f'or the extensive powers and privileges 
contained in the lease. It would mean that they 
w·ould begin a long period o:f intimate association 
with this country in an un:favorable atmosphere 
which, as the bears go by, might develop into 
antagonism." 8 
In the area o:f customs duties, the proposals contained in the 
Knox dra:f't seemed particularly odious. '"We trust," the Commission 
telegraphed to London, 
"that the point of view o:f the United States Govern-
ment >vas not correctly set forth in the Knox draft 
lease, as the claim in respect to customs duties 
appeared there in its most extreme form by proposing . 
that United States importati ons, whether :for Govern-
ment use or for that of any personnel, civilian oS 
military, and for their :families, be duty free ." 1 
That no Ameri can Government could expect, i n a wartime situation, that 
its soldiers would pay customs to a :foreign government whose soil they 
had come to de:fend seems not to have occurred to the drafters of that 
telegram at that time for they continued: 
"He should regard duty :free admission o:f importations 
:for private use of . i ndividuals and their :families, 
79 Te legram No. 814, Governor v.Jalwyn to Secretary of State f or 
Dominion A:f:fai rs, De cember 30 , 1940 . FCG S-4-2-l,C. 
so 
I bid. 
81 Tel egram No . 809 , Governor l'ialwyn to the Secr et ary of State for 
Dominion A:ffairs, December 28 , 1940 . FCG S-4-2- l,C. 
whether military or civilian, as inadmissible, 
but anticipate that the United States Gover~~nt 
might be persuaded to abandon this claim." 
Specifically, the Commission opposed duty-free entry of any 
commodities not directly used in armament or base construction such 
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as food, material for the repair of buildings, fuels, and clothing other 
than service issue. It claimed that it held this view because any 
duty-free entry for such goods 1vould be difficult to administer-- the 
goods might end up in the hands of Newfoundlanders; it would be 
politically difficult for the United States since Newfoundlanders 
would resent inhabitants of the same Island who obtained goods duty-
free 1·1hen they had to pay; and, finally, it would be financially diffi-
cult since Newfoundland needed the money it might collect as duty to 
"pay for the requirements of the Bases." 83 The attitude of the Com-
mission did not develop very much in the next fevT >veeks for 1vhen it 
communicated its views to the British Embassy in Washington just prior 
to the start of formal negotiations, it relented to permit soldiers to 
bring in personal effects (except any cigarettes in excess of 500, liquor 
or private cars) duty-free on first arrival but to require that parcels 
or personal effects received later be dutiable. 84 
82 Ibid. Duties 1·1ould have had to be paid either by the individual 
serviceman or by the Government of the United States and it would seem 
impossible for either to have been Horkable since the Gov·ernment had no 
vTay of controlling, or limiti ng, parcels shipped from home to a service-
man serving abroad. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Telegram No. 3, Governor HalvlYn to British Embassy Hashington, 
January 10, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2,M. 
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~fuile the attitude in St. John's is understandable in terms of 
a search for additional revenue, the willingness of the Secretary of 
State for Dominion Affairs to go along with it is puzzling in light of 
historic British experience with military forces in foreign areas. In 
his "preliminary response" the latter felt that,in addition to the free 
entry of military hardware and construction materials,United States 
Government stores should be permitted free entry if these were not for 
resale. He stated that no other customs concessions v1ere being considered. 
If other goods, such as "canteen goods" were to be allowed customs free 
entry, customs barriers might have to be established between the bases 
and the territory in ivhich they were located vrith the United States 
bearing the cost of such barriers. 85 
The projected arrival of the USAT Edmund B. Alexander in late 
January 1941 required that the issue of customs be at least temporarily 
brought to a head. A modus Yi vendi had to be 1-rorked out even if temporary 
and subject to change as a result of the negotiations for a formal agree-
ment about to begin. The suggestion of the London authorities that the 
Alexander be treated like any other visiting ship 86 v1as obviously not 
satisfactory since the Alexander had an entirely different mission (it 
served as a temporary base for the Army garrison) and was expected to 
remain in port for an indefinite period. The Commi ssion of Government 
therefore proposed that, on the assumption that any temporary modus vivendi 
would be without prejudice to the later negotiations and on the further 
85 Tel egram No. 31, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to 
Governor Halvryn, January 13, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2 ,M. 
86 Telegr am No. 1041, Secretary of State for Domi nion Affairs to 
Governor Hal1·ryn, December 24, 194o. FCG S-L~-2-l,C. 
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assumption that the Knox draft was not acceptable as a basis for dis-
cussion, the following arrangement be presented to the United States 
Government: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
6. 
7. 
The Government of Newfoundland was willing 
to waive harbour and light dues, but not the 
cost of potable water. 
The vessel would be subject to the normal 
quarantine. 
Duty would be waived on ship's stores. 
Military equipment could enter duty-free. 
Consumable stores would be subject to duty but 
Newfoundland would defer the collection of 
such duty until the conclusion of t~e formal 
negotiations. 
Personal effects could be brought ashore duty-
free except for cigarettes in excess of 500 
per person, all liquor and all private cars. 
LJust who might have brought their private cars 
aboard the Alexander was never made clear~ 
All subsequent parcels received by perso~el 
aboard the troop ship would be dutiable. 7 
Anxious to be able to tell Congressional Committees that American 
troops had in fact arrived in Newfoundland, and aware of the proviso 
that the modus vivendi was without prejudice with regard to the final 
agreement, the State Department in Washington agreed to the Newfound-
land proposal on January 22, 1941, only one week prior to the Alexander's 
arrival in St. John's. By no means had the last been heard of the 
customs issue. 88 
87 Telegram No. 6, Governor Walwyn to British Embassy Washington, 
January 12, 1941, FCG S-4-2-2,M. 
88 Telegram, British Embassy Washington to Governor Walwyn, 
January 22, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2,M. 
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Equally difficult as the issue of customs was the problem of 
the acquisition of property for the bases and the concomitant issue of 
expropriation. During October and November 1940, United States officials 
in both St. John's and Washington gave frequent expression to their 
desire to move as quickly as possible toward the establishment of the 
bases and the negotiations leading to the letter :trom Mr. Butler, the 
British Charg~ d'Affaires in Washington, to the Secretary of State 89 
was part of this effort. Until the owners and occupants of' the land 
in question had been moved, however, no actual construction could take 
place. 
In response to the pressure from American of'ficia~s in 
St. John's, the Commission of Government advised London on November 23 
that it believed that the question of expropriation should be settled 
quickly not only to let the Americans proceed but also to give the 
owners maximum notice. The Commission proposed the establishment of' a 
Special Board for this purpose to be presided over by a Justice of the 
Newfoundland Supreme Court assisted by one man :f"rom the field of com-
merce and one man experienced in land values. 9° London asked its 
Embassy in Washington to obtain the views of the American Government. 9l 
Urgency developed as the various forms of expropriation tribunals 
(use of existing institutions, special boards, one-man commissions, etc.) 
89 see p.58 , above. 
90 Telegram No. 760, Governor Walwyn to tue Secretary of' State for 
Dominion Affairs, November 23, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,C. 
91 Telegram No. 990, Secretary of' State for Dominion Affairs to 
Governor Walwyn, November 30, 1940. FCG S-4-2-1,C. 
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were debated between London and St. John's. 92 On November 30, the 
Commission of Government once more expressed its preference for a 
special independent board and made the suggestion that it proceed to 
expropriate provided it could be furnished with some advanced :f'unds --
it suggested the United States advance $20,000. 93 
On December 13, Secretary of State HUll addressed a letter to 
the British Charg~, Mr. Butler, as follows: 
"It is my understanding that the British and 
Newfoundland authorities are in agreement that 
the United States authorities may commence any 
works on the proposed bases in Newfoundland at 
once; that the Newfoundland authorities are pre-
pared to institute immediatelY such condemnation 
proceedings as may be necessary to acquire title 
to privately owned property and subsequently to 
lease such properties to the United States 
Government in accordance with the provisions of 
the basic exchange of notes of September 2, 1940. 
Officers of the United States forces in Newfound-
land are being instructed to communicate with the 
authorities in Newfoundland respecting the re-
lative priorities in which they desire condem-
nation proceedings to be instituted in these 
areas in order that construction may be com-
menced at once and prosecuted without delay. " 94 
The urgency of the matter had become of sufficient importance 
to involve the personal intervention of Secretary Hull. In the 
same letter, Secretary Hull agreed to the procedure which had been 
proposed by the Newfoundland authorities for a special board to be con-
stituted to take evidence and advise the Government of Newfoundland on 
92 The files of the Commission of Government (FOG S-4-2-l,C) 
indicate some concern in London about establishing a uniform method 
throughout the territories in the Western Hemisphere where bases were 
to be established. 
93 Telegram No. 815, Governor Walwyn to Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, November 30, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,C. 
94 NARS No. 450a • 
the payments to be made to dispossessed owners with the following 
understanding: 
1. Any compensation for privately owned pro-
perty would be subject to the agreement of 
the United States Government. This had 
been specifically provided in the exchange 
of notes of September 2, 1940. 95 
2. The United States authorities would be 
freely afforded facilities to make such 
investigations as might appear advisable in 
case of any recommended payments which 
appeared to the American authorities to be 
excessive. 96 
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In spite of the urgency of the matter and the obvious import-
ance lent to it by the American Government, Mr. Butler (uncharacter-
istically) forwarded this letter not by telegram but by mail and it 
did not reach St. John's until December 22. In order to permit work 
to progress, especially at Argentia, some condemnation proceedings 
were conducted in mid-November 1940, and owners were paid the price fixed 
by the Special Board. In view of the first proviso of the mill letter, 
the Newfoundland authorities now were concerned whether the Americans 
would question the level of compensation already awarded and, possibly, 
leave Newfoundland saddled with the need to pay the dif':f'erence. All 
further efforts to move property owners stopped again, pending resolution 
of this question. On January 8, Mr. James Dunn, who had been made 
chairman of the special Interdepartmental Committee within the United 
States Government for the conduct of the base negotiations, suggested 
that the families in question be paid an interim compensation without 
95 See Appendix A. 
96 See NARS No. 450a. Also see FCG s-4-2-l,C. 
-76-
prejudice to the final award. 97 More haggling ensued. st. John's was 
willing to accept the proposed compromise provided the United States 
would be willing to accept an award not more favorable than would be 
acceptable in the United States in comparable circumstances. 98 
By January 15, twenty families had still not been moved from 
Argentia a.nd work could not pxcceed. Washington's impatience grew, and 
it again communicated with the British Embassy. It warned that 
"certain none too friendly members of' Congress 
are taking a close interest in the matter and 
may make trouble if' the matters are too long 
delayed •••• As an example of the mischievous 
interest of certain politicians, the suggestion 
has been made that an amendment be tacked onto 
the "Lend-Lease" Bill providing it should not 
come into operation until His Majesty's Govern-
ment has paid all expenses in connection with the 
expropriation of' land f'9o~ the construction of United States bases." ':J 
100 
The same day Governor Walwyn concurred with the Washington 
Embassy proposal that the families be paid without prejudice to a final 
settlement but the agreement did not reach the State Department in time 
to stay a personal message from Secretary Hull to the American Charg~ 
d'Affaires in London, Mr. Hershel! V. Johnson, reciting the entire back-
ground of' the events and urging Mr. Johnson "to see the Foreign Secretary 
LMr· Ederi7 at the earliest possible moment and place the ••• facts before 
him." He emphasized that the Secretary of' the Navy and the Chief' of' 
97 Telegram No. 4, British Embassy Washington to Governor Walwyn, 
January 8, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2,M. 
98 Telegram, Governor Walwyn to British Embassy Washington, 
January 9, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2,M. 
99 Telegram No. 9, British Embassy Washington to Governor Walwyn, 
January 15, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2,M. 
100 Telegram No. 10 Governor Walwyn to British Embassy Washington, 
January 15, 1941~ FOG S-4-2-2,M. 
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Naval Operations expected to have to testif.y before Congressional 
Committees in the next few days and that they would undoubtedly be 
asked about the status of the proposed bases. "It is unnecessary to 
point out how important it is that they be placed in a position to say 
that there are no obstacles in the way of the immediate prosecution 
of construction." 101 
On January 18, three of the Commissioners visited Argentia. 
The occupants demanded not only compensation but insisted on assurances 
of alternative accommodations. The situation was appraised to be "very 
difficult" but in view of the pressure for speedy action all were 
promised help including the possibility that the Government would set 
them up in abandoned homes nearby, in hotels or boarding houses and 
supply them with furniture. In spite of the obvious difficulties, the 
Commission reported to London that it had decided to go ahead "in the 
belief that from the point of view of the situation of the Empire 
as a whole this risk Lf.e. the risk of not being fully reimbursed by 
the United State!! is preferable to the risk of providing material for 
opposition to President Roosevelt's policy of aid to Britain." 102 
Similar explanations were being made in London. Mr. Anthony 
Eden' s first reaction to the Hull telegram (delivered to him by 
101 Telegram No. 175, Secretary of State Hull to the Charg~ in 
the United Kingdom, January 17, 1941. Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States (Diplomatic Papers). Volume III, 1941, 
The British CoDDnonwealth, The Near East and Africa (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1959}, pp. 60-61. 
102 Telegram No. 33, Governor Walwyn to Secretary of' State for 
Dominion Affairs, January 18, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2,M. 
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memorandum :tram Charg~ d'Affaires Johnson on January 20) was to express 
his regrets at the delay and to assure Johnson that he would do every-
thing in his power to solve the problem. 103 On January 21 he handed 
Johnson the :following memorandum: 
"There has been no desire on the part of the 
Newfoundland Government to adopt other than a 
helpful attitude with regard to the initiation 
of construction work on the bases to be leased 
to the United States in the Island in spite of 
the inevitably short time available for making 
arrangements in regard to the local inhabitants. 
The memorandum of' the 2oth of January refers to 
the question of procedure for compensation to 
those owners who are dispossessed in order to 
provide sites for the bases. The sole concern 
of the Government of Newfoundland in this con-
nection has been to find a procedure which 
would be equitable to the United States Govern-
ment. The question of' procedure is, of' course, 
one which bas to be considered in relation not 
only' to Newfoundland but also to all the colonies 
concerned and it is proposed to discuss it gener-
a.lly at the forthcoming conference in London. 
In the meantime, in order that there may be no 
delay in beginning construction work in the 
Island, the Government of Newfoundland have 
agreed that, without prejudice to the general 
discussions, compensation should be paid to 
certain numbers of the owners who are being 
dispossessed immediately, the compensation being 
provided out of' a fund supplied for that purpose 
by the United States authorities. In order to 
enable this interim procedure to be rapidly put 
into effect, they are arranging to provide at 
once, at considerable expense to themselves, 
alternative accommodations for the persons 
concerned. 
In the circumstances, the immediate question 
appears to be satisfactorily disposed of, and 
it is assumed the United States Government will 
not think it necessary to discuss Lbefore the 
103 Telegram No. 212, American Embassy London to Secretary of' 
State, January 20, 1941. NARS No. 458. 
Congressional Committei7 in detail the course 
of events referred to in the memorandum of 
2oth January ,LConcerning the delay in obtaini~ 
the land for base construction in Newf'oundlan~. " 
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104 
On January 22, the British Charg~ in Washington wired Governor 
Walwyn that the Embassy had explained the situation at Argentia to 
the State Department and had suggested that addi tionaJ. sums be made 
available for temporary quarters. The state Department had expressed 
its appreciation for the action taken by the Newfoundland authorities 
and had agreed to provide the additional :f'unds. At this time the 
final formula for the payment of compensation was also worked out: 
the Special Board would decide on its award, the award would be 
approved by the Government o:f Newfoundland, then by the United states 
authorities and payment would be made with the United States Government 
reimbursing the British Government for the payments made. In the case 
of disagreement with the size of the award the final award would be 
decided upon by an Arbitration Board set up by the British and American 
Governments. 105 Construction at Argentia was actua~ started on 
December 29, 1940. lo6 
104 Telegram No. 225, American Embassy London to Secretary of 
State, January 21, 1941. NARS No. li61. 
105 Telegram No. 14, British Embassy Washington to Governor l-lalwyn, 
January 22 , 1941. FCG S- 4- 2- 2,M. It is i nteresting to note that in 
fact all awards recommended by the Newfoundland Board were approved by 
the United states Government and the Arbitration Board was never 
activated. 
lo6 United States Navy, Building the Navy ' s Bases in World War 
Histo o:f the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil E ineer Corps 
19 0- 19 Washington: United States Government Pri nting 0 i ce , 7) 
Vol. I, p. 39 . 
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PART III - THE LONDON NEGOTIATIONS 
For a while, at least, it seemed as if everything about the 
negotiations for the proposed Leased Bases Agreement was going to 
be extremely difficult. There was, for example, no agreement on the 
place where the negotiations were to be held. From the beginning, 
the British Government had assumed that they would be held in London; 
the American Government had consistently assumed that the talks would 
be held in Washington. The British Government was placed on notice 
that it would be asked by the Opposition in the House of Commons on 
November 20, 1940 about the status of the negotiations. In its reply, 
first checked with the Newfoundland Government and the Colonial 
Authorities concerned, it stated that the discussions were to be 
held soon "in London" and that the Government of Newfoundland and 
certain colonial authorities had already been requested to send 
representatives.1 There does not appear in the record any indication 
that the United States Government was asked before this response was 
given. On December 13, 1940, however, the Secretary of State, in a 
letter to the British Cbarg~, pointed out that the President was keenly 
desirous that all of the negotiations be carried to a successful con-
elusion as soon as possible and explained that with that in view an 
1 Great Britain, Parliament~ Debates, Fifth Series, Volume 365, 
House of Commons Official Report ~5 H.C.Deb. 55) (London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1940), p. 2030. 
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informal committee composed of representatives from the interested 
American Departments had been appointed to handle these negotiations 
"in Washington." 2 On December 20, Ambassador James Dunn, who had been 
appointed to head this Interdepartmental Committee, again advised the 
British Embass,y that the United States Government desired that the 
negotiations be held in Washington. "Mr. Dunn made it clear that the 
Administration felt that in present circumstances, it would not be 
practicable for American officials with the necessary qualifications 
to be sent to London to conduct negotiations there." The British 
Embass,y immediately voiced its objections to Dunn's views but promised 
to report to London. 3 In response to the reaction by the British 
Embassy, Ambassador Dunn checked his instructions and on the next day, 
December 21, stated that the view favoring the locale of the talks in 
Washington was shared by all the Cabinet Ministers concerned and by the 
President. 4 
Immediately a:f'ter the Christmas-New Year's holiday, the British 
Government made a concerted effort to obtain American agreement to have 
the talks held in London. On January 3, the British Embassy addressed 
an Aide-Memoire to the Department of State which Mr. Butler, the 
Charg~, personally handed to Mr. Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of 
2 See Aide-Memoire, British Embassy Washington to the Department 
of State, January 3, 1941 in Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United States. The British Commonwealth, The Near East and Africa, 
Vol. III, 1941 (washington: United States Govermnent Printing Office, 
1959), p. 53. 
3 Ibid., and Telegram, British Embassy Washington to Foreign 
Office, December 20, 1940. FOG S-4-2-l,C. 
4 Telegram, British Embassy Washington to Foreign Office, Dec-
ember 21, 1940. FCG S-4-2-l,C. 
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State. In the Aide-Memoire, it was pointed out that His Majesty's 
Govermnent "are • • • most anxious that these negotiations be conducted 
in London •••• They have ... reluctantly came to the conclusion that 
to hold the negotiations in Washington would present the most ~o~idable 
difficulties from the point of view of the British authorities."5 The 
Aide-Memoire held fUrther: 
"In view of the complexity o~ the issues involved 
and o~ the number o:f separate administrations 
concerned, it will be necessary for the British 
authorities during the discussions to have the 
advice of representatives t.rom a number of 
different departments, both civil and mill tary, 
of legal advisors, and of Colonial experts. A 
large interdepartmental committee has in fact 
been sitting in London :for same months past to 
consider the administrative and other questions 
involved in the leases, and all the necessary 
personnel is available there. It is, however, 
feared that it would be quite impracticable :for 
these persons to be spared to visit Washington 
in present circumstances when so many demands are 
being made upon their time in connection with 
the day-to-day conduct of the war. " b 
The Aide-Memoire also pointed out that it was particularly desirable 
that Newfoundland and Bermuda and the other colonies should be directly 
represented during the negotiations and that arrangements to this 
effect could be made without great difficulty in London but considerable 
complications would be caused i~ the discussions were to take place 
in Washington. 7 Butler's presentation was apparently quite persuasive; 
at any rate, Sumner Welles records that he told Butler only that 
5 Aide-Memoire, British Embassy Washington to Department o~ State, 
January 3, 1941. NARS No. 423~. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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"further consideration would be given to the question and he would be 
prompt~ advised of our decision in the matter. " 8 
Three days later, the British Government made a. similar pitch 
to the American Charg~ in London. Mr. Eden, in conversation with 
Mr. Johnson, asked that the venue of the discussions be London because 
the British Government would be unable to send experts to Washington 
at this time. "Both he and the Prime Minister would be more than grate-
:t'uJ. if we could help them out of' very real difficulty by consenting to 
have the meeting of experts take place in London," Mr. Johnson reported 
and, in concurring in the request, advised Washington that 
Eden's considerations were not overdrawn. 9 
On receipt of this telegram, Under Secretary Welles informed 
Charg~ Butler that the President had final~, although reluctantly, 
consented to have American experts proceed to London. 1° Charg~ 
Johnson was informed of the decision by telegram and of the designation 
of the following officials to take part in these negotiations: 
Mr. Charles Fahy , Assistant Solicitor General, 
Department of Justice; 
Colonel Harry J. Maloney, FA, United States Army;1fnd Commander Harold Biesemeier, United States Navy. 
(Both Maloney and Bieseme~ had been members of the original Greenslade 
8 Memorandum of Conversation by Under Secretary of State, Mr. 
Welles, January 4, 1941. NARS No. 535. 
9 Telegram No. 60, American Embassy London to Secretary of State, 
January 7, 1941. NARS No. 419 
10 Memorandum of Conversation by the Under Secretary of State, 
Mr. Welles, January 7, 1941. NARS No. 495 
11 Telegram No. 102, Secretary of State toAmerican Embassy, London, 
January ll, 1941. NARS No. 419 
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Mission.) The appointment of the negotiating team was publicly 
announced on the same day, along with an indication that the group 
12 
was to leave for London via Lisbon by clipper plane on January 17. 
When the authorities in St. John's learned of the decision to 
send an American delegation to London, they immediately requested that 
the Newfoundland delegation (Commissioners Emerson and Penson) be 
pe~tted to travel to London on the same aircraft and arrangements 
were made to this effect, giving the CoDBDissioners time for a short 
stop in Washington en route. 13 While they did not have an opportunity 
to call on any American officials, they did have talks with British 
Embassy officials who had been carrying on the preliminary discussions 
and reported that they felt reassured about the formula on expro-
priation which had just been agreed. One more hurdle had been overcome 
and negotiations were ready to begin in London on Tuesday, January 28. 
There were still many obstacles in the way of final agreement. 
As the two parties were about to meet in London for the 
detailed negotiations, the American position was still based on the 
Knox draft. In spite of Secretary Knox's personal withdrawal of the 
dra:rt in his conversation with Lord Lothian on October 5, 1940 11~ 
the American delegation had never been informed of its withdrawal. 
12 Department of State Press Release, January 11, 1941. FCG 
s-4-2-2,M. It is difficult to assess the underlying cause for the 
disagreement over the venue. In London there was an obvious reluct-
ance to spare the negotiators for any length of time from their other 
wartime duties; Washington may have been motivated more by bureau-
cratic inertia than by any other factor. 
13 Telegram No. 7, Governor Walwyn to Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, January 12, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2,M. During the period 
when Britain was at war and the United States was neutral, the Pan-
American clipper left from Baltimore and flew to Lisbon via the Azores. 
The flight then went :f'rom Lisbon to London. 
14 
see p. 56 , above. 
-85-
Indeed, Ambassador Dunn's letter of December l3 to Mr. Butler indicated 
as much and Mr. Butler asked his legal advisor to speak to the legal 
advisor at the State Department. l 5 This, however, seems to have had 
little effect in as much as the instructions to the American uegotiators, 
signed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and dra:rted in the State 
Department by the Director of the O:f:fice of European Affairs, John D. 
Hickerson, authorized negotiations on the basis of dra:rt leases pre-
viously handed to the British Government. All changes were subject to 
l6 
washington's approval. 
The British delegation, on the other hand, was working :fran 
an entirely different docmnent. On December 3l, Viscount Cranborne, 
the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, sent a letter to Governor 
Walwyn enclosing a memorandum prepared as a basis for instructions to 
the British delegation. He asked for canment thereon by the Government 
of Newfoundland but Newfoundland's negotiators had apparently lef't 
before the letter, sent by mail, was received and no formal comments 
by the Commission are recorded. l 7 The British memorandum which in its 
preamble suggestEd it "should serve as a basis for instructions to be 
given to the British experts who will negotiate • • • with the experts 
designated by the United States Government to settle the terms of the 
proposed leases 11 was dated December l7, l940 and entitled "Administrative 
Questions. 11 It covered nine major topics and, in an Annex, addressed 
l5 Telegram, British Embassy Washington to Foreign Office. 
December l3, l94o. FOG S-4-2-l,C. 
l6 Instructions to the Negotiators, January 15, l94l. NARS No. 505A. 
l 7 Letter No. 469 (Secret) Viscount Cranborne to Governor Walwyn, 
December 3l, l940. FOG S-4-2-l,C. 
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itself in detail to one of these, the question of currency in the 
American bases. 
In the area of immigration, the British proposed that all United 
States citizens would have to comply with Colonial immigration laws. 
Those who landed directly on leased land were thought to need only to 
conform to the local quarantine law~ and to ordinar.y regulations 
respecting health. 
In the area of shipping, which was to cause considerable dis-
cussion in the negotiations to follow, the British authorities proposed 
that United States ships which proceeded directly to ports in the 
leased areas, without passing through a British port, should be liable 
to pay harbour dues, light dues and pilotage dues if services with 
respect to these dues were rendered. The British were adamant that 
United States coastwise shipping laws could not be applied so as to 
exclude British shipping from trade between the United States and the 
18 leased areas. 
In the field of customs duties, the draft instructions stated 
at the outset : "We do not consider that any customs concessions should 
be granted in respect to goods imported into the leased areas from the 
United States of America except that exemption should be accorded to 
18 Ibid., Annexed Document, p.l, para.4. It is unclear why there 
was such-a-Btrong point made of this during the entire negotiations 
although it was a "straw man" since there was never any intention on the 
part of the United States to exclude British shipping. Great Britain 
was traditionally opposed to the United States Merchant Marine Act of 
1920 (the so-called Jones Act) (46 US C 861) because it prevented 
British bottoms from cartage between American ports and therefore was 
apparently strongly opposed to any extension of its principle, however 
remote the possibility. 
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United States Government stores imported otherwise than for resale." l9 
"We therefore trust, 11 the document continued, "that it may be possible 
to resist the demands for concessions ••• in respect of' goods imported 
into United States leased lands for the personal requirements of 
United States Naval and Military personnel and civilian officials. 11 
But even the drafters of this document must have bad some doubt as to 
the acceptability of this course of' action for they made provisions 
that if such a system of' customs were not acceptable, customs barriers 
might have to be established between the leased areas and the terri-
tories in which they were located and the United States would have 
to be asked to defray the cost of' ~ such special arrangement. 
Another "straw man" was the establishment of' businesses and 
professions by United States citizens competing with local services to 
which the British authorities were strongly opposed.20 There is no 
record of' any such attempt having been made. 
The British draft proposed the use of local postal and telephone 
and telegraph facilities except for military purposes. 
On the lighter side, Paragraph 15 of the document proposed that 
Newfoundland or Colonial traffic regulations should be applied to all 
vehicles using public roads in the United States leased land. This 
presumably would have meant that even inside the bases, drivers would 
have to drive on the left. What earthly difference, other than the 
application of a question of principle, this could possibly have made 
19 Ibid., p. 2, para. 7. Italics in original document. 
20 Ib.d 2 10 --~-·, p. , para. • 
to the host authorities remains quite unclear. Beyond this point, 
however, the draft proposed that if United States vehicles based in 
leased land entered the adjoining territory "they should pay the 
. 21 
appropriate taxatJ.on." 
-88-
The British draft recommended the reservation of mineral rights 
within the leased areas and the right of fishing in the areas adjacent 
to the leased land. Finally the draft endeavored to find language to 
ensure that there would be no discrimination on account of color in 
public vehicles, admission to hotels, etc. While the sentiment was 
there, the words were not nearly as persuasive as those concerning the 
collection of customs duties. 
A comparison of the two documents -- the Knox draf't and the 
British recommended instructions -- show an overbearing, much too broad-
ly based demand for rights on the part of the Americans and a picayunish 
effort to disregard the wartime circumstances under which the Americans 
were to occupy the bases on the part of the British. 
The President's Base Lease Commission, as Messrs. Fahy, Maloney 
and Biesemeier were to call themselves, arrived in London on Saturday, 
January 25, 1940 and on that day conferred informally with Sir Alan 
Burns, Assistant Under Secretary of the Colonial Office, who had been 
designated by the British Government to preside at the business meetings 
of the negotiations. Negotiations were scheduled to begin the following 
Tuesday with a formal opening meeting in the morning and the first 
business session that afternoon. It is interesting to note that Sir 
21 Ib.d J. • ' 
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Alan assumed that with two business meetings each day it might be 
possible to conclude the negotiations in two weeks. 
Actually, the informal meeting on January 25 turned out to be 
the first business session as Sir Alan handed the United States Com-
missioners the suggested agenda for the talks. While a few subjects, 
of a non-administrative nature, had been added since December 17, the 
outline of the December 17 background paper is clearly discernable in 
the suggested agenda: 
"1. Form of the lease or other document. 
2. Provision as to satisfactory use of leased 
territory. 
3. Boundaries of sites. 
4. Questions relating to the ~litar.[lservices 
(a) command and policy as to defense, (b) 
reciprocal use in peace and war of: (1) naval 
bases, anchorages and dockyards, (2) military 
airdromes, (c) radio stations, (d) local 
flying regulations (e) meteorological stations, 
(f) hydrographic surveys. 
5. Jurisdiction. 
6. Apprehension and surrender of offenders. 
7. Regulations in areas (e.g. health, gambling, 
etc.). 
8. Immigration and Shipping (a) immigration laws; 
(b) quarantine (including plant quarantine); 
(c) P8\YJilents by United States ships of (1) 
harbour dues, (2) light dues, (3) pilotage 
dues; (d) nature of lights put up by United 
States Government; (e) coastwise shipping; 
(f) harbour facilities in leased areas for 
British and other shipping. 
9. CUstoms duties. 
10. Import and export control in time of war. 
ll. Financial (a) currency, (b) exchange control. 
12. Establishment of' businesses and pro-
fessions by United States citizens and 
others in leased areas. 
13. Employment of' local labour. 
14. Use of' British and local goods. 
15. Postal and telegraph (a) postal facilities, 
(b) cable, wireless and telephone facil-
ities in leased areas, (c) censorship in 
time of war. 
16. Traffic regulations in leased areas. 
17. Particular rights to be reserved in leased 
areas, e.g. (a.) minerals and oil, (b) 
treasure trove, (c) antiquities, (d)f'ishing 
and other local industry. 
18. Expropriation of' private property. 
19. Treatment of' colored population. 
20. Additional costs of administration due to 
establishment of' United States bases. 
21. Additional compensation to Newfoundland and 
the colonies. 
22. Civil Aviation. 
23. Liability of United States contractors to 
Newfoundland or Colonial i~2ome tax, 
professional :fees, etc." 
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The draft agenda handed to the American Commissioners by Sir 
Alan Burns became the basis of further discussions and has for that 
reason been reproduced here in fUll. To understand the negotiations 
that followed it is often necessary to revert to the agenda to see just 
why a particular item should be creating such difficulty of agreement. 
As predicted, the meeting on the morning of' January 28, under 
the chairmanship of Viscount Cranborne, was one of :formality and the 
22 Telegram No. 294 from the President's Base Lease Commission to 
the Secretary of State, January 25, 1941. NARS No. 481. 
negotiations started in earnest that afternoon. The American Com-
mission requested the addition of five agenda headings: 
" (a) Those items included in the draft leases 
submitted by the United States. 
(b) The right of an official to employ such 
legal assistance as he may require to defend 
himself in suits involving acts done under 
the authority or color of his office. This 
assistance covers attorneys who are not 
members of the local bar. 
(c) The following paragraphs of the draft 
agenda require clarification in as much as 
the problem stated is not understood: 
par~aphs 4(c) [radio station!J, 
10 import and export control in time of 
w~ , 20 Ladditional costs of administration 
due to establishment of' United States base if 
and 21 ~ditional c~ensation to Newfound-
land and the colonie!f. 
(d) Right to make surveys outside the leased 
areas. 
(e) Upon the signing of the leases immediate 
possession of the sites shall be given." 23 
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Discussions of the agenda items began that afternoon and covered 
the first nine items. Discussion of' the form of the lease (Item 1) was 
deferred at the request of the American delegation which was seeking 
instruction on this from Washington. "Provision as to satisfactory use 
of the leased territory" (Item 2) turned out to be a British proposal 
that the leased areas revert to the British Government if' not used. The 
Americans held that there could be no reversion except by formal act of' 
the American Government. A:f'ter some discussion there was agreement that 
there could be no reversion without formal abandonment by the American 
23 Telegram No. 330, President's Base Lease Commission to Department 
of' State, January 28, 1941. NARS No. 491. 
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Government and that in turn the United States had the obligation to 
give reasonable notice of the intention to abandon the base. The 
question of exact boundaries (Item 3) was referred to a subcoJIIDi ttee. 
Discussion on Item 4 (questions relating to the military services) was 
deferred since the agenda item appeared to raise a number of major 
issues not subject to quick agreement. Items 5 (JUrisdiction), 
6 (Apprehension and surrender of offenders) and 7 (Regulations pertain-
ing to health, gambling, etc.) were referred to ·a jurisdiction sub-
committee. Item 8, which had been generally entitled "immigration 
and shipping'" brought the first recorded observation by the Newfound-
land delegation. They "questioned the possibility of immigration 
control between the bases and the adjacent territory unless the bases 
were subject to the local immigration requirements." 24 The American 
Commissioners maintained that United States Government control over 
both official and private persons should be sufficient. Sir Alan felt 
the item seemed to provide only little difficulty and referred it to 
the Drafting Conmittee. On quarantine (Item Bb) there was no objection 
on the part of the American delegation to the application of local 
regulations. The question of p~ent by the United States for light, 
harbor and pilotage dues (Item 8c) was deferred for future discussion. 
The American delegation agreed in principle with the proposition that 
any lights installed by Americans would have to be erected in con-
formity with local requirements (Item 8d) and requested deferment of 
Item Be (coastwise shipping) pending instruction fioom Washington. 
Similar deferment was given to the remainder of that agenda item. 
24 Ibid. 
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On Item 9 (customs), the Newfoundland representatives, joined by those 
of Bermuda and Jamaica, 11 expressed strong opposition to the :f'ree im-
portation of articles of general use on the grounds of difficulty of 
control and of creating a favored class in the community. 11 A:f'ter some 
discussion, the item was deferred and the American delegation reported 
"this item will probably prove troublesome." 25 
Washington's initial reaction to the first report of its dele-
gates proved at least two points: the American delegation to London 
was not instructed very well and the British side had failed, at least 
in some respects, to read their own telegrams. The lack of instruction 
to Messrs. Fah•7, Maloney and Biesemeier became clear in Washington's 
surprise at the inclusion of that intricate~ worded paragraph (b) in 
the added agenda which o~ a lawyer of considerable deviousness could 
have thought up. 11\'Te do not understand purpose of item (b) in your 
£Telegram No~ 330 which you have proposed for discussion since any 
matter involving action by an American official in.his official capacity 
would be a matter between the two Governments and not one for the local 
tribunals. As regards your proposed (e) .LPossession immediately upon 
signi~, the British Government has already agreed to the immediate 
possession without awaiting the signature of the formal leases. " 26 
But, as mentioned, the Americans were not the only ones pro-
ceeding somewhat confusedly. The United States had on various occasions 
agreed that it would use local labor and local materials to the 
25 Ibid. 
26 Telegram No. 303, Secretary of State to the President's Base 
Lease Commission, London, January 29, 1941. NARS No. 491. 
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maximum extent practicable in the construction of the bases. This 
view had been formally conveyed by letter from Secretary of the Navy 
Knox to the British Charg~ in Washington on November 11, 1940 when the 
United States also agreed that it would pay prevailing local wage 
rates and that these would be determined in consultation with the 
local authorities.27 Nevertheless, the British delegation had included 
items 13 and 14 in its agenda, covering employment of local labor and 
the use of British and local goods. Washington saw no necessity for 
including any provision respecting these matters in the leases in view 
of the assurances previously given. 28 
On the whole, Washington was somewhat surprised at the mention 
of certain items in the British agenda and supposed "that they have 
listed same of these for discu~sion because of the insistence of the 
colonial authorities; and that they will therefore not be disposed to 
press a number of these matters. Should our estimate of the situation 
prove to be incorrect, we shall have, as you doub·tless know, very strong 
views to communicate to you on a considerable number of these points." 29 
Two other specific items are worth mentioning at this time. 
Washington did not believe that questions of command and policy as to 
defense (paragraphs 4(a) and (b) of the draft agenda) should become part 
of the .lease but rather should be settled by separate agreement if 
necessary at all. As regards the application of the Jones Act, 
27 Telegram No. 1395, British Embassy to Foreign Office, November ll, 
1940. FOG S-4-2-l,C. 
28 Telegram No. 303, Secretary of State to President's Base Lease 
Commission, January 29, 1941. NARS No. 491. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Washington saw no difficulty but wanted to check further. 
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The next afternoon the negotiators met again to continue dis-
cussions of' the agenda. Items 10 and ll (import and export controls 
and currency and exchange controls) were referred to a technical 
committee. There was quick agreement, as expected, on item 12 when it 
was stipulated that no pri va.te business would be penni tted in the leased 
areas without the consent of the local authorities and that service 
doctors would not engage in public practice without similar consent. 31 
When Items 13 and 14 (local labor and materials) were raised, 
the American delegates referred to the assurances already given but 
the NewfotuULLand representatives and those of same other territories 
expressed the desire that these points be included in the Agreement 
"for local political reasons." 32 When renewed assurances were given 
during the negotiations, the reference was dropped :from the f'inal 
agreement. In Item 16 (traffic) it was agreed that local traffic rules 
would be obeyed on the islands outside the leased areas, but not in 
the leased areas themselves. The British delegation made clear that it 
wished to reserve mineral, treasure trove and antiquity rights. The 
discussion on expropriation (Item 18) was deferred inasmuch as this 
subject was simultaneously being discussed between the Department of 
State and the British Embassy in Washington. There was quick agreement 
that the leases should omit aey references to the treatment of"colored" 
(Item 19). Items 20, 21 and 22 were deferred for clarification since 
30 Ibid. 
3l Ibid. 
32 Telegram No. 350, President's Base Lease Commission to Depart-
ment of State, January 29, 1941. NARS No. 500. 
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the American delegation had alre~ questioned the meaning o~ these 
items on "additional compensation." When Item 23 (liability o~ United 
States contractors to Newfoundland or colonial income tax) was reached, 
the Newfoundland representatives again participated in the discussions, 
claiming that an exemption from local taxation ~or American contractors 
would give them an advantage over local contractors in being able to 
bid on construction tenders. When the American delegation pointed out 
that American contractors were subject to American taxes, the item was 
de~erred ~or fUrther study. 33 
The next day, having received Washington's comments contained 
34 in :its telegram No. 303, the President 's Base Lease Commission re-
assured Washington, somewhat prematurely, that it was not worried over 
the course o~ the negotiations. The "colonial representatives are 
having a chance to blow ott steam in the ~meetings but are ccm-
35 pa.rati vel.y reasonable in the subconmi ttees and in private discussions." 
In Washington's next instruction, the British Government's 
request for reserved rights of minerals, treasure troves and antiquities 
was accepted and the request for fishing rights in the waters adjacent 
to the leased areas accepted insofar as they were compatible with 
military requirements. Washington also realized that one o~ the pro-
blems surrounding the question of customs was a failure of the British 
side to understand the nature of the American post exchange system. 
33 Ibid. 
34 see p. 93 , above. 
35 Telegram No. 360, President's Base Lease Commission to Department 
of State, January 30, 1941. NARS No. 509. 
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Accordingly it urged the American delegation to make clear that such 
institutions were not private businesses but enterprises under Govern-
ment control which were not authorized to sell to anyone not in the 
service of the United States G~vernment. 36 
Items 10 and 11 (control of imports, exports and currency) raised 
a more important problem as far as Washington was concerned. "We do 
not feel," the instructions to the London delegation read, "that we 
need any written understanding to the effect that official personnel 
shall not be subject to exchange or export and import controls [in the 
leased areaiJ." The Knox dra:rt, which the United States was still using 
as the basis for its negotiations, had envisaged exclusive rights, powers, 
authorities and control only within the leased areas. Currency exchange 
and import and export controls were not among these rights because they 
applied to the areas outside the leased bases. No one had envisaged 
the need for such controls outside the leased areas since American 
personnel would in any case have no rights there; on the other hand 
"any regulations elsewhere in Newfoundland (for example) which might be 
imposed by the Newfoundland authorities would be without effect in the 
leased areas. " 37 
By Friday, January 31, four or five items had been agreed upon 
but the differences in the two approaches had become painfully clear. 
Mr. Fahy and his colleagues reported as follows: 
3b 
"This morning we began discussion of the draft 
leases /Joe. the Knox drartE._7 and, a:rter the 
Telegram No. 319, Secretary of State to President's Base Lease 
Commission, January 30, 1941. NARS No. 491, p.4. 
37 Telegram No. 330, Secretary ot· State to President's Base Lease 
Commission, January 31, 1941. NARS No. 509. 
first three general paragraphs had been 
briefly touched, serious disagreement became 
so apparent that the discussion was adjourned. 
We knew that the British did not like the 
drafts and ffiher_7 • • • intimated this morning 
that they understood the drafts were to have 
been withdrawn." 38 
Later the same d~ the British Foreign Office advised the American 
delegation as follows: 
"Lord Lothian had reported in October a con-
versation with Secretary Knox in which the 
former had expressed the belief that the 
drafts were much too sweeping and the latter 
had agreed that the drafts would be withdrawn. 
Mr. Butler had reported in December that the 
State Department had apparently not been in-
formed of this conversation, that he had 
accordingly expressed the same views and had 
been told that the drafts were not to be pre-
sented in a take it or leave it spirit and 
that ithe United State!Jwould consider 
modifications." 39 
The American Commission then commented as follows: 
"Discussions of the items of the British agenda 
have so far not indicated ~ insuperable diffi-
culties but have indicated a desire on the part 
of the colonies, particularly Newfoundland and 
Bermuda, to restrict the freedom of action of 
our establishments in ma.n;y ways which would 
inure to their pecuniary benefits. They seem 
almost to consider the establishments as groups 
of individuals who, with certain necessary ex-
ceptions, should be subject to local or British 
laws and regulations rather than as units of 
the American armed forces based on territory 
which is being leased to us for 99 years. It 
will be unfortunate if they carry this attitude 
over, as they apparently have every intention 
of doing, into discussions of the rights, powers 
and authorities necessary for us to establish and 
operate the bases efficiently." 4o 
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38 Telegram No. 383, President's Base Lease Commission to Depart-
ment of State, January 31, 1941. NARS No. 512. 
39 Ibid. 
4o Ibid. 
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Nearly all previous communications between Newfoundland and the 
United States had filtered through British hands, either in London or 
Washington, or both. Now, for the first time, the American delegation 
came face to face with the "reappraisal" views expressed in the Emerson 
41 
memorandum and it came as a distinct surprise. 
Mr. Faby and his colleagues sought immediate further clarifi-
cation from their British colleagues. In private conversations, Sir 
Alan Burns, Lord Crariborne and a representative of the Foreign Office 
saw the principle objections to the Knox draft leases in two major 
points : the grant of mill tary powers outside the leased areas in normal 
times as well as in times of emergencies or war; and the extension of 
rights over unlimited "adjacent waters and air spaces." As they saw it, 
the problem was to secure practical application of the fourth paragraph 
42 43 
of Lord Lothian's note of September 2 not more, but no less. 
This reversion to the original exchange of notes of September 2, 
194o worked both ways, of course, and was brought into play by Washington 
as well as London. It was used by Washington on February 6, 1941 to 
make clear the attitude of the American Government toward demands voiced 
in some of the territories, notably Newfoundland, for non-related com-
pensation for the right to establish the bases. "There have been 
suggestions in the Bermuda press, as well as in that of Newfoundland and 
other colonial areas," the State Department advised the President's Base 
41 
see p. 64 , above. 
42 
see Appendix A, p. 2. 
43 Telegram No. 382 from President's Base Lease Commission to 
Depart~ent of State, Janua.ey 31 , 1941. NARS No. 512. 
Lease Commission, 
"that the United States should agree to changes in 
our immigration laws and tariff rates in favor of 
areas in which we are to have bases as a part of the 
destroyer-bases exchange. A recent press article in 
Newfoundland, for instance, pointed out that Britain 
obtained 50 destroyers of great assistance to her, that 
the United States obtained bases of inestimable value, 
and raises the question rather bluntly as to what 
Newfoundland could get out of this exchange; the 
article went on to suggest that we change our 
immigration laws in favor of Newfoundland, and 
agree to admit fish and other Newfoundland products 
free of duty. " 44 
The telegram concluded: 
"It is hardly necessary for me to inform you that 
we could not consider for one moment any such 
request. We decline to recognize that there is 
even the slightest obligation on the part of the 
United States to go beyond the obligations which 
it assumed in the exchange of notes of September 2." 45 
At about this time, the Newfoundland delegation made its first 
substantive report to St. John's. Commissioners Emerson and Penson 
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reported to Governor Walwyn that the United States had not yet abandoned 
the Knox dra:f't, that most matters had been referred to committees and 
that, while agreement in principle was in sight on questions of quarantine, 
harbor, pilot and light dues, coastal shipping, immigration, civil 
aviation, exchange control, the employment of local labor and the 
establishment of private enterprises outside the leased areas, agree-
ment in princi ple had not been reached on two items of major importance 
to Newfoundland: customs and t axes, and juri sdiction. 46 
44 
Telegram No. 394, Secretary of State to President's Base Lease 
Commission, February 6, 1941. NARS No. 517 
45 Ibid. 
46 Tel egram No. 93 , Commissioners Emerson and Penson to Governor 
Walwyn, February 3, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2,M. 
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The first real break in the apparent deadlock came with the 
Harry Hopkins mission to London. Hopkins had arrived in London on 
January 10 as the President's personal envoy to the British Prime 
Minister and tried to have the least possible relationsnip with the 
every day work of the Embassy and of special missions such as those 
of Mr. Fa.hy. However, the United States was without any Ambassador 
(Ambassador Winant did not arrive until later in February) and those 
who had become discouraged by the direction in which the negotiations 
were going sought HopkinS ' assistance. Hopkins spoke with Viscount 
Cranborne on February 2 and Cranborne expressed the hope that the 
United States would not stick too closely to the ~o!J draft leases. 
Hopkins explained that the United States merely sought the practical 
. 47 
application of the spirit of the September 2 exchange of notes. The 
following day there was a private meeting between the three members of 
the American Commission and Sir Alan Burns in an attempt to draw general 
lines of a compromise formula. Sir Alan indicated that the replacement 
of the numerous "rights, power and authority" clauses by an opening 
provision substantially similar to paragraph 4 of the September 2 
note, 
48 followed by an undertaking that the United States would not 
use the power granted over territorial waters or adjacent air spaces 
unreasonably, would be reassuring to the colonies and acceptable to the 
47 Telegram No. 419, President's Base Lease Commission to Department 
of State, February 3, 1941. NARS No. 519. 
48 See Appendix A. The paragraph in question reads as follows: 
"His Majesty's Government, in the leases to be agreed upon, will grant 
to the United States :for the period o:f the leases all the rights, power 
and authority within the bases leased, and within the limits o:f the 
territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the Vicinity o:f such 
bases, necessary to provide access to and defence of such bases, and 
appropriate provisions for their control." 
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British. The American Commissioners recommended this course of action, 
thus effectively dropping the arbitary, sweeping aspects of the Knox 
dra:rt, and stated that they believed that "care:t'ul dra:fting along this 
line would enable us to secure substantially aJ.l. rights, powers and 
authority given in the dra:ft leases. 11 49 
The breakthrough nearly collapsed the· next day when Sir Alan 
Burns met privately with the Colonial representatives. They suggested 
a general amendment to give the Colonial authorities the right to approve 
the details of application of the powers granted. The United States 
Commissioners declined to accept this proposition but there was agreement 
that 11 in the practical application of the foregoing paragraphs there 
shall, as occasion requires, be consultation between the Governments 
concerned." 50 Even this seemingly innocuous clause was later altered 
to read ''between the Government of the United States and the Government 
51 
of the United Ki.ngdan." 
By February l2, Commissioners Emerson and Penson were able to 
report that while the Knox dra:ft had been virtually abandoned by the 
American negotiators, progress on reaching agreement remained slow. 52 
49 Telegram No. 5l9, President's Base Lease Commission to Department 
of State, February 3, 1941. NARS No. 519. 
50 Telegram No. 432, President's Base Lease Commission to Department 
of State, February 4, l941. NARS No. 525. 
51 Canada, A eement Concerni Leased Bases in Newfoundland: 1941-
1952, Treaty Series 1952, No. 1 ottawa: Queen's Printer, 195 , p •• 
(This text of the Agreement, readily available in Newfoundland, will be 
used throughout this paper. It contains several documents but for the 
purpose of this paper only the first document including its annexes and 
supplements are of concern. The short-hand reference wi ll be to Agreement 
of March 2:(, l941. It is reproduced in Annex B.) 
52 Telegram No. 108, Commissioners Emerson and Penson to Governor 
Walwyn, February 12, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2 ,M. 
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Tentative agreement had been reached on the question of jurisdiction 
which seemed satisfactory to both sides. 53 This clause had not yet 
been translated into a draft agreement and was to cause further problems. 
While efforts at dra1'ting individual clauses continued in sub-committees, 
new and previously' unforseen questions needed to be solved. For 
example, strategy demanded the stationing of some American troops at 
Gander, Newfoundland, where Canadian forces operated an airfield 
although this area was clearly not part of the leased area. Could 
American troops there have the same rights and privileges as those 
stationed in the leased areas? The President's Base Lease Commission 
54 
was instructed to obtain agreement to this effect and received 
t t ti th f d later. 55 A t en a ve assurances ereon a ew ays greemen was 
56 d reached that one year's notice would be required for abandonment an 
that in the case of coastwise shipping and the use of harbor facilities, 
British vessels should receive the same rights as American vessels. 57 
Continued difficulties beset the effort to reach agreement on the use 
of American postal facilities when some of the territorial governments, 
including Newfoundland, thought "their prestige would suffer" if 
53 Ibid. See also Telegram No. 432, President's Base Lease Com-
mission to Department of State, February 4, 1941 and Telegram No. 423, 
Secretary of state to President's Base Lease Commission, February 5, 
1941. NARS No. 525. 
54 Telegram No. 343, Secretary of State to President's Base Lease 
Commission, February 1, 1941. NARS No. 528. 
55 Telegram No. 478, President's Base Lease Commission to Depart-
ment of State, February 7, 1941. NARS No. 538. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Telegram No. 479, President's Base Lease Commission to Depart-
ment of State, February 7, 1941. NABS No. 539. 
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American postage stamps were used to despatch mail from the leased 
areas. 58 The United States, on the other hand insisted on its right 
to operate post offices in the leased areas and likened the situation 
to that of vessels in foreign seaports wr~n mail franked with stamps 
of the ship's flag are accepted by foreign post offices. The cost of 
transportation of such mail could be offset by use of the formula already 
in use between Post Offices of various countries. 59 
On February 18 the drafters presented the full committee with a 
new draft which began to approach the shape of the final agreement. 
Obviously, the format of the Knox draft had been essentially abandoned; 
on the other hand there was to be, in Article I, a general description 
of the rights which was intended to meet the original request for a 
spelling out of the rights, power and authority of the United States 
in the leased areas. A draft of such an article was included on 
February 18 but it was not finally agreed to at this point. 60 Indeed, 
when the draft was presented, it was clear that only a limited number 
of articles had received agreement from all the negotiators. These 
were Article VI (Article IX in the final agreement) granting the 
United States the right to employ and use all public facilities in the 
territories on the same basis as the British Government; Article VII 
(later Article X) permitting the United States to make topographic and 
hydrographic surveys outside the leased areas; Clauses (1), (3) and 
58 Telegram Uo. 384, President's Base Lease Commission to Depart-
ment of state, January 31, 1941. NARS No. 510. 
59 Telegram No. 46o, Secretary of State to President's Base Lease 
Commission, February 12, 194L NARS No. 546. 
60 Telegram No. 616, President's Base Lease Commission to Depart-
ment of State, February 18, 1941. NARS No. 579. 
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( 5) of Article VIII (later Article XI) on lights and navigational aids, and 
use of American facilities by British vessels and coastwise shipping. 
In the latter clause, the U~~ted States agreed to include in the Agree-
ment a specific statement that "it is understood that a Leased Area is 
not a part of the territory of the United States for the purpose of 
coastwise shipping laws so as to exclude British vessels from trade 
61 
between the United States and the Leased Areas. " There was agreement 
on motor traffic (Article XII of the final agreement) as previously 
stated; on the use of wireless and cable facilities (Article XV); on 
the status of forces outside the leased areas (Article XIX); on health 
measures outside the Leased Areas (Article XX); on abandonment (Article 
XXI); on the rights of the United States to take away removable improve-
menta (Article XXII);on reservations of minerals, antiquities and 
treasure trove (Article XXV); and on the right of the United States to 
negotiate for additional sites during the period of the lease agreement 
62 {Article XXVII). Of the proposed 28 articles, there was agreement 
on ten, agreement on some clauses of Article VIII and a fair level of 
understanding on quite a few others. Major disagreement still held on 
a proposed Article II on the role of the United States in the de£ense 
of the territories; on the question of jurisdiction; on postage; on 
immigration; on customs; on postal facilities; on censorship; on 
currency; and on income tax. A number of new articles had i.een proposed 
by the drafters including a prohibition of the assignment of the rights 
61 Ibid. See Agreement of March Z7, 1941, Article XI ( 4). See p .145 below. 
62 Ibid. 
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granted to a third party; an article of' definitions and an article on 
modification of' the agreement. The latter was included "to soothe 
colonial sentiments" and was thought by the American negotiators to 
of'f'er no difficulty since "it appears innocuous." 63 
As might have been expected, especially if' the American 
negotiators had been made aware of the views of the New:foundland dele-
gation, one of' the touchiest of the subjects on which there was still 
no agreement was the question of' jurisdiction. The British negotiators 
based their objections on the American views as expressed in the original 
Knox draft and were unwilling to grant to the United States rights of 
original jurisdiction over British subjects charged with non-military 
offenses even if' these were committed inside the leased areas. 64 This 
was a considerable change from the trial balloon sent up on October 30, 
194o and reflected the reaction of the territorial administrations. 
In response~ Washington agreed to exempt from American jurisdiction 
those British subjects who were charged with offenses committed outside 
63 Telegram No. 617, President 's Base Lease Commission to the 
Department of State, February 18, 1941. NARS No. 580. 
64 Telegram No. 555, President's Base tease Commission to the 
Department of State, February 13, 1941. NARS No. 564. Interestingly 
enough, the British negotiators did not until much later accept the 
view reported to them as early as January 13. Following a discussion 
between a British Embassy official in Washington and Judge Hackworth, 
the State Department 's Legal Advisor, the Embassy reported that "the 
President had already emphasized thatthe United States authorities 
did not desire jurisdiction over local inhabitants and had no intention 
of setting up American civilian courts. While the United States 
authorities might claim to exercise theoretical jurisdiction over 
local inhabitants in respect of offenses arising in the leased areas, 
in pra~tice such persons would be handed over to the local courts." 
Telegram, January 13, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2 ,M. 
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the Leased Areas and those who committed offenses inside the Leased 
Areas but escaped from them to the surrounding terri tory before being 
65 
apprehended. What about British subjects charged with non-military 
offenses inside the Leased Areas? Since only military law applied there, 
the British delegates held, civilians could not be tried by military 
courts. Did the United States propose to take these people to the 
66 United states to be tried there by a civilian court? 
A:f'ter the draft af February 18 showed continued disagreement on 
the question, the American negotiators suggested to Washington that it 
might help to achieve agreement if the British side could be assured 
that the right to exercise jurisdiction over British subjects would be 
used only in exceptional circumstances and that all would be tried by 
jury. 67 Washington believed it was necessary to go further and indi-
cated its willingness not to exercise jurisdiction over British subjects 
except as regards offenses committed within the Leased Areas affecting 
the safety of the area or the security of the United States provided 
that the British Govermnent would undertake to apprehend and punish all 
other offenders. If any British subjects were brought to the United 
States for trial, trial by jury was, of course, mandatory except if 
martial law were declared within the United States. Washington's tele-
gram added: "We do not desire to extend jurisdiction over civilians 
65 Telegram No. 505, President's Base Lease Commission to Depart-
ment of State, February 15, 1941. NARS No. 564. 
66 Telegram No. 599, President's Base Lease Commission to Depart-
ment of' State, February 18, 1941. NARS No. 574. 
67 Telegram No. 682, President's Base Lease Commission to Depart-
ment of State, February 22, 1941. NARS No. 603. 
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but we do desire to have the right to do so in case of necessity. " 68 
As the issue neared resolution, there were first suggestions of a 
separate exchange of notes covering the various "attitudes" or 
"interpretations" with regard to jurisdiction but the entire matter 
was finally' included in the Agreement itself not only' in Article IV, 
entitled Jurisdiction, but also in Articles V, VI, VII and VIII all 
of which concern themselves with this subject. The United States did 
retain certain rights of jurisdiction but agreed, if necessar,y, to con-
vene a civilian court within the Leased Area so as to avoid the poss-
ibility of having to transport nationals of the territories to the 
United states for trial. On this point, in particular, Newfoundland 
and Bermuda had voiced strong objection and were reported to be 
"disturbed by the possibility of distant trials. They considered i~ 
a fundamental question of civil rights." 69 While the United States 
initially' believed that it would require Congressional authorization 
to establish a court at a leased base for the trial of non-American 
offenders, it later decided not to follow through on the proposed legis-
lation and as far as is known no such court was ever established, 
certainly not in Newfoundland. 
On February 22, Commissioners Emerson and Penson reported that, 
although the Knox dra:f't had been withdrawn, the United States still 
occasionally made demands in similar terms. They reported that in 
68 
Telegram No. 627, Secretary of State to President 's Base Lease 
Commission, February 26, 1941. NARS No. 632. 
69 Telegram No. 908, Ambassador Winant (London) to President 
Roosevelt and Secretary of' State Hull, March 8, 1941. NARS No. 669. 
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spite of generous offers by the British side on the question of customs, 
70 post office and jurisdiction no agreement was in sight. The develop-
ment in the area of jurisdiction has already' been described. Just what 
Commissioners Emerson and Penson held to be "generous" in the field of 
customs remains difficult to discern for on February 21, following a 
. 71 
meeting of the British Cabinet Committee, the British delegation 
still proposed to give free entr,r only to personal and household effects 
(except cars) on first entry and insisted that goods destined for ship's 
stores and Post Exchanges were dutiable. It reportedly reached this 
position because of the "desire of all the colonies for increased 
revenue." 72 
It was this type of thinking, and the resultant delays, which 
caused Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to summon the newly-
appointed British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, to his office on Februar,r 25. 
He expressed to Lord Halifax the disappointment of the United States 
over the delay in the conclusion of the London negotiations. He 
70 Telegram No. 139, Commissioners Emerson and Penson to Governor 
Walwyn, February 22, 1941. FOG S-4-2-2,M. 
7l Consisting of Lord Cranborne, Secretary of State for Do~nion 
Affairs; Lord ffialter Edwai§f Moyne, who assumed the post of Secretary 
of State for the Colonies following the death of Lord Lloyd on 
February 4, 1941; Mr. Arthur Greenwood, Minister without Portfolio; 
Mr. L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India; and Mr. R. A. Butler, 
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The members of the 
committee were reported by Messrs. Emerson and Penson in their Tele-
gram of February 22; for titles refer to Winston S. Churchill The 
Second World War: Volume III: The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 1949) , Appendix H. 
72 Telegram No. 672, President's Base Lease Commission to Depart-
ment of State, February 21, 1941. NARS No. 598. 
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explained that the Appropriations Committees in the two Houses of' 
Congress now had before them the request for the appropriations necessary 
to carry out the defense facilities required in the bases and it "gave 
rise to a great deal of' undesirable conjecture and debate when it had 
to be admitted that the leases had not yet been agreed upon." 73 Mr. 
Welles told Lord Halifax that the Department of State was about to 
recommend to the President that he send a personal message to Mr. 
Churchill expressing his hope that the leases would soon be agreed 
upon and explaining the serious situation which was developing on the 
part of American public opinion with regard to the present situation. 
Lord Halifax asked that such a message be delayed until he could present 
a communication from his Government just received. This was agreed. 
The next day, Lord Halifax presented a memorandum which re-
hearsed the major areas of differences (apparently as culled from 
various communications received by the British Embassy in Washington 
from the Foreign Office) • The tone of the memorandum was, in part, 
just sufficiently patronizing to raise a distinctly adverse reaction 
on the part of' some members of the State Department. In part, it 
stated: 
"While the British authorities are naturally 
particularly concerned to protect the interest 
of the local inhabitants for whose welfare they 
are responsible, it is felt that it is equally 
to the advantage of the United States authorities 
to see that the leases are drawn up in such a 
manner as to reduce to the minimum the causes 
of friction between the various parties concerned. 
73 Memorandum of' Conversation by Under Secretary of State Welles, 
February 25, 1941. Foreign Relations, III (1941), 68-69. 
The leases are to run for a period of 99 years, 
and that being so, it is clearly necessary that 
their long term effect upon the wellbeing of' the 
local inhabitants should be taken into account. 
It would seem, however, that the instruction 
sent to the United States Delegates in London 
make it difficult for the latter to p~ due 
account to the interests of the different 
territories, and their inhabitants, and compel 
them to put forward demands for concessions or 
facilities which would not seem to be esse~~ial 
for the defense or control of the bases. 11 
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As examples, the memorandum singled out the question of juris-
diction and the question of shipping. In the latter case, it mentioned 
both the question of exemption from harbor dues and the question of 
coastwise shipping. On the last of these, agreement had already been 
reached with the presentation of the revised dra:f't of February 18 and 
the British Embassy in Washington, apparently uninformed, had picked 
a poor example. 7 5 
On March 1, a:fter considerable drafting within the State 
76 Department, Secretary of State Cordell Hull presented Lord Halifax 
with a memorandum in reply. The prickly short hair on the back of the 
necks of some Washington diplomats is discernable even in the short 
covering memorandum which uses such phrases as "I have gone into this 
matter with great care" and "I have also indicated thetenor of the 
instructions ••• which have already been sent to American delegates 
in London. 11 77 
74 
Ibid.' p. 70. 
75 
see p. 105 , above. 
76 See NARS No. 707. 
77 Letter, Secretary of State Hull to the British Ambassador, 
Lord Halifax, March 1, 1941. Foreign Relations, III (1941), 72. 
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In the attached Memorandum, the United States referred 
specifically to the issues raised. As to jurisdiction, it expressed 
the belief that the new instructions sent to the American delegation 
on February 26 78 should provide sufficient concessions to assure 
~eement. The question of harbor and light dues, in which the 
British had contended that American public vessels should not have 
greater exemptio~ than those granted to similar ships of the Royal 
Navy appeared to take an approach which the United States could not 
accept. The American argument held first of all that British pUblic 
vessels of the type corresponding to United States public vessels 
probably used ports in these outlying possessions only on infrequent 
occasions and that the payment of light and harbor dues "from one 
British pocket into another" would be a matter of little consequence. 
American public vessels, on the other hand, would use the ports 
constantly and would be PS\V'ing large sums into the local treasury 
"for the use of a leased base which under the agreement they would 
have a perfect right to use without charge." 79 The memorandum, 
apparently taking account of the report of the American delegates of 
Bo 
February 21 then states: 
78 
"It is not clear :f'rom the British contention 
whether same reasonable contributions by 
American public ships to the upkeep of the 
local aids to navigation is contemplated 
see p.l08, above. 
79 Memorandum, the Department of State to the British Embassy 
at Washington, March l, 1941. Foreign Relations, III (1941), 73. 
80 
see p.l09, above. 
or whether this is a matter of raising new 
revenue • 
••• If new revenue is the point at issue, it 
is easy to understand how the expenses in-
volved in the use of these bases ffiy American 
public vessels for light and harbor duei/ 
would amount to considerable sums annually 
and to huge sums over a period of 99 years. 
• • • Furthermore, the British Govermnent seems 
to have overlooked the statement in the ex-
change of notes bgtween the Secretar,y of State 
and Lord Lothian 1 wherein it stated that ••• 
'All the bases and facilities referred to ••• 
will be • • • free fran all rent and charges 
other than such compensation to be mutually 
agreed on to be paid by the United States in 
order to compensate the owners of private 
property for loss by expropriation or damage 
arising out of the establishment of the bases 
and facilities in question.' 
No one ever thought of charges on United 
States Government vessels for the privilege 82 of entering or departing from these bases." 
-ll3-
On coastwise shipping, ~~e memorandum referred to the agreement 
already reached. Finally it came to grips with Lord Halifax's com-
plaint about the absence of broad instructions to the American 
delegation: 
81 
82 
"Every consideration has been given at all 
times to meet in as far as possible the desires 
of the local territories, but it must be said 
that many of the points which have caused 
delay in the discussions have referred to 
matters in which apparently it has been the 
desire of the local authorities to have pro-
visions inserted which would circumscribe the 
rights' considered by the United States Govern-
ment as necessary and in accordance with the 
September 2, 194o, see Appendix A. 
Memorandum of March 1, 1941. Foreign Relations, III (1941), 74. 
principles laid down in the exchange of notes 
of September 2, 1940. 
• • • It would be unfortunate if' the British Govern-
ment, by a continuation of' the discussion of such 
matters as customs, harbor and light dues should 
cause these Committees /_Of CongresiJ to gain an 
unfavorable iqpression at a time when the American 
Government is doing its utmost in an ettgro to be 
of assistance in the world situation." 
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At about the same time that Lord Halifax arrived in Washington 
to assume the duties as British Ambassador, the new American Ambassador 
to the Court of St. James, Honorable John G. Winant, a.rri ved in 
London. He was quickly briefed on the negotiations in progress and 
reported in his memoirs that "negotiations had been dela;yed and cam-
plicated by Colonial and Dominion officials who ••• had raised ob-
jections to what we thought were necessar,y concessions to secure the 
bases. We felt that suf'f'icient recognition was not being given to 
the over-all defense needs of either Great Britain or the United 
states. " 84 
He quickly raised the problems involved in the negotiations 
with the Prime Minister and on March 5 held talks with Lord Cranborne, 
Lord Moyne and Sir Alan Burns. He reported that the meeting was 
animated by a desire to reach accord on the outstanding points which 
represented a real problem for the British. In an effort to meet 
certain views voiced by the Prime Minister, Paragraph ( 3) was added 
to Article I in which the United States pledged itself "that the 
powers, granted to it outside the Leased Areas, would not be used 
83 Ibid., p. 75. 
84 John Gilbert Winant, Letter from Grosvenor Square (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co.~ 1947), p. 33. 
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unreasonably' or, unless required by military necessity, so as to 
interfere with the necessary rights of navigation, aviation, or 
camnunication to or from within the Territories ••• " 85 This 
paragraph was drafted at the specific request of Prime Minister 
Churchill in response to the views of the Newfoundland delegation 
which had heretofore blocked acceptance of Article I by the British 
side because of its concern over the effect of unlimited American 
powers in the port of St. John's. 86 In this same conversation, 
the need to respect the presumed resumption by Newfoundland of its 
own responsible Government was discussed and it was agreed that 
there would be a protocol which would assure that on resumption by 
Newfoundland of the constitutional status it held prior to February 16, 
1934, the words "Government of Newfoundland" would be substituted 
for "Government of the United Kingdom" in the Agreement. 87 
At this stage the British Govermnent tried what appeared to 
be an end play which, however, was sufficiently clumsy in execution 
to be bound to fail. On March 3, the British Embassy in Washington 
asked if it could discuss the questions of jurisdiction, customs and 
light dues informal.l.y with the Department of State. The State Depart-
ment called the bluff at once : 
"We replied that we found it difficult to under-
stand their desire to discuss these questions 
in Washington; that all of our views had been 
85 Telegram No. 853, Ambassador Winant to the Department of 
State, March 5, 1941. NARS No. 660. 
86 Ibid. 
87 6 Ibid. See also p.l5 of' Annex B. 
communicated to our delegation in London and 
that the members of our delegation were pre-
pared to deal ~ and ccmprehensi vely with 
all of these questions; that on the earnest 
insistence of the British Government the 
President had sent a delegation to London 
to handle these negotiations and that ob-
viously it would be impossible to negotiate 
simultaneously in two places on the same 
subjects without considerable contusion. 
We therefore inquired whether it is the wish 
of the British Government that the negotia-
tions be transferred to Washington; we 
stated if such is their wish we would have 
to take the matter up with the President. 11 88 
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The British illlmediately withdrew the suggestion. However, President 
Roosevelt now seized the opportunity and asked Lord Halifax to call at 
the White House on March 7. The President discussed with Halifax 
various topics of the dra:f't agreement, including light and harbor dues, 
navigational facilities, the restricted use of the waters adjacent to 
the bases by British vessels (including fishing vessels), jurisdiction, 
and the exemption fram customs and other duties of articles shipped 
to the leased areas. On all these subjects the President fully and 
force:f\ll.ly supported the position o:f the American delegation. 89 On 
one point, the President mey have been particularly help:f'ul. in breaking 
the impasse. He assured Lord Halifax of a solemn understanding on the 
part of the United States, in respect to customs-free entry of goods 
shipped to the Leased Areas, that any resale of such outside the 
leased areas would be prohibited under penalty of severe punishment. 9° 
88 
Telegram No. 712, Secretary of State to the President 's Base 
Lease Commission, March 4, 1941. Foreign Relations, III (1941), 16 .· 
89 Ibid. 
90Te1egram No. 777, Secretary of State to the President's Base 
Lease Commission, March 8, 1941. Foreign Relations, III (1941), 77. 
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The next day, Ambassador Winant was able to report that there 
had been a definite speeding up of the negotiations. He voiced here 
what he later recorded in his memoir£, that "the negotiations had been 
complicated ~d delayed by overemphasis on Colonial objections without 
sufficient recognition by the British of our primar,y defense needs. 
I am certain that unnecessary prolongation of negotiations would be DO 
more helpful here than at home • ., 9l 
While both Ambassador Winant and the American Base Lease 
Commission felt that there had been a distinct speeding up, that 
impression had not yet been noted by the Newfoundland Commissioners. 
On the very same day as Ambassador Winant's telegram just cited, 
Messrs. Emerson and Penson reported that the situation had not improved. 
They noted that the British Ambassador in Washington had been asked to 
take up the important items with Secretary of State Hull and that 
Ambassador Winant had sought an interview with Prime Minister Churchill 
"who appreciates :f'Ul.ly the objections to the United States requirements • ., 92 
In the same telegram, Commissioners Emerson and Penson also 
alerted the Government in St. John's to a new problem which suddenly 
appeared on the negotiating scene. The Canadian observer at the 
London negotiations, Mr. Lester B. Pearson, was unhappy with the pre-
dominant position which the dra.:t't agreement appeared to be according 
to the United States in the defense of Newfoundland. He was reporting 
9:L Telegram No. 908, Ambassador Winant to President Roosevelt and 
Secretary of State Hull, March 8, 1941. NARS No. 669. 
92 Telegram No. 173, Commissioners Emerson and Penson to Governor 
Walwyn, March 8, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2,M. 
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this to ottawa. 93 While the canpromise formula final.ly accepted was 
forwarded by the British negotiators that same ~, this issue nearly 
scuttled the agreement at the last minute. The British proposed a 
tripartite exchange of notes with the Governments of Canada and the 
United States to the effect that nothing in the agreement should be 
deemed to conflict with the arrangements relative to the defense of 
Newfoundland already made by the United States-Canada Joint Defense 
Board. 94 But ottawa saw its role in the defense of Newfoundl.and 
endangered. The Canadian Chief's of' staff Committee reported to the 
War Committee of' the Canadian Cabinet that they viewed the trend of 
the London discussions "with grave concern inasmuch as the United 
States appeared to be insisting on rights which in an emergency would 
give them complete control of the whole of Newfoundland. " 95 The 
Chiefs of Staff recamnended that discussions and agreements concerning 
Newfoundland should be held separately :from those connected with other 
leased bases, a suggestion which C.P. Stacey claims was made by the 
Newfoundland representatives in London to the Canadian High Commissioner 
there on February 27. 96 The Chief's also proposed that these discussions 
be held in Canada. They advised that the PJBD should review the re-
commendations resulting from such discussions before any governmental 
93 Ibid. 
94 Telegram No. 915, President's Base Lease Commission to Department 
of: State, March 9, 1941. NARS No. 673. 
95 C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Government: The War Policies of: 
Canada: 1939-1945 (ottawa: The Queen's Printer i'or Canada, 1970), p. 358. 
96 Ibid. No confirmation of' this could be i'ound in the files of' 
the Commission of Government and it seems somewhat out of: character. 
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action of any of the parties to implement them. Fina.lly the Chiefs 
made it very clear that in their opinion 
"Newfoundland represents a most important -out-
post, and is in fact Canada's first line of 
defense in this hemisphere, the preservation 
and protection of which is absolutely vi tal 
to her interests." 97 
The Canadian High Commissioner in London, Hon. Vincent Massey, was 
instructed to discuss the proposal with the British Government. On 
March ll he reported that the British authorities thought separate 
discussions "would be most difficult now." Ambassador Winant took a 
similar view. He reported to Washington that he expected to convince 
the Canadian High Commissioner that any such procedure at this point 
was out of the question.98 Washington agreed ~.99 Both the 
American and British Governments, however, expressed themselves in 
favor of the tripartite note formula advanced by the British delegation 
100 
on March 8. The Canadian War Cabinet agreed reluctantly on March 12 
to accept that formula. It wired St. John ' s (and London) as follows : 
"The Canadian Government still adheres to the 
view that discussions in regard to Newfound-
land bases should be held separately from 
those relating to other bases in the Western 
Hemisphere but in view of the fact that a 
general agreement has now been almost com-
pleted, they have reluctantly come to the 
conclusion that the expediency of an exchange 
97 Ibid., p. 359. 
og 
-' Telegram No. 943, Ambassador Winant to Department of State, 
March 12, 1941. Foreign Relations, III (1941), 82. 
99 Telegram No. 849, Secretary of State to Ambassador Winant and 
President's Base Lease Commission, March 13, 1941, Foreign Relations, 
III (1941), 82-83. 
100 Ibid. See p.118, above. 
of notes between Canada, the United Kingdan 
and the United States must suffice. The 
Canadian Government desire that these notes 
should emphasize the importance of Canada's 
interest in Newfoundland, and that in an;y 
actions resulting from a general agreement 
between the United Kingdom and the United 
States relating to Newfoundland, Canadian 
interests are to be respected. It is desired 
to stipulate that in any consultations arising 
out of such a general agreement, the Canadian 
Government shall enjoy rights of participation 
therein. Finally it is proposed that the 
Canada-United States Pe:nn.anent Joint Board 
on Defense should review the provisions of 
the general agreement and that if in any 
particular the terms of that agreement con-
flict with recommendations which have been 
previously made by the Board, and of which 
the Newfoundland Govermnent bas been kept 
informed, the re~.8~endations of the Board 
shall prevail." 
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In light of previous reaction of the Commission of Government 
to ottawa's assertiveness, it is not surprising that the authorities 
in St. John's responded to the receipt of ottawa's message by sending 
it to Commissioners Emerson and Penson in London with a request for 
their comments "as we find it difficult to appreciate the significance 
of the message in the absence of information as what has transpired 
in London." 102 Perhaps Washington was more aware of the sensitivity 
felt in Newfoundland about the sovereignty of the country than ottawa, 
for on March 22, after the exact wording of the tripartite note 
exchange had been agreed upon, the State Department wired the American 
delegation: 
"We hope that this text will meet with the 
approval of the Newfoundland representatives. 
If you feel there is any reason to do so, 
101 Telegram No. 10, Secretary of State for External Affairs, ottawa, 
to Governor Walwyn, March 13, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2 ,M. 
102 Telegram, Governor Walwyn to Commissioners Emerson and Penson, 
March 14, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2 ,M. 
you ~ inform the Newfoundland representatives, 
lest the publication of the foregoing regarding 
the defense of Newfoundland offend their sensi-
bilities, that the idea of this exch~thdid 
not originate in the United States." 
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A next text of the Agreement, embodying JD8.DY' of the canpromises 
found in London as well as in the conversations in Washington, was 
tabled on March 12 :following a meeting on March 11 attended by the 
Prime Minister, Lord Moyne, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound (then First Sea 
Lord), Sir Alan Burns, Ambassador Winant and the members of the American 
delegation. It is presumably this meeting to which Ambassador Winant 
was referring when he recorded in his memoirs that Prime Minister 
Churchill showed detailed knowledge of the negotiations. "In less than 
five minutes he had swept away as immaterial three-quarters of the ob-
jections which had been raised by his negotiators, but at the same time 
he questionedthe military clauses [_Article I]} which, because of 
General /Jormer 1y Coloney Maloney's skillful. insistence, had been 
agreed upon. 11 104 Ambassador Winant commented ·on the Prime Minister's 
generous attitude in a personal telegram to the President: 
103 
"In working out the defense section of the base 
agreement feJ.f0~ou should know that Certain Naval Person overruled opinion of' his 
mill tary and naval advisors in order to meet 
our position. I hope the present draft of 
the defense clause will be acceptable and 
thought you mighir wish to send him word of 
appreciation. 11 luo 
Telegram No. 973, Secretary of State to the President's Base 
Lease Commission, March 22, 1941. NARS .No. 697. 
104 John c. Winant, Letter f'rom Grosvenor Square, p. 36. 
l05 Roosevelt's pseudonym for Churchill in wartime telegrams. 
- o6 
.J. Telegram No. 947, Ambassador Winant to President Roosevelt, 
March 13, 1941. NARS No. 681. 
-122-
The end now seemed final.l.y in sight. Dra:tt texts were tel.e-
graphed to Washington and st. John's and Washington insisted on minor 
wording changes here and there and resisted a final British effort 
to annex a special confidential exchange of l.etters on jurisdiction. 
The Commission of Government in St. John's, on the other hand, was 
deeply troubled by what it feared would be adverse public reaction 
in Newfoundland to what it considered to have been sweeping concessions. 
Accordingly, they addressed a telegram to the Newfoundland delegation 
on this subject. "While sure that you will have explained :f'ully what 
is likely to be the trend of public opinion here when the terms of 
the bases agreement are publ.ished," the telegram read, "we wish to 
suggest as a counteracting measure that you arrange if possible to 
bring back with you a message to the people o:f Newfoundland, preferably 
from the Prime Minister, in which it would be recognized that the 
acquiesence o:f Newf'oundland in the terms o:f the agreement is both a 
valuable contribution to the common cause and a striking example o:f 
Empire solidarity. 11 107 
On the evening of March 1.8, Commissioners Emerson and Penson 
saw the Prime Minister. After expressing his regret at the outcome o:f 
the negotiations, Mr. Churchill said "he hoped the arrangements would 
work out in practice better than the terms o:f the document might 
108 indicate. 11 Emerson and Penson conveyed the concern about public 
107 Telegram No. 153, Vice Chairman o:f the Commission o:f Government 
to Commissioners Penson and Emerson, March 17, 1941. FOG S-4-2-2,M. 
108 Telegram No. 211, Commissioners Emerson and Penson to Governor 
Walwyn, March 19, 1944. FOG S-4-2-2,M. . 
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reaction to the agreements and the Prime Minister agreed to write a 
letter conveying a message to the Newfoundland people. 
"The Prime Minister vent on to say the grant 
of the bases with the accompanying rights 
must be regarded not mere~ as in recognition 
of the gift of the original fifty destro,yers 
but of the whole of United States cooperation 
in the present war. This is now on a most 
generous scale and without it, a satisfactory 
conclusion of the war · would be grave~ 
jeopardized. He spoke emphatically on this. rr 109 
Commissioners Emerson and Penson gave their own assessment. 
11We have no illusion," they reported, "as to the character of the 
terms which are one-sided throughout and often extremely ha.,.sh in our 
view. Taxation clauses LArticle XVI!7 are in addition unworkable apart 
:f'rom further understandings to be reached. The terms were not reached, 
however, without a long struggle. Both the Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs and in the final stages, the Prime Minister, gave 
unstinted support to our point of view. " 110 
The Prime Minister's letter was dated March 22 and telegraphed 
to St. John's on March 24. While it was made public at the time, it 
has been largely lost :from sight by historians; the events of the war 
at that time tended to overshadow the efforts surrounding the final 
accord on the American bases in New:foundland. For that reason, and 
because it substantiates the strong feeling on the part of Great Britain 
to bring about Empire solidarity at a time of real crisis, it is 
reproduced here in full: 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
"Dear Mr. Emerson: 
When Mr. Penson and you saw me on March 18 
you told me of the apprehension which you felt 
as to same of the provisions in the proposed 
agreement With the United States on the leased 
bases. 
I can assure you that both I and those of 
my colleagues who have been engaged in the 
negotiations have had 1'ully in mind the great 
importance which is attached in Newfoundland 
to the matters dealt with in the Agreement, 
and I can readily appreciate the feelings 
which Mr. Penson and you told me might arise 
that Newfoundland was being asked in this 
Agreement to give up much which she holds of 
value. 
I need not SS¥ how sorry we in this country 
would be if this should be so. I would only 
ask the people of Newfoundland, of whose loyalty 
we have in this tested time as throughout her 
long and eventful history had ample proof, to 
bear in mind the wider issues which hang on 
this Agreement. 
The exchange of notes last September 
provi<Ung for the lease of bases .in British 
territories and the transfer of destroyers by 
the United States was hailed, and rightly so, 
not only as an act of highest significance in 
itself but also as a symbol of cooperation 
between the great democracies in defense of 
~iberty and all that they hold dear. The 
:f'rui ts of that Agreement in this wide sphere 
are already being made manifest ever more and 
more as each day passes. During the last 
fortnight we have seen notable proof of the 
profound results flowing from it. The present 
Agreement which gives effect to the . general 
arrangement embodied in the original exchange 
of notes is not merely a contract. It is one 
stage in the process of which the exchange of 
notes was the first step. Without this 
Agreement it is impossible to say what would 
be the effect on the prosecution of the war 
and the whole future of the world. I have 
every confidence that all those who have to 
administer the provisions of the instrument 
in practice will do so with regard not so 
much to the letter of the documents as to 
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the spirit animating the Governments who here 
put their signature to them. 
It is with these considerations in mind 
that, recognizing to the tull. the considerable 
sacrifice made by New:f'ound1and to the cause 
we all have at heart and her splendid contri-
bution to the war effort, we ask her to accept 
this Agreement. 
It will be yet one more example o-r what 
she is ready to do -ror the sake o-r the Empire, 
o-r liberty and the welfare o-r all mankind. 
Yours very "raithf'ully, 
Winston s. Churchill" 111 
Mr. Emerson 1 s reply was short but ~cal: 
"Dear Prime Minister: 
Please accept Mr. Penson 1 s and JDY' thanks 
"ror your letter of March 22 in which you are 
good enough to express your appreciation o-r 
the possible feeling of the people of New-
"roundland in regard to the proposed Agreement 
with the United states on the leased bases. 
We shall take the earliest opportunity o-r 
making your views known to our people and 
feel confident that the personal commendation 
of acceptance of the Agreement by the Empire's 
leaders in this crisis will not "rail to im-
press them with the importance o-r the part 
they are playing in strengthening co-operation 
between the two greal Democracies in the 
struggle for the freedom o-r mankind. Mr. 
Penson and I have been aware of the great 
personal interest which you have taken 
throughout the negotiations in London and 
on behalf of the Government and people of 
Newfoundland we wish to express to you our 
deep sense of gratitude. 
Yours fai thf'ul.ly, 
L.E. Emerson" 112 
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lll Telegram, Commissioners Emerson and Penson to Governor Walwyn, 
March 24, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2,M. 
112 Ibid. 
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There was, in fact, general acceptance of the nature of the Agreement 
in NewfouncUand. Whether the concerns of the NewfouncUand delegates 
were exaggerated or if the reaction might have been different without 
all the steps they took to influence public opinion DI.8\Y be left to 
conjecture. They were, however, deeply concerned, partly perhaps 
because they had been in London for over two months and had not 
experienced the landing of the first American troops in St. John's 
aboard the Edmund B. Alexander or the cordial relationship which 
developed almost at once between American servicemen and the people 
of NewfouncUand. From London, ready to return to Newfoundland via 
Washington aboard the same clipper aircraft with the American delegates, 
Emerson and Penson expressed their concern. They regretted their in-
ability to telegraph anything which might be helpful and their inability 
to be in St. John's to help explain the Agreements when they were first 
published. They suggested that the Commissioners talk to the news-
papers and to influential citizens and explain to them the need to 
create the proper atmosphere not only because of the Prime Minister's 
letter but also in order to be helpful in the negotiations in Washington 
which they envisaged on the return trip. "The future of Newfoundland.r 
. 113 United States relations depend on good will," they Wl.red. They 
suggested that the following points be made: the separate position 
of Newfoundland was recognized in the Protocol on its status; juris-
diction over British subjects was very limited and might never be 
113 Telegram No. 244, Commissioners Emerson and Penson to Governor 
Walwyn, March 24, 1941. FCG S-4-2-2,M. 
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exercised, especial.ly not in Newfoundland; the customs and tax clauses 
were limited broadly to the leased areas. They believed, and were 
later proved to be accurate, that the United States had no intention 
of exercising its rights to the detriment of the Newfoundland Revenue 
114 Act or to impose financial. or administrative burdens on the country. 
President Roosevelt, having authorized the signing of the 
Agreement on March 24, indicated he woul.d like to send a message to 
Congress at noon on March 27 and therefore hoped that the Agreement 
coul.d be signed on March 26. This, too, failed to come off as planned 
because it would have provided insufficient notice to the territorial. 
governments. It was final.l.y decided to sign the Agreement at 3:30 p.m. 
(British Summer Time) on Thursday, March 27 and publish it at 6:00 p.m. 
(B.S.T.). The following message informed the President who was waiting 
to send the dra:t't to Congress. It marked the conclusion of two months 
of intensive negotiation on an Agreement which at various times nearly 
collapsed: 
"To: Secretary of State 
Washington 
TRIPLE PRIORITY 
From London 1194, Twenty-seventh 
Agreement signed. 
WINANT" 115 
In Newfoundland, the Commission of Government issued a com-
munique at the same time as it made public the text of the Agreement 
114 Ibid. 
115 NARS No. 794. 
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and the exchange of letters between Prime Minister Churchill and 
Commissioner Emerson. The communique explained the dangerous situation 
in which the Empire found itself in September 1940 and then explained 
that secret negotiations had been in progress since that time to define 
the terms under whjch the bases would be leased. It stressed that 
there had been full and free consultation and that for the final 
negotiations two members of the Commission had represented Newfound-
land at London. The communique then became very defensive about the 
content of the Agreement, hiding to some extent behind the fact that 
Great Britain was charged with the conduct of Newfoundland's foreign 
relations and that, seen in this light, the specific references to 
Newfoundland both in the preamble and in the special protocol on the 
effect of the resumption of Newfoundland's normal constitutional 
status, were seen as acts of recognition of Newfoundland's special 
position. A lengtby paragraph of the communique was then devoted to 
the question of jurisdiction and the American assurances that the United 
States did not intend to exercise the rights granted in this field were 
nearly lost in a maze of legal phrases. "The Commission of Government 
are confident," the communique stated, "that no group of persons required 
to speak on behalf of the people of Newfoundland could have done 
otherwise than acquiesce in the Agreement." 116rn its final paragraph, 
the communique made the expected appeal to patriotism but also recognized 
what had already become apparent, the economic benefits which would 
flow from the presence of tne bases: 
116 St. John's Daily News, March 28, 1941, p.9. 
"The Commission of Government suggest to the 
people of Newfoundland that the terms of the 
Agreement are to be viewed not merely as a 
catalogue of advantages secured by either 
side, but as constituting in their effect 
a substantial contribution no less potent 
because it is indirect to the provision of 
aid to His Majesty the King in the defeat of 
the enemy. In the concl.usion of this Agree-
ment it has been necessary for Newfoundland 
to repose great confidence in the intentions 
of the United States. We have before our 
eyes the most convincing reasons for not 
hesitating to give that confidence in the 
generous measure of assistance which the 
United States is gi v:i.ng to the Empire in its 
hour of peril and in the stand which the 
United States has made in support of the 
principles of freedom. Looked at in the 
light of that assistance and in the J.ight 
of the whole attitude of the United States 
toward the struggle in which the Empire is 
involved the concessions made by Wewfound-
land will be seen in true perspective. It 
wouJ.d be f'easibl.e to set against the con-
cessions made an imposing array of pros-
pective advantages to the economy of 
Newfoundland but the Commission of Govern-
ment do not rely upon these in asking the 
people of Newfoundland to confirm their 
acquiescence in the Agreement. Rather they 
prefer to rely upon the broad consideration 
set forth in a letter addressed by the 
Prime Minister of Great Britain to our repre-
sentative in London at the conclusion of the 
negotiations in which they partici pated. The 
Connnission of Government feel that the text 
of this letter ••• wil.l be accepted by the 
People of Newfoundland as a complete con-
firmation of the wisdom of' the Govermnent 1 s 
action in acquiescing in the Agreement and 
that they will endorse the sentiments 
expressed in Mr. Emerson 1 s r~ly to the 
Prime Minister 1 s letter. " 11·7 
The Commission also persuaded Lt. Col. Leonard c. Outerbridge, 
c.B.E., D.s.o., to broadcast on Radio Station VOCM that evening. He 
ll7 Ib." ~C.i.. 
-129-
pulled out all the stops of Empire loyalty, sacrifice in war, good 
neighborliness and pl~ng a role in destiny. "M~ not Newfoundland's 
sacrifice be in reality a glorious privilege?" he asked. "I know that 
if the problem [Ot signing the Agreemen'fl was put to us individually, 
each one of us, even if it meant a sacrifice, would not hesitate; 
and as Newfoundlanders with red blood running through our veins, we 
would sign that agreement with a heart and a half." 118 
The newspapers supported the Agreement in similar terms. In 
an editorial, the Daily News of March 28, 1941 addressed itself to the 
issue in these terms: 
". • • There is in fact nothing that might 
imaginably have been sought by the United 
States in respect of concessions relating to 
the controlled areas which has been refUsed. 
• • • That the terms of the agreement were 
considered severe is evident :from the corres-
pondence between Mr. Emerson and Mr. Churchill 
and from the somewhat apologetic and defensive 
attitude of the Commission of Govermnent in 
its covering communique. On the other hand, 
with the stark realities of this urgent 
Imperial necessity confronting them, it would 
have probably been difficult for any New-
foundland Government to have taken a differ-
ent course. " 119 
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In ottawa, Prime Minister w. L. MacKenzie King announced the 
Agreement in the House of Commons, stressing the Canadian protocol. 120 
ll8 Reprint of the Broadcast by Lt. Col. outerbridge (St. John I s : 
Long Brothers, 1941), p. 5. 
ll9 St. John's Daily News, March 28, 1941, p.4. 
120 Dominion of Canada, Official Report of Debates, House of 
Commons, Second Session, 19th Parliament, Vol. II, 1941 (ottawa: 
Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1941), 
p. 1904. 
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In Washington, President Roosevelt transmitted the Agreement 
to both Houses of Congress with only a short transmittal note. There 
was no debate in either the Senate or the HOuse of Representatives. 
The Newfoundland Commissioners did not return to st. John's 
until the end of April. In mid-April they wired from Washington 
that they had seen the Secretaries of' State, War and Navy and senior 
officials. They had been cordially received and all problems raised 
had received sympathetic consideration. On the question of juris-
diction over British subjects, they had again been authorized to state 
121 
that the United States had no desire to exercise the rights granted. 
Two weeks later, Consul General Quarton was directed to advise the 
Commission the United States Government hoped and expected that if 
it should ever be necessar,y to charge British subjects with offenses 
against the United States in Newfoundland, such cases would be tried 
122 in the courts of' Newfoundland. 
On Arril 26, shortly upon his return from Washington, Com-
missioner Emerson gave a lengthy radio address explaining the nature 
of' the agreement. On the following night a similar address was made 
123 by Commissioner Penson. It remains an open question whether these 
speeches and the effort by the Commission to "sell" the Agreement 
were really necessar,y. Except f'or one letter by a constant 
121 Telegram No. 23, Commissioners Emerson and Penson to Governor 
Walwyn, April 13, "1941. FOG S-4-2-3,Q • . 
122 Note, Consul General Quartan to Commissioner Emerson, April 28, 
1941. FCG S-4-2- 3-0. 
123 For texts see st. John's Daily News of' April 27 and April 28, 
1941, respectively. Both reports begi n on p. 3. 
correspondent of the Dai1y News there would appear to have been no 
adverse public reaction of any sort. The people, understandably, 
probably found the terms of the Agreement too technical to comprehend, 
too wordy to even read. The inf'lux of American money had started, the 
Americans (from all verbal accounts, at any rate) were at that time 
considered welcome visitors who spent funds generously and employed 
large numbers of previously unemployed Newfoundlanders. Even the war 
seemed to be going better with British victories in the Battle of 
Britain. As A.B. Perlin wrote many years later: "It is one o:f the 
imponderables of local history whether, i:f Newfoundland had had its 
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own elected government in 1940, a different arrangement would have been 
made with the Americans for post-war readjustment of the agreements on 
124 the bases • " 
124 St. John's Dai1y News, October 28, 1969, p.4. 
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CONCLUSION 
The rather detailed review of the negotiations for American 
base rights in Newfoundland, which this paper has attempted, confirms 
the judgment of a number of historians who have held that the trade 
of destroyers for bases was the first and most definitive American 
act in support of Great Britain and her Allies, and was, more than 8JlY' 
other, the step which took the United States away from neutrality and 
toward status as a co-belligerent in the war against Hitler. This is 
the view held by the historians William L. Langer and S. Everett 
Gleason, 1 it is also the view supported by military historians like 
Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild in their very authoritative history 
of the military thinking of this period. 2 
While the major step away from neutrality and toward limited 
participation in the war had been taken by September 2, 1940, the 
personal involvement of President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, 
Secretary of the Navy Knox and Under Secretary of State Welles in the 
negotiations that followed shed additional light on their desire to 
see the negotiations succeed. They wanted the momentum which had been 
generated by the September 2 exchange of notes to continue and to 
avoid a situation where isolationist sentiment could point to British 
intrPnsigence in the negotiations as a reason to slow down the 
1 William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to 
Isolation, Volume II {New York: Harper and Row, 1952), Harper Torch-
books Edition, p. 775. 
2 Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, United States Army in World 
War II, The Western Hemisphere, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense 
(Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960), p. 62. 
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support for the Allies. It is practically redundant to note that 
similar motives, and a recognition of the residue of neutralist sentiment 
in the United States, motivated Prime Minister Churchill and his cabinet 
to override same of the objections from the dependent territorial 
administrations although many of these would have been disposed of in 
any case once the military situation itself became a major factor. 
It is interesting to note that many of the issues which caused 
great difficulties in the London negotiations are no longer questioned 
in agreements between allied countries respecting the stationing of 
troops on each other's soil. The most notable such agreement, the 
Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding 
the Status of Their Forces, signed in London in JUne 1951, 3 makes 
provisions in such fields as taxes, customs exemption, post offices, 
and even jurisdiction, very similar to those embodied in the Agreement 
of March 27, 1941. In this regard, the Agreement negotiated at 
London in 1941 may well have been a pace setter for fUture similar 
agreements. 
As for the reflection of the events in Newfoundl.and, the 
consistent unanimity of the Commissioners of Government has already 
been touched upon in the Preface. Their deeply felt concerns were at 
least partly the result of their fear of the unknown, accentuated in 
the case of the two negotiating Commissioners by their remo~~l from 
the scene. Verbal accounts speak of a euphoria of welcome for the 
American servicemen during the early days of 1941. This euphoria 
3 See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO - Facts about 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Paris : NATO Information 
Service, 1965), pp. 217-229. 
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may have worn off in later years but the relationship never deteriorated 
to create a chasm of dislike between the local population and the 
American servicemen. It must be admitted in retrospect, however, that 
the Commissioners were probably unable to predict what that relationship 
would be and sought those safeguards which they hoped would at least 
maintain a 11proper" basis for the new relations between the two 
sovereign nations. 
Any study of this nature, which focuses on a very short period 
of time and on a very specific activity, raises numerous questions which 
are outside its immediate scope and which it cannot hope to answer. It 
would be interesting, for example, to follow the application of the 
jurisdiction clauses from early 1941 at least to the end of 1960 when 
Fort Pepperrell was closed and to determine just how the question of 
jurisdictional conflict was solved in practical ter.ms. The social 
historian would probably find a rich field of study in the social impact 
of a large contingent of American (as well as Canadian and British) 
troops on the local population. This is directly intertwined with the 
extent of economic change resulting from the presence of the bases 
an area in which, unfortunately, the Commission of Government kept very 
few statistics and in which the quantitative historian might find more 
frustrat i ons than answers. There is also, among these areas for 
further investigation, a need for some rather detailed biographic 
history on the men who made up the Connnission of Government. All of 
them are now dead but their decendants are still alive and it might 
be hoped that they treasure biographic material which could be made 
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available to historians and preserved. For it is apparent from this 
study that f'or Newfoundland, and to a considerable extent f'or the 
Western Allies, the Commissioners of' Govermnent played a key role in 
many negotiations during World War II and that the tone they set, the 
concerns they expressed, and the actions which they took make up a 
segment of' Newfoundland history badly in need of' an accurate record. 
SIR: 
APPENDIX A 
Exchange of Notes September 2, 194o 1 
BRITISH EMBASSY, 
Washington, D.C., September 2, 194o. 
I have the honour under instructions f'rom His Majesty's 
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that 
' in view of the friendly and sympathetic interest of His Majesty's 
Govermnent in the United Kingdom in the national security of the 
United States and their desire to strengthen the ability of the 
' United States to cooperate effectively with the other nations of the 
Americas in the defense of the Western Hemisphere, His Majesty's 
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Govermnent will secure the grant to the Govermnent of the United States, 
freely and without consideration, of the lease for immediate establish-
ment and use of naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto 
and the operation and protection thereof, on the Avalon Peninsula and 
on the southern coast of Newfoundland, and on the east coast and on 
the Great Bay of Bermuda. 
Furthermore, in view of the above and in view of the desire of 
the United States to acquire additional air and naval bases in the 
Caribbean and in British Guiana, and without endeavouring to place a 
monetary or commercial value upon the many tangible and intangible 
r i ghts and properti es invol ved, His Majesty's Govermnent will make 
available to the United States for immediate establishment and use 
naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the 
1 United States Department of Stat e , Peace and HP.r: 1939-1941 
(Washi ngt on: United St ates Government Printing Offi ce , 1943), pp . 565- 567 . 
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operation and protection thereof, on the eastern side of the Bahamas, 
the southern coast of Jamaica, the western coast of St. Lucia, the 
west coast of Trinidad in the GuJ.:r of Paria, in the island of Antigua 
and in British Guiana within fifty miles of Georgetown, in exchange 
for naval and military equipment and material which the United States 
Government will transfer to His Majesty's Government. 
All the bases and facilities referred to in the preceding 
paragraphs will be leased to the United States for a period of ninety-
nine years, free fran all rent and charges other than such compensation 
to be mutually agreed on to be paid by the United States in order to 
compensate the owners of private property for loss by expropriation or 
damage arising out of the establisLment of the bases and facilities 
in question. 
His Majesty's Government, in the leases to be agreed upon, will 
grant to the United States for the period of the leases all the rights, 
power, and authority within the bases leased, and within the limits of 
the territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the vicinity of 
such bases, necessary to provide access to and defence of such bases, 
and appropriate provisions for their control. 
Without prejudice to the above-mentioned rights of the United 
States authorities and their jurisdiction within the leased areas, the 
adjustment and reconciliation between the jurisdiction of the 
authorities of the United States within these areas and the juris-
diction of the authorities of the territories in which these areas 
are situated, shall be determined by common agreement. 
The exact location and bounds of the aforesaid bases, the 
necessary seaward, coast and anti-aircraft defences, the location of 
sufficient military garrisons, stores and other necessary auxiliary 
facilities shall be determined by common agreement. 
-138-
His Majesty's Government are prepared to designate immediately 
experts to meet with experts of the United States for these purposes. 
Should these experts be unable to agree in any particular situation, 
except in the case of Newfoundland and Bermuda, the matter shall be 
settled by the Secretary of State of the United States and His 
Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
I have [etcJ 
LOTHIAN 
The Honourable Cordell Hull, 
Secretary of State of the United States, 
Washington, D.c. 
EXCELLENCY: 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
Washington, September 2, 194o. 
I have received your note of September 2, 1940, of which the 
text is as follows : 
LHere follows text of the note printed aboveJ 
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I am directed by the President to reply to your note as 
follows: 
The Govermnent of the United States appreciates the declarations 
and the generous action of His Majesty's Government as contained in 
your communication which are destined to enhance the national security 
of the United States and greatly to strengthen its ability to cooperate 
effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defense of 
the Western Hemisphere. It therefore gladly accepts the proposals. 
The Govermnent of the United states will immediately designate 
experts to meet with experts designated by His Majesty's Government 
to determine upon the exact l.ocation of the naval. and air bases 
mentioned in your communication under acknowledgment. 
In consideration of the declarations above quoted, the 
Government of the United States will immediately transfer to His 
Majesty's Government fifty United States Navy destra,yers generally 
referred to as the twelve hundred-ton type. 
Accept [etc J 
CORDELL HULL 
His Excellency 
The Right Honorable 
The Marquess of Lothian, C .H., 
British Ambassador 
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APPENDIX B 
AGREEMENT (MARCH 27, 1941) BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
.AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RElATING TO THE BASES LEASED TO 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND RElATED DOCUMENTS 
AGREEMENT 
WHEREAS the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, in consul.tation with the Government of Newfoundland, 
are desirous at this time of :further effectuating the declarations made 
on their behalf by His Excellency the Most Honourable the Marquess of 
Lothian, C.H., His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, 
in his communication of the 2nd September, 1940, to the Secretary of 
State of1 the United States of' America, a copy of' which is set out in Annex I hereto and made a part hereof; 
And whereas it is agreed that leases in respect of' the naval 
and air bases to be leased to the United States of America in Newfound-
land, Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua, Trinidad and British Guiana, 
respectively, shal1 forthwith be executed substantia.l.l.y in the forms 
of the leases set out in Annex II hereto, which are hereby approved, and 
that a s~ilar lease in respect of a base in the Bahamas shall be 
executed as soon as possible; 
And whereas it is desired to determine by common agreement 
certain matters relating· to the lease of the said bases, as provided 
in the communication of the 2nd September, 1940, and the reply thereto 
of' the same date :f'ram the Honourable Cor~ll HUl.l., Secretary of State 
of the United States, set out in Annex I and made a part hereof; 
And whereas it is desired that this Agreement shall be fulfilled 
in a spirit of good neighbourliness between the Government of the United 
Kingdom and the GoVernment of the United States of America, and that 
details of its practical application shall b~ arranged by :f'riendly 
co-operation; 
The Undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, have agreed 
as follows:-
ARTICLE I. 
General Description of Rights. 
(l.) The United States shall. have all. the rights, power and 
authority Within the Leased Areas which are necessary for the establishment, 
1 See Appendix A. 
2 Ibid. 
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use, operation and defence thereof, or appropriate for their control, 
and all the rights, power and authority within the limits of territorial 
waters and air spaces adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the Leased 
Areas, wh.i.ch are necessary to provide access to and defence of the 
Leased Areas, or appropriate for control thereof. 
( 2) The said rights, power and authority shall include, inter 
alia, the right, power and authority:-
(a) to construct (including dredging and filling), maintain, 
operate, use, occupy and control the said Bases; 
(b) to improve and deepen the harbours, channels, entrances 
and anchorages, and generally to fit the premises :for 
use as naval and air bases; 
(c) to control, so :far as ma;y be required :for the efficient 
operation of the Bases, and within the limits of military 
necessity, anchorages, moorings and movements of ships 
and water-borne craft and the anchorages, moorings, 
landings, take-offs, movements and operations of 
aircraf't; 
(d) to regulate and control within the Leased Areas all 
communication within, to, and :t"rom the areas leased; 
(e) to install, maintain, use and operate under-sea and 
other defences, defence devices and controls, including de-
tecting and other similar facilities. 
(3) In the exercise of the above-mentioned rights, the United 
States agrees that the powers, granted to it outside the Leased Areas 
will not be used unreasonably or, unless required by military necessity, 
so as to interfere with the necessary rights of navigation, aviation 
or communication to or :t"rom or within the Territories, but that they 
shall be used in the spirit of the fourth clause of the Preamble. 
(4) In the practical application outside the Leased Areas of 
the foregoing paragraphs there shall be, as occasion requires, con-
sultation between the Government of the United States and the Government 
of the United Kingdom. 
ARTICLE II. 
Special Emergency Powers. 
When the United States is engaged in war or in time of other 
emergency, the Government of the United Kingdom agree that the United 
States may exercise in the Territories and surrounding waters or air 
spaces all such. rights, power and authority as may be necessary for 
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conducting any military operations deemed desirable by the United 
States, but these rights will be exercised with all possible regard 
to the spirit of the fourth clause of the Preamble. 
ARTICLE III. 
Non-user. 
The United states shall be under no obligation to improve the 
Leased Areas or any part thereof for use as naval or air bases, or to 
exercise a:ny right, power or authority granted in respect to the Leased 
Areas, or to maintain forces therein, or to provide for the defence 
thereof; but if and so long as any Leased Area, or any part thereof, 
is not used by the United States :for the purposes in this Agreement 
set forth, the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of 
the Terri tory may take such steps therein as shall be agreed with the 
United States to be desirable for the maintenance of public health, 
safety, .law and order, and, if necessary, for defence. 
ARTICLE IV. 
Jurisdiction. 
(l) In any case in which-
(a) a member of the United States forces, a national of the 
United States or a person who is not a British subject 
shall be charged with having committed, either within 
or wi. thout the Leased Areas, an offence of a military 
nature, punishable under the law of the United States, 
including but n.ot restricted to, treason, an offence 
relating to sabotage or espionage, or any other offence 
relating to the security and protection of United 
States naval and air Bases, establishments, equipment 
or other property or to operations of the Government 
of the United States in the Territory; or 
(b) a British sUbject shall be charged with having committed 
any such offence within a Leased Area and shall be 
apprehended therein; or 
(c) a person other than a British subject shall be charged 
with having committed an offence of any other nature 
within a Leased Area, 
the United States shall have the absolute right in the first instance to 
assume and exercise jurisdiction with respect to such offence. 
(2) If the United States shall elect not to assume and exercise 
such jurisdiction the United States Authorities shall, where such offence 
is punishable in virtue of legislation enacted pursuant to Article V 
or otherwise under the law of the Terri tory, so inform the Government 
of the Territory and shall, if it shall be agreed between the Govern-
ment of the Territory and the United States authorities that the 
alleged offender should be brought to trial, surrender him to the 
appropriate authority in the Territory for that purpose. 
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(3) If a British subject shall be charged with having camnitted 
within a Leased Area an offence of the nature described in paragraph 
(1) (a) of this Article, and shall not be apprehended therein, he shall, 
if in the Terri tory outside the Leased Areas, be brought to trial before 
the courts of the Territory; or, if the offence is not punishable under 
the law of the Territory, he shall, on the request of the United States 
Authorities, be apprehended and surrendered to the United States 
Authorities, and United States shall have the right to exercise 
jurisdiction with respect to the alleged offence. 
( 4) When the United States exercises jurisdiction under this 
Article and the person charged is a British subject, he shall be tried 
by a United states court sitting in a Leased Area in the Territory. 
( 5) Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to affect, 
prejudice or restrict the full exercise at all times of jurisdiction and 
control by the United States in matters of discipline and internal 
administration over members of the United States forces, as conferred 
by the law of the United States and any regulations made thereunder. 
ARTICLE V. 
Security Legislation. 
The Government of the Territory will take such steps as may from 
time to time be agreed to be necessary with a view to the enactment of 
legislation to ensure' the adequate security and protection of the 
United States naval and air Bases, establishments, equipment and other 
property, and the operations of the United States under the Leases and 
this Agreement and the punishment of persons who may contravene any 
laws or regulations made for that purpose. The Government of the 
Territory will also from time to time consult with the United States 
Authorities in order that the laws and regulations of the United States 
and the Territory in relation to such matters may, so far as circum-
stances permit, be similar in character. 
ARTICLE VI. 
Arrest and Service of Process. 
(l) No arrest shall be made and no process, civil or criminal, 
shall be served within any Leased Area except with the permission of the 
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Commanding Officer in charge of the United States forces in such 
Leased Area; but should the Commanding Officer refuse to grant such 
permission he sha11 (except in cases where the United States Authorities 
elect to assume and exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Article 
IV (1) ) forth with take the necessary steps to arrest the person 
charged and surrender him to the appropriate authority of the 
Terri tory or to serve such process, as the case may be, and to 
provide for the attendance of the server of such process before 
the appropriate court of the Terri tory or procure such server to 
make the necessary affidavit or declaration to prove such service. 
( 2) In cases where the courts of the United States have 
jurisdiction under Article IV, the Government of the Territory will on 
request give reciprocal facilities as regards the service of process 
and the arrest and surrender of alleged offenders. 
( 3) In this Article the expression "process" includes any 
process by wq of summons, subpoena, warrant, writ or other judi cal 
document for securing the attendance of a witness, or for the production 
of any documents or exhibits, required in any proceedings civil or 
criminal. 
ARTICLE VII. 
Right of Audience for United States Counsel. 
In cases in which a member of the United States forces shall be 
a party to civil or criminal proceedings in any court of the Terri tory 
by reason of same alleged act or omission arising out of or in the 
course of his official duty, United States counsel (authorized to 
practise before the courts of the United States) shall have the right 
of audience, provided that such counsel is in the service of the Govern-
ment of the United States and appointed for that purpose either generally 
or specially by the appropriate authority. 
ARTICLE VIII. 
Surrender of Offenders. 
Where a person charged with an offence which falls to be dealt 
with by the courts of the Territory is in a Leased Area, or a person 
charged with an offense which :falls under Article IV to be dealt with by 
courts of the United States is in the Territory but outside the Leased 
Areas, such person shall be surrendered to the Govermnent of the Terri tory 
or to the United States Authorities, as the case may be, in accordance 
with special arrangements made between that Government and those 
Authorities. 
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ARTICLE IX. 
Public Services. 
The United States shall have the right to employ and use all 
utili ties, services and facilities, roads, highways, bridge~, viaducts, 
canals and similar channels of transportation belonging to, or con-
trolled or regulated by, the Government of the Terri tory or the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom, under conditions comparable to and no less 
:favourable than those applicable :f'rom time to time to the Government 
of the United Kingdom. 
ARTICLE X. 
Surveys. 
(1) The United States shall have the right, a.f'ter appropriat~ 
notification has been given to the Government of the Territory, to make 
topographic and hydrographic surveys outside the Leased Areas in any 
part of the Territory and waters adjacent thereto. Copies, with title 
and triangulation data, of any surveys so made will be furnished to 
the Government of the Terri tory. 
(2) Notification and copies will be given to the United States 
Authorities of any such surveys carried out by the Government of the 
United Kingdom or the Government of the Terri tory. 
ARTICLE XI. 
Shipping and Aviation. 
(1) Lights and other aids to navigation of vessels and aircra:f't 
placed or established in the Leased Areas and the territorial waters 
adjacent thereto or in the vicinity thereof shall conform to the system 
in use in the Territory. The position, characteristics and any alterations 
thereof shall be notified in advance to the appropriate authority in the 
Territory. 
(2) United States public vessels operated by the War or Navy 
Departments, by the Coastguard or by the Coast and Geodetic Survey, 
bound to or departing :f'rom a Leased Area shall not on entering or 
leaving the Leased Area or the territorial waters in the vicinity there-
of be subject to compulsory pilotage or to light or harbour dues in the 
Territory. If a pilot is taken pilotage shall be paid for at appropriate 
rates. 
( 3) British commercial vessels may use the Leased Areas on the 
same terms and conditions as United States commercial vessels. 
( 4) It is understood that a Leased Area is not a part of the 
territory of the United States for the purpose of coastwise shipping 
laws so as to exelude British vessels from trade between the United 
States and the Leased Areas. 
( 5) Commercial aircraf't will not be authorized to operate 
from any of the Bases (save in case of emergency or for strictly 
military purposes under supervision of the War or Navy Departments) 
except by agreement between the United States and the Government of 
the United Kingdom; provided that in the case of Newfoundland such 
agreement shall be between the United states and the Government of 
Newfoundland. 
ARTICLE XII. 
Motor Traffic. 
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(1) Standard and test types of motor vehicles as determined 
by the United States shall not be prevented from using roads in a 
Territory by reason of non-compliance with any law relating to con-
struction of motor vehicles. 
(2) No tax or fee shall be payable in respect of registration 
or licensing for use in a Territory of motor vehicles belonging to 
the Government of the United states. 
ARTICLE XIII. 
Immigration. 
(1) The immigration laws of the Territory shall not operate 
or apply so as to prevent admission into the Territory, for the purposes 
of this Agreement, of any member of the United states Fcrces posted to 
a Leased Area or any person (not being a national of a Power at war 
with His Majesty the King) employed by, or under a contract with, the 
Government of the United States in connection with the construction, 
maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases in the Territory; but 
suitable arrangements will be made by the United States to enable such 
persons to be readily identified and their status to be established. 
(2) If the status of any : -rson within the Territory and ad-
mitted thereto under the foregoing paragraph shall be altered so that 
he wou1d no longer be entitled to such admission, the United States 
Authorities shall notify the Government of the Terri tory and shall, if 
such person be required to leave the Terri tory by that Government, be 
responsible for providing him with a passage from the Territory within 
a reasonable time, and shall in the meantime prevent his becoming a 
public responsibility of the Territoryo 
ARTICLE XIV. 
Customs and other Duties 
(1) No import, excise, consumpti on or other tax, duty or impose 
shall be charged on -
(a) material, equipment, suppJ.ies or goods :for use in the 
construction, maintenance, operation or defence o:f the 
Bases, consigned to, or destined for, the United States 
Authorities or a contractor; 
(b) goods :for use or consumption aboard United States public 
vessels o:f the Army, Navy, Coast Guard or Coast and 
Geodetic SUrveys; 
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(c) goods consigned to the United States Authorities for the 
use of institutions under Government control. known as Post 
Exchanges, Ships' Service Stores, Commissary Stores or 
Service Clubs, or :for sale thereat to members o:f the 
United States forces, or civilian employees o:f the United 
States being nationals o:f the United States and employed 
in connection with the Bases, or members of their :families 
resident with them and not engaged in any business or 
occupation in the Territory; 
(d) the personal belonging or household e:f:fects o:f persons 
referred to in sub-paragraph (c), and of contractors and 
their employees being nationals of the United States 
empl.oyed in the construction, maintenance or operation 
and present in the Territory by reason only o:f such 
employment. 
(2) No export tax sh8JJ. be charged on the material, equipment, 
supplies or goods mentioned in paragraph ( 1) in the event of reshipment 
from the Territory. 
(3) This ArticJ.e shal.l app.cy- nothwithstanding that the material, 
equipment, supplies or goods pass through other parts o:f the Terri tory 
en route to or from a Leased Area. 
( 4) Administrative measures shall be taken by the United States 
Authorities to prevent the resale o:f goods which are sold under paragraph 
(1) (c), or imported under paragraph (1) (d), of this Article, to persons 
not entitl.ed to buy goods at such Post Exchanges, Ships' Service Stores, 
Commissary Stores or Service Clubs, or not entitled to free importation 
under paragraph ( 1) (d); and generall.y to prevent abuse o:f the customs 
privileges granted under this Article. There shall be co-operation 
between such Authorities and the Government o:f the Terri tory to this 
end. 
ARTICLE XV. 
Wireless and Cabl.es. 
(1) Except with the consent of the Govermnent o:f the Territory, no 
wirel.ess station shall be established or submarine cable landed in a 
Leased Aree otherwise than for military purposes. 
( 2) All questions relating to frequencies, power and like 
matters, used by apparatus designed to emit electric radiation, shall 
be settled by mutual arrangement. 
ARTICLE XVI. 
Postal Facilities. 
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The United States shall have the right to establish United States 
Post Offices in the Leased Areas for the exclusive use of the United 
States forces, and civilian personnel (including contractors and their 
employees) who are nationals of the United States and employed in 
connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of 
the Bases, and the families of such persons, for domestic use between 
United States Post Offices in Leased Areas and between such Post Offices 
and other United States Post Offices and Post Offices in the Panama 
Canal Zone and the Philippine Islands. 
ARTICLE XVII. 
Taxation. 
(1) No member of the United States forces or national of the 
United States, serving or employed in the Territory in connection with 
the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases, and 
residing in the Territory by reason only of such employment, or his wife 
or minor children, shall be liable to pay income tax in the Territory 
except in respect of income derived from the Territory. 
(2) No such person shall be licble to pay in the Territory any 
poll tax or similar tax on his person, or any tax on ownership or use 
of property which is inside a Leased Area, or situated outside the 
Territory. 
(3) No person ordinarily resident in the United States shall be 
liable to pay income tax in the Territory in respect of any profits 
derived under a contract made in the United States with the Government 
of the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, 
operation or defence of the Bases, or any tax in the nature of a license 
in respect of any service or work for the United States in connection 
with the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases. 
ARTICLE XVIII. 
Businesses and Professions. 
Unless the consent of the Government of the Territory shall have 
been obtained-
(1) No business shall be established in a Leased Area; but 
the institutions referred to i n Arti cle XIV (c), offering 
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goods, under a prohibition against re-sale, exclusively 
to the persons mentioned in the said Article XIV (1) (c), 
shall not be regarded as businesses for the purposes of 
this Article; 
(2) No person shall habitually render any professional services 
in a Leased Area, except to, or for, the Govermnent of the 
United States or the persons mentioned in Article XIV ( 1) (c). 
ARTICLE XIX. 
Forces outside Leased Areas. 
(1) United States forces stationed or operating outside the 
Leased Areas under separate agreement with the Govermnent of the United 
Kingdom or the Govermnent of the Territory shall be entitled to the same 
rights and enjoy the same status as United States forces stationed within 
the Leased Areas. 
( 2) The United States shall be under no obligation to maintain 
forces outside the Leased Areas by virtue of any such agreement. 
ARTICLE XX. 
Health Measures outside Leased Areas. 
The United States shall have the right, in collaboration with the 
Government of the Territory and, where necessary, .with the Local Auth-
ority concerned, to exercise, without other consideration than just 
compensation to private owners, if any, such powers as such Government 
and Local Authority and the Government of the United Kingdom may possess 
of entering upon any property in the vicinity of the Leased Areas for 
the purpose of inspection, and of taking any necessary measures to 
improve sanitation and protect health. 
ARTICLE XXI. 
Abandonment. 
The United States may at any time abandon any Leased Area or any 
part thereof, without thereby incurring any obligation, but shall give 
to the Government of the United Kingdom as long notice as possible and 
in any case not less than one yea:r, of its intention so to do. At the 
expiration of such notice the area abandoned shall revert to the Lessor. 
Abandonment shall not be deemed to have occurred in the absence of such 
notice. 
ARTICLE XXII. 
Removal of Improvements. 
The United States may at any time before the termination of a 
lease, or within a reasonable time thereaf'ter, take away all or any 
removable improvements placed by or on behalf' of the United States in 
the Leased Area or territorial waters. 
-150-
ARTICLE XXIII. 
Rights not to be Assigned. 
The United States will not assign or underlet or part with the 
possession of the whole or any part of any Leased Area, or of any 
right, power or authority granted by the Leases or this Agreement. 
ARTICLE XXIV. 
Possession. 
(1) On the signing of this Agreement, leases of the Leased Areas, 
substantially in the forms respectively set out in Annex II hereto, 
shall be forthwith executed, and alJ. rights, power, authority and 
control under such leases and under this Agreement (including transfer 
of possession where it shall not previously have been transferred) 
shall thereupon become effective tmmediately, and pending execution 
of such Leases they may be exercised ad interim and possession of the 
Leased Areas shall be immediately given so far as the location thereof 
is then ascertained. Where the precise location of a portion of any 
Leased Areas is not ascertainable until more detailed descriptions are 
available, possession of such portion shall be given as rapidly as 
possible. This Article shall not require occupiers of buildings in a 
Leased Area to be removed :f'ran such buildings until reasonable notice 
to vacate has been given and expired, due regard being had to the 
necessity of obtaining alternative accommodation. 
( 2) The foregoing paragraph shall not apply in relation to the 
Bahamas, but a lease of the Leased Area therein, in terms similar to 
those of the leases set out in Annex II hereto, and subject to such 
special provisions as may be agreed to be required, will be granted to 
the United States of America as soon as the location of that area shall 
have been agreed, whereupon this Agreement shall apply thereto. 
ARTICLE XXV. 
Reservations. 
(1) All minerals (including oil) and antiquities and all rights 
relating thereto and to treasure trove, upon or connected with the land 
and water comprised in the Leased Areas or otherwise used or occupied 
by the United States by virtue of this Agreement, are reserved to the 
Government and inhabitants of the Territory; but no rights so reserved 
shall be transferred to third parties, or exercised wi thin the Leased 
Areas without the consent of the United States. 
(2) The United States will permit the exercise of fishing 
privileges within the Leased Areas in so far as may be found compatible 
with military requirements, and in the exercise of its r i ghts will use 
its best endeavours to avoid damage to fisheries in the Terri tory. 
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ARTICLE XXVI. 
Special Provisions for Individual Territories. 
The provisions contained in Annex III hereto shall have effect 
in relation to the Territories to which they respectively appertain. 
ARTICLE XXVII. 
Supplementary Leases. 
The United States may, by common agreement, acquire by supple-
mentary lease for the unexpired period of the Lease granted in a 
Territory, such additional areas, sit~s and locations as may be found 
necessary for the use and protection of the Bases upon such terms and 
conditions as mS\Y' be agreed, which shall, unless there are special 
reasons to the contrary, be on the basis of those contained in this 
Agreement. 
ARTICLE XXVIII. 
Modification of this Agreement. 
The Government of the United states and the Government of the 
United Kingdom agree to give sympathetic consideration to any repre-
sentations which either may make a:f'ter this Agreement has been in :force 
a reasonable time, proposing a review o:f any of the provisions of this 
Agreement to determine whether modifications in the light of experience 
are necessary or desirable. Any such modifications shall be by mutual 
consent. 
ARTICLE XXIX. 
The United States and the Government of the Territory respectively 
will do all in their power to assist each other in giving :full effect 
to the provisions of this Agreement according to its tenor and will take 
all appropriate steps to that end. 
During the continuance of any Lease, no laws of the Terri tory 
which would derogate from or prejudice any of the rights conferred on 
the United States by the Lease or by this Agreement shall be applicable 
within the Leased Area, save with the concurrence of the United States. 
ARTICLE XXX. 
Interpretation. 
In this Agreement, unless the context otherwise requires, the 
:following expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assi gned 
to them:-
"Lease" means a lease entered into in pursuance o:f 
the communications set out in Annex I hereto, and in 
relation to any Terri tory means a lease entered into in 
respect to an area therein. 
"Leased Area" means an area in respect of which a lease 
is or will be entered into. 
''Base" means a base established in pursuance of the 
said communications. 
"Terri tory" means a part of His Majesty's dominions in 
which a lease is entered into in pursuance of the com-
munications set out in Annex I hereto; and "the Terri tory" 
means the Territory concerned. 
"The United States Authorities" means the authority or 
authorities from time to time authorised or designated, by 
the Government of the United States of America, for the 
purpose of exercising the powers in relation to which the 
expression is used. 
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"United States forces" means the naval and military forces 
of the United States of America. 
"British subject" includes British protected person. 
Signed in London in duplicate this twenty-seventh day of March, 1941. 
On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland:-
WINSTON S. CHURCKI:LL 
CRANBORNE 
MOYNE 
On behalf of the Government of the United States of America: 
JOHN G. WINANT 
CHARLES FAHY 
HARRY J. MALONY 
HAROLD BIESEMEIER 
EXCERPr FROM ANNEX II. 
FORMS OF LEASES 
1. NEWFOUNDLAND 
THIS rnDENTURE of Lease made the d~ of 
nineteen hundred and :forty-one, between His Excellency Sir Humphrey 
Walwyn, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., C.B., D.s.o., Governor an~ Commander-in-
Chief in and over the Island of Newfoundland and its Dependencies, 
in Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Newfoundland Government, 
of the first part, and the United States of America, of the other 
part: 
WHEREAS by Notes exchanged on the second d~ of September, 
nineteen hundred and forty (copies of which are appended to the 
Agreement hereinafter referred to) between His Majesty's Ambassador 
at Washington and the Secretary of State of the United States of 
America, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom undertook to 
secure the grant to the United states of America of the lease of 
certain Naval and Air bases and facilities in certain localities, 
including Newfoundland, for a period of ninety-nine years, :free :from 
all rent and charges other than compensation to be mutually agreed on 
to be paid by the United States in order to compensate the owners of 
private property :for loss by expropriation or damage arising out of 
the establishment of the said bases and :facilities; 
AND WHEREAS in furtherance of the said Notes an Agreement 
between the Government of the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America was signed on the twenty-seventh day of March,nineteen hundred 
and :forty-one; 
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AND WHEREAS in compliance with the undertaking of the Government 
of the United Kingdom hereinbefore referred to the Newfoundland Govern-
ment has agreed to demise and lease the several pieces or parcels of 
land hereinafter described; 
NOW THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH that in consideration of the 
premises the Newfoundland Govermnent hath demised and leased and by 
these presents doth demise and lease unto the United States of America 
all those six several pieces or parcels of land (hereinafter referred 
to as the Leased Areas) ~escribed in the Schedule to these presents and 
delineated on the plans hereto annexed: 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same :for the full end and term of ninety-
nine years to begin and to be computed from the date of these presents 
free :from the payment o:f all rent and charges other than compensation as 
aforesaid. 
3 Plans to these :forms of Leases not reproduced. 
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AND the United States of America agrees that it will not during 
the term hereby granted use the Leased Areas nor permit the use thereof 
except for the purposes specified and on the terms and conditions con-
tained in the aforesaid Notes and Agreement, which are incorporated in 
and form part of these presents except such parts thereof as refer 
specific~ to territory other than Newfoundland. 
SCHEDUlE 
(1) Beginning at the ~tersection of the shoreline northwest 
of Placentia with latitude 47 16' N. , thence due east approximately 
7, 300 feet to longitude 53° 58 1 18" W. ; thence in a northeaster :cy 
direction approximately 8, 200 feet to latitude 47° 17 1 12" N. , longitude 
53° 57 1 25" W.; thence in a northwesterly direction approximately 4,200 
feet to the intersection of the shoreline with longitude 53° 57 1 58" W.; 
thence along the shoreline to the point or beginning, including therein 
the Peninsula of Argentia lying between Little Placentia Harbour and 
Placentia Bay, the entire site containing approximate:cy 2,610 acres; 
there is reserved fran the foregoing all those areas, contained within 
a right-of-WS¥ of the Newfoundland Railway, its wharf, property and 
station at Argentia, as ~ be mutually determined to be essential 
to the operation of the said Railway. 
( 2) Beginning at the intersection of The Boulevarde, along 
the northwest shore of Quidi Vidi Lake, with the road approximately 
perpendicular thereto at the Rose residence known as Grove Farm Road; 
thence approximately 600 yards northwest along the road and its extension; 
thence generally north on an irregular line along, but not including, 
the southeast egde of the golf course; thence general:cy north to the 
junction of the White Hills Roads; thence southeast along the northern-
most of these roads to The Boulevarde; thence genera.l.ly southwest to 
point of beginning. 
( 3) An area about 300 feet wide on the eastern boundary of 
the m.unicipal park between The Boulevarde and the shoreline of Quidi 
Vidi Lake, the two last above described areas containing approximately 
160 acres. 
( 4) An area of approximately 700 feet by 1, 4oo feet on the 
crest o:f' the White Hill about .!. mile east of the White Hills Roads 
with a connecting strip about 6o :feet wide across the property of 
Arthur Cooke. 
( 5) Beginning at a point on the shoreline of St. George' s Bay 
eastward of the town of Stephenville andabout 1,350 feet southeast of 
· the small natural outlet of Blanche Brook, which outlet is about 
16,000 :feet northwest of Indian Head Light at the entrance of St. George 1 s 
Harbour; thence north 50° 30 1 east a distance of about 1,285 feet to a 
point on the west shoreline of Stephenville Pond at its northwest 
outlet; thence following the general westerly shoreline of Stephenville 
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Pond northeasterly to a point on said shoreline which bears north 
25° 15 1 east and is approximately 3, 700 :feet :f'rcm the last described 
point; thence north ~ 45 1 east a distance o:f 1,970 :feet to a point; 
thence ngrth 4~ west a distance o:f 4,_220 :feet to a point; thence 
south 43 west a distance o:f about 6,o50 :feet to the shoreline of st. 
George 1 s Bay (this course touches the shoreline of Blanche Brook at a 
point about 900 :feet northeast :f'rom St. George's Bay) ; thence south-
easterly :following the general shoreline of St. George's Bay :for a 
distance o:f about 5, 000 :feet to the point of beginning. 
(6) From a point at the intersection o:f the centre lines o:f 
Signal Hill Road and Middle Battery Road; thence south 44° 17' 41.3" 
east along Middle Battery Road :for a distance o:f 268.ll :feet; thence 
south 54° 9 •· 41.3" east along Middle Battery Road :for a distance of 
95.36 feet to the point which is the point of commencement; thence 
:f'rom. the point o:f commencement south 18° 39' 3" and west for a distance 
of 201.44 :feet; thence south 12° 4' 2" and west :for a distance o:f 12 
:feet; thence along the north shoreline of St. John' s Harbour southward 
and eastward for a distance o:f 1,025 :feet; thence llOrth 26° 26' 47. 57" 
ee.st :for a distance of 50 :feet to the eentre line of' Middle Battery 
Road; thence along Middle Battery Road north 5~ 5' 32.43" west :for a 
distance of 246.17 :feet; thence north 85° 57' 28.49" west for a distance 
of 182.86 feet ; thence north 73° 16 ' 50.1" west :for a distance of 165.95 
feet; thence north 55° 29' 29.31" west for a distance of 243.87 feet; 
thence north 54° 9' 41.3" west for a distance of 199.67 :feet, to the 
point of' commencement. 
The exact metes and bounds of' the property gener~ described 
in the Schedule hereto shall. with all. convenient speed be established 
by Survey conducted by the United States of' America, and shall. then be 
described and delineated in a document or documents and a plan or plans 
in duplicate, which, when agreed and signed on behalf' of the parties 
hereto, sha.ll. supersede the description contained in the Schedule hereto 
and the plans annexed hereto. One copy of each such document and plan 
shall. be retained by the United states of America and the other shall 
be deposited with the Government of Newfoundland. 
m WITNESS WHEREOF 
The Great Seal of the Island o:f Newfoundland has been affixed 
to these . presents at s·~. John' s in the Island aforesaid. 
By His Excellency's Command 
Commissioner for Home Affairs. 
And the United States of America has caused these presents to be 
executed on its behalf by 
the day and the year first above written. 
EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING NEWFOUNDLAND BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER 
OF THE UNimD KINGDOM AND THE UNimD STATES AMBASSADOR IN 
LONDON 
Mr. Winston Churchill to Mr. Winant 
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Foreign O:f'fice, March 2:7, 1941. 
Your Excellency, 
I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in signing 
this d.a¥ the Agreement concerning the lease of Bases, it is the 
intention of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland that, upon the resumption by Newfoundland of the 
consti tutiona1 status held by it prior to the 16th Febru.ary, 1934, 
the words "the Govermnent of the United Kingdom," wherever they occur 
in relation to a provision applicable to Newf'o,mdland in the said 
Agreement, shall be taken to mean, so far as Newfoundland is concerned, 
the Government of Newfoundland, and the Agreement sha11 then be 
construed accordingly. 
2. If the Government of the United States agree to this 
interpretation, I would suggest that the present Note and your 
Excellency's reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record 
the understanding of the two Contracting Governments in this matter. 
I have, etc. 
WlNSTON S. CHURCHILL 
Mr. Winant to Mr. Winston Churchill 
Embassy of the United states of America, 
London, March 27, 1941. 
Your Excellency, 
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's 
Note of todey' s date, the terms of which are as follows :-
"Your Excel!ency, 
"I have the honour to inform your Excellency 
that, in signing this day the Agreement concerning 
the lease of Bases, it is the intention of the 
Government of the United Kingdan of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland that, upon the resumption by 
Newfoundland of the constitutional status held by 
it prior to the 16th February, 1934, the words 
'the Government of the United Kingdom' wherever they 
occur in relation to a provision applicable to New-
foundland in the said Agreement, shall be taken to 
mean, so f&.J:" as Newfoundland is concerned, the Govern-
ment of Newfoundland, and the Agreement shall then 
be construed accordingly. 
"2. If the Government of the United States 
agree to this interpretation, I would suggest that the 
present Note and your Excellency's reply to that 
effect be regarded as placing on record the under-
standing of the two Contracting Governments in this 
matter." 
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2. In reply, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that 
the Government of the United States accepts the interpretation of the 
Agreement concerning the lease of Bases signed this day as set forth 
in your Excellency's Note and, in accordance with the suggestion con-
tained therein, your Excellency's Note and this reply will be regarded 
as placing on record the understanding between the two Contracting 
Governments in this matter. 
I have, etc. 
JOHN G. WINANT. 
PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND BETWEEN CANADA, . THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
PROTOCOL 
The undersigned plenipotentiaries of the Governments of Canada, 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
States of America having been authorized by their respective Governments 
to clarify certain matters concerning the defence of Newfoundland arising 
out of the Agreement signed this da\v concerning the Bases leased to the 
United States, have drawn up and signed the following Protocol:-
1. It is recognised that the defence of Newfoundland is an 
integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence, and as such is a 
matter of special concern to the Canadian Government, which has already 
assumed certain responsibilities for this defence. 
2. It is agreed therefore that, in all powers which may be 
exercised and in such actions as may be taken under the Agreement for the 
use and operation of P!lit~a- !=;tates bases dated the 27th March, 1941, in 
respect of Newfoundland, Canadian interests in regard to defence Will be 
fully respected. 
3. Nothing in the Agreement shall affect arrangements relative 
f.io the defence of Newfoundland already made by the Governments of the 
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United States and Canada in pursuance of recommendations submitted to 
those Governments by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence - United 
States and Canada. 
4. It is further agreed that in all consultations concerning 
Newfoundland arising out of Articles I ( 4) , II and XI ( 5) of the 
Agreement, or of any other Artic1es involving considerations of 
defence, the Canadian Government as well as the Government of New-
foundland will have the right to participate. 
Domin triplicate, in London, the 27th dq of March, 1941. 
On behalf of the Government of Canada: 
VINCENT MASSEY 
L. W. MURRAY 
L. B. PEARSON 
On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland: 
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL 
CRANBORNE 
MOYNE 
On behalf of the Government of the United States: 
JOHN G. WINANT 
CHARLES FAHY 
HARRY J. MA:WNY 
HAROLD BIESEMEIER 
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